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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation I examine some of the most relevant proposals of common
solutions to the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes. In order to do that, I present first
a definition of what a paradox is so that, with this at hand, I can characterize
in detail what should we expect from a common solution to a given collection of
paradoxes. Next, I look into the reasons we might have to endorse a common
solution to a group of paradoxes and some consequences are drawn with respect
to Vann McGee’s and Graham Priest’s proposals to cope with both the Liar and
the Sorites paradoxes. In the next chapters, three authors are examined in some
detail. First, Jamie Tappenden’s account is judged inappropriate, specially in the
case of the Liar paradox. With respect to the Sorites, it is showed to be at least as
problematic as Supervaluational approaches. Second, Paul Horwich’s epistemicist
proposal is examined with a special focus on the treatment of the Liar paradox.
Horwich’s account about how to construct his theory of truth is formalized and
critically discussed with the use of a fixed-point construction. In the last chapter,
I introduce and discuss some logics based on the work of Hartry Field that use
two conditionals in a language with a truth predicate and vague predicates.
RESUM
En aquesta tesi examino algunes de les propostes me´s importants de solucio´ co-
muna a les paradoxes del Mentider i la Sorites. Per tal de fer-ho, introdueixo,
primer, una definicio´ de la nocio´ de paradoxa i, amb ella, caracteritzo en detall
que` cal esperar d’una solucio´ comuna a un grup de paradoxes. A continuacio´,
considero quines so´n les raons que podem tenir per tal d’adoptar una solucio´
comuna a una coleccio´ de paradoxes i extrec algunes conclusions respecte les pro-
postes de Vann McGee i Graham Priest per fer front al Mentider i la Sorites.
En els tres cap´ıtols segu¨ents, examino tres autors en detall. Primer, rebutjo la
proposta de Jamie Tappenden per inapropiada, especialment en el cas del Men-
tider. Pel que fa a la Sorites, mostro que la teoria que Tappenden defensa e´s, al
menys, tan problema`tica com les propostes superavaluacionistes. En segon lloc,
examino la teoria epistemicista de Paul Horwich, amb especial atencio´ a la seva
aplicacio´ al mentider. A trave´s d’una construccio´ de punt fixe, formalitzo i dis-
cuteixo cr´ıticament la proposta de Horwich sobre com construir la seva teoria de
la veritat. En l’u´ltim cap´ıtol, introdueixo i discuteixo algunes lo`giques, basades
en les propostes de Hartry Field, que usen dos condicionals en llenguatges amb un
predicat de veritat i predicats vagues.
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CHAPTER
ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Truth
The investigation on the notion of truth is one of the main problems in
philosophy and also one of the oldest ones. At least since Pilate asked ‘what
is truth?’ (John, 18:38), human beings have tried to look into the nature of
truth.
As Russell (1950) sensibly stated, looking at the question ‘What is truth?’
—so as to obtain a general definition of truth— is not the same as asking
‘Which beliefs, or sentences, are true?’ —so as to obtain a general criterion
for truth. But yet, a clear answer to the former might be an invaluable help to
respond to the latter. Moreover, since often enough philosophical problems
have their roots in confusion rather than in ignorance, a theory that clarifies
the concept of truth makes easier any approach to theories containing such
concept, for it elucidates one of the sources of confusion.
The inquiry into the nature of truth has bred many different proposals.
Among the main ones it is worth mentioning the following.1
The correspondence theory of truth Inspired by Aristotle, who cryptically
defended it in his Metaphysics (Aristotle (1984, 1011b25)) and, later,
by the work of Thomas Aquinas (Aquinas (1981, Ia, Q. 16)), this is
very likely the most venerable of the theories of truth. It defends that
being true consists in corresponding to facts. Different versions of the
1For an overview of the many theories of truth present in the philosophical landscape
see, for example, Mackie (1973), Kirkham (1995), Lynch (2001), Ku¨nne (2003),
Blackburn and Simmons (2005), Burgess and Burgess (2010) or Glanzberg (2014).
1
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correspondence theory of truth have been defended in, for example,
Russell (1950) and Austin (1950).
The coherence theory of truth According to the coherence view on truth,
being true consists in being coherent with a certain given collection of
other truth-bearers. It has been defended, in different forms, in Bradley
(1914) or, more recently, in Young (1995).
The pragmatic theory of truth Pragmatists about truth think that being
true consists in being useful in practice. The pragmatic theory of truth
has been defended, specially, in the work of the American philosopher
William James (see, for instance, James (1907)).
The deflationary theory of truth According to Dummett (1959) this view
originated with the work of the German philosopher Gottlob Frege
(see, for instance, his 1918). The deflationary theory of truth defends
the view that truth is not a genuine, or robust, property, but a defla-
tionary one; this means that the truth predicate is not used to describe
anything, in the sense that truths do not share any interesting common
property. Some forms of Deflationism can even stress this point a little
further and defend that truth is not a property at all.2
Deflationists think that asserting that something is true is equivalent
to asserting this something itself, although, of course, the nature of
such equivalence may vary from one philosopher to another. Moreover,
nothing more is needed beyond this equivalence to explain all facts
concerning truth. Two of the main contemporary defenders of defla-
tionism are Paul Horwich and Hartry Field (see Horwich (1998b) and
Field (1994)). Both will be discussed in this dissertation; the former in
Chapter 6 and the latter in Chapter 7.
Any investigation into the nature of truth sooner or later has to face one
of the oldest and toughest paradoxes in Philosophy of logic and language: the
Liar paradox. In the following section I will introduce such paradox together
with some other paradoxes closely related to it.
2Dorothy Grover, for example, claims that the expressions ‘true’ and ‘false’ are pros-
entences; that is, like pronouns, they are expressions without operative meaning
unless they inherit it from other expressions. Grover has defended the Prosenten-
tial account, for instance, in Grover (1992) or Grover (2001)
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1.2 The Liar
Suppose we have a sentence λ that asserts its own untruth (I will call such
a sentence the Liar sentence or, sometimes, just the Liar):
(λ) λ is not true.
Suppose, now, that λ is true. Then, if λ is true what λ says is the case
(is not that what truth is about?); but what λ says is precisely that λ is
not true, which contradicts our initial supposition that λ is true. Thus, we
confidently conclude, by reductio that λ is not true. Unfortunately, if λ is
not true, then what λ says (that is, that λ is not true) is the case and, thus,
λ is true after all, which contradicts our previous conclusion. We suddenly
realize, then, with astonishment that we are stuck.
This is an informal presentation of the Liar paradox. The first version of
this paradox is often credited to Eubulides of Miletus (fourth century BC),
contemporary of Aristotle, and famous for his seven puzzles: the Liar, the
Disguised, Electra, the Veiled Figure, The Sorites, The Horned One and the
Bald Head (Laertius 1972, p. 237). There is still another purported version of
the paradox, though, attributed to the Cretan philosopher Epimenides (sixth
century BC); according to St. Paul’s Epistle to Titus, Epimenides said that
all Cretans were liars (Titus, 1:12).
Notice that Epimenides’ assertion is not necessarily paradoxical; actually,
in most ordinary situations it will be plainly false (for example, if there is
some Cretan who is not a liar). Its paradoxicality only arises in certain
situations that can be easily devised. Suppose, first, that a liar is a person
who has never (even unintentionally) said anything true. Consider, second,
a situation where all cretan utterances are false (except perhaps Epimenides’
one). Then, in this case, if the sentence ‘all Cretans are liars’ is true, this
very same sentence is false, for it has to be a lie (since it has been uttered by a
Cretan). But if it is false, then it is a lie and, consequently (given that the rest
of Cretan utterances are false) it is true. The distinction between Eubulides’
and Epimenides’ version of the Liar brings up one important feature of this
paradox: some sentences (like Eubulides’ one) are intrinsically paradoxical
in the sense that they can generate a paradox independently of the way the
world is; they are paradoxical in all possible worlds. On the other hand, some
sentences (like Epimenides’ one) generate paradoxes that do not depend only
on semantic stipulations, but also on empirical facts in the world.
Kripke (1975) remarks precisely this distinction when he shows the fol-
lowing way of achieving self-reference. Suppose P and Q are two predicates
of a given language that apply to sentences of that very language. Then the
sentence
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∀x(Px→ ¬Qx)
can be paradoxical if some empirical facts determine that this very same sen-
tence is the only one that satisfies P and, moreover, Q is the truth predicate.
For instance, suppose that the predicate P is the predicate ‘the sentence writ-
ten on the blackboard of room 202’. Now, depending on the way things are,
the sentence ∀x(Px → ¬Qx) can be paradoxical; it is only needed that this
very same sentence, and only it, is written on the blackboard of room 202
and that the predicate Q is interpreted as the truth predicate. That means
that utterances in which we use the truth predicate might be paradoxical
without our being aware of it. Following the habitual usage, I will call para-
doxes like this contingent Liar paradoxes and the sentences that generate
them contingent Liar sentences.
Apart from the contingent Liar paradox, there is another liar-like paradox
which is worth mentioning: the Liar Cycles paradox.3 Let me present a
version of such a paradox. Consider these three sentences:
(λ1) λ2 is true.
(λ2) λ3 is true.
(λ3) λ1 is not true.
We can now informally reason as follows. Suppose λ1 is true. Then what
it says is the case and, hence, λ2 is true, what, in turn, implies that λ3 is
true, what, finally, lets us conclude that λ1 is not true (for that is what λ2
says). So, from the supposition that λ1 is true, we reached a contradiction
and, hence, we can conclude that λ1 is not true. But if λ1 is not true, then
λ3 is true (for λ3 says, precisely, that λ1 is not true) and, hence, λ2 is true
and, consequently, λ1 is true, contradicting our previous conclusion.
It is easy to see that the Liar Cycles paradox can be constructed with any
finite cycle of sentences we like. Another preeminent feature of this paradox
is that it shows that simple self-reference is not necessary for having a Liar-
like paradox, but mere circularity is enough; even if in the last example above
there is not a sentence who directly claims its own untruth, it seems clear
that sentence λ3 is indirectly claiming its own untruth via the other two
sentences.
3This version of the Liar paradox is sometimes called Jourdain’s paradox, after the
British logician Philip Jourdain who, the myth says, was the first to introduce it.
Its version with just two sentences is usually called the Card paradox.
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It is worth introducing another Liar-like paradox, related to the Liar
Cycles paradox, intended to show that, in order to have paradoxical results,
not even circularity is necessary: Yablo’s paradox.
Yablo (1993) claims that his paradox shows that a Liar-like paradox can
be developed even in the absence of self-reference or circularity. The paradox
is the following one.
Suppose you have an infinite sequence of sentences such that any sentence
claims that every subsequent sentence is not true:
(S0) for all k > 0, Sk is not true,
(S1) for all k > 1, Sk is not true,
(S2) for all k > 2, Sk is not true,
...
(Sn) for all k > n, Sk is not true,
...
Now, we can reason informally as follows. For any n:
1. if Snis true, then for all k > n, Sk is not true,
2. that means that, in particular, Sn+1 is not true.
3. 1 also implies that for all k > n+ 1, Sk is not true,
4. but then, Sn+1 is true; contradiction.
5. Since supposing Snis true leads to a contradiction, we must conclude
that Sn is not true.
6. since n was arbitrary, we conclude, by universal generalization, that for
all k, Sk is not true.
7. Now we can end the argument by showing that, by 6, for all k > 0, Sk
is not true,
8. which implies that S0 is true; contradiction (for we showed that all
sentences were not true).
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If we really have a Liar-like paradox without circularity, then we have
shown that circularity is not a necessary condition for having a paradoxical
result. However, there is no consensus on whether Yablo’s paradox involves
some kind of circularity; Graham Priest, for instance, has defended that
the kind of paradox just sketched does involve self-referential circularity (see
Priest 1997 or Beall 2001) and, besides Yablo himself (in the aforemetioned
Yablo 1993 and also in Yablo 2004), other authors have defended that this
paradox is a genuine case of a paradox not involving circularity (see, for
example, Sorensen 1998).
I will finish this section with another semantic paradox closely related to
the Liar: Curry’s paradox.4 Let γ be a sentence, called a Curry sentence,
which asserts that if itself is true then φ, where φ is any sentence whatsoever:
(γ) If γ is true, then φ.
Suppose, now, that γ is true. Then, under this supposition, what γ says
is the case; that is, if γ is true, then φ. We can now apply Modus Ponens and
conclude, under the assumption that γ is true, φ. Since we have achieved φ
under the supposition that γ is true we can conclude, now, that if γ is true,
then φ. We realize, now, that we just proved γ itself. But if γ is the case
—as we have just proven— then γ is true. This means that we have, now,
the following two claims: first, that if γ is true, then φ and, second, that γ is
true. Finally, then, applying Modus Ponens again, we astonishingly conclude
φ. But φ was any sentence, in particular, thus, it could be a contradiction
or any false sentence (of course, though, it could also be a true sentence).
1.3 The Formal Liar
We ought to ask ourselves, now, what properties should be expected from a
truth predicate. As we will see, what characterizes truth is, above all, the
close connection there is between a sentence and its truth ascription.
Following this line of thought, a highly desirable property of a truth
predicate Tr is the so called Intersubstitutivity Principle:5
4This paradox is named after Haskell B. Curry who first presented it in his (1942).
Some authors, given the similarity of the reasoning used in the paradox with the
reasoning used in the proof of Lo¨b’s theorem have called this paradox Lo¨b’s paradox
(see, for instance, Barwise and Etchemendy 1984).
5All the desirable properties for the truth predicate in this context are implicitly
stated for non opaque contexts.
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(IP) If two sentences φ and ψ are alike except that one has a sentence χ
where the other has Trpχq, then φ ` ψ and ψ ` φ.6
Another two features we might want our truth predicate to validate are
the following ones. First, an ascent principle or truth introduction principle;
for any sentence φ:
(Tri) φ ` Trpφq.
And second, a descent principle or truth elimination principle; for any
sentence φ:
(Tre) Trpφq ` φ.
Finally, another characteristic we might expect our truth predicate to
have is expressed by the T-schema, so called after Alfred Tarski; for any
sentence φ:
(T-schema) φ↔ Trpφq
All these principles are closely related and all of them, as I said, try to
capture the close relation there is between a sentence and its truth ascription.
Notice that, if a sentence implies itself, (IP) clearly entails (Tri) and (Tre).
The other way around, though, is not the case; we may have a theory of truth
which validates (Tri) and (Tre) but which fails to validate (IP) and, hence,
fails to validate the principle of intersubstitutivity of logical equivalents.
The T-schema depends on the properties of the conditional. If the condi-
tional validates the principle ‘φ→ φ’ for any sentence φ, then (IP) will imply
the T-schema and if the logic has the principle of conditional proof (if φ ` ψ
then φ→ ψ is a logical truth), (Tri) and (Tre) will imply the T-schema. In
classical logic all such principles are equivalent and, thus, Tarski captured
all of them when he presented the T-schema (see, for example, Tarski 1944,
1983). According to him, the T-schema is a minimal material condition for
any theory of truth; the instances of the T-schema should be implied by any
characterization of the notion of truth (Tarski 1944, p. 344).
In order to arrive to a contradiction as a conclusion of the Liar paradox
in classical logic we need, on the one hand, the intuitive properties of the
truth predicate captured by the principles above and, on the other hand, we
also need a sentence that somehow says of itself that it is not true; we can
6Here, the brackets (‘p’ and ‘q’) indicate some device of canonical name formation
for sentences; thus, ‘pφq’ is just a name for the sentence φ and ‘Trpφq’ ascribes
truth to the sentence φ.
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construct such a sentence either with the use of plain self-reference (with
a sentence mentioning itself) or some kind of circularity or, finally, certain
surrogates of self-reference that are enough to create the paradox —in par-
ticular, we will show how to have a sentence that mentions another sentence
that is equivalent to the first one. Go¨del showed how to construct such a
sentence in what is usually called the Diagonal Lemma.
In order to sate and prove the Lemma, let us suppose we have a classical
first-order language L+ = L∪ {Tr} with a certain monadic predicate Tr and
suppose, furthermore, that for every formula φ ∈ L+ we can express its
canonical name pφq in L via some Go¨del codification. Go¨del (1931) showed
that, if T is a theory that can be appropriately axiomatized and contains
Robinson’s arithmetic, which is weaker than Peano’s arithmetic, then we
can have canonical names for all the expressions in the language, we can
express the syntax of the language and we can prove the following important
Lemma.7
Lemma 1.3.1 (Diagonal Lemma) If φ(x) is a formula of L+ with one
free variable, then there is a sentence δ of L+ such that T ` δ↔ φ(pδq).
Proof Let us define, first, the diagonal function, d(x), which assigns to any
formula φ(x) of L+ with one free variable the sentence which is the result
of substituting the canonical name of φ for x in φ(x); that is, d(φ(x)) =
φ(pφ(x)q). That a sentence y is the diagonalization of some formula x can
then be expressed by a formula of L+, diag(x, y). Now consider the following
sentence:
ψ(y) =de f ∀z(diag(y, z)→ φ(z))
which is a sentence with one free variable stating that if a given sentence is
the diagonalization of y, then that sentence, so to speak, has the property
expressed by φ.
We can now diagonalize ψ(y) so that its diagonalization is δ; that is,
diag(pψ(y)q, pδq). Notice now that, if δ is the diagonalization of ψ(y), that
means that, by definition of the diagonal function, δ↔ ψ(pψq) and, hence,
δ↔ ∀z(diag(pψq, z)→ φ(z)).
Again, now, if diag(pψ(y)q, pδq), then ∀z(diag(pψ(y)q, z) ↔ z = pδq).
This last equality implies, hence, ∀z(diag(pψ(y)q, z) → φ(z)) ↔ ∀z(z =
7I am simplifying the presentation of the Diagonal Lemma; I am specially loose with
the use-mention distinction. For details of a modern formulation see, for example,
Boolos, Burgess, and Jeffrey (2002) or Smith (2007). The proof here is adapted
from the latter.
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pδq→ φ(z)), because the antecedents of the conditionals at each side of the
biconditionals have been proved to be equivalent.
But we have just seen that the left-hand side of this last biconditional is
equivalent to δ and the right-hand side is just stating that φ(pδq). Hence,
we conclude δ↔ φ(pδq). 
Once we have the Diagonal Lemma it is simple to formulate the Liar
paradox. Suppose we are in T as before and that we interpret the predicate
Tr as a truth predicate (that is, T contains some axioms that make Tr into
a truth predicate for L+). That means that Tr obeys the T-schema (as it
was said before, if we are in classical logic this is just equivalent to (IP)
on the one hand and, on the other, to (Tri) and (Tre) together). That is,
for any sentence φ ∈ L+, T ` Trpφq ↔ φ. But now, using the Diagonal
Lemma and taking ¬Tr(x) as φ(x), we obtain a sentence λ ∈ L+ such that
T ` λ ↔ ¬Trpλq. It is clear now that this last biconditional together with
the λ-instance of the T-schema, Trpλq↔ λ, yield Trpλq↔ ¬Trpλq, which,
in classical logic is equivalent to Trpλq ∧ ¬Trpλq. We then conclude that
T ` Trpλq∧¬Trpλq.
It turns out that, in order to reach a contradiction, the full biconditional
of the T-schema is not needed. Montague (1963) showed that it is enough to
have one direction of it together with the rule version of the other direction.
Thus, suppose we have now an extended language L+ with a new predicate
τ and an axiomatic theory S such that, for any sentence φ ∈ L+:
(I) S ` τpφq→ φ
(II) If S ` φ then S ` τpφq
Then we reason as follows, using, again, the Liar sentence:
1. ¬τpλq→ λ (Diagonal Lemma)
2. τpλq→ λ (I)
3. λ (1, 2 and logic)
4. τpλq (II on 3)
5. τpλq→ ¬λ (Diagonal Lemma)
6. ¬λ (Modus Ponens on 4 and 5)
7. λ∧¬λ (3 and 5)
Principles (I) and (II) can be reasonably expected of notions like knowl-
edge and necessity (besides, of course, truth itself). Thus, Montague’s ar-
gument shows that paradoxicality dangerously spreads from truth to other
related notions.
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We can also formulate in a precise way Curry’s paradox, where the Diago-
nal Lemma is used to obtain a sentence γ ∈ L+ such that γ↔ (Trpγq→ φ),
where φ is any sentence of L+. Let us, then, reason as follows:
1. γ↔ (Trpγq→ φ) (Diagonal Lemma)
2. Trpγq→ (Trpγq→ φ) (γ-instance of the T-schema and logic on 1)
3. Trpγq→ φ (contraction —ψ→ (ψ→ χ) ` ψ→ χ— on 2)
4. (Trpγq→ φ)→ Trpγq (γ-instance of the T-schema and logic on 1)
5. Trpγq (Modus Ponens on 3 and 4)
6. φ (Modus Ponens on 3 and 5)
1.4 The Sorites
Another of the logical puzzles that Eubulides of Miletus held was the Sorites
paradox. The Greek word ‘sorites’ is an adjective cognate with the noun
‘soros’, which means heap. In antiquity this kind of puzzles were usually
presented in the form of a series of questions; thus, in the framework of the
disputes between the empirical doctors and the dogmatic doctors, Galen says
in his On Medical Experience:
I say: tell me, do you think that a single grain of wheat is a heap?
Thereupon you say: No. Then I say: What do you say about two
grains? For it is my purpose to ask you questions in succession, and
if you do not admit that 2 grains are a heap then I shall ask you
about three grains. Then I shall proceed to interrogate you further
with respect to four grains, then five and six and seven and eight, and
you will assuredly say that none of these makes a heap.[...] I for my
part shall not cease from continuing to add one to the number in like
manner [...]. It is not possible for you to say with regard to any one of
these numbers that it constitutes a heap. [...] If you do not say with
respect to any of the numbers [...] that it now constitutes a heap, but
afterwards when a grain is added to it, you say that a heap has now
been formed, consequently this quantity of corn becomes a heap by
the addition of the single grain of wheat, and if the grain is taken away
the heap is eliminated. (Galen, Medical Experience, XVI 2, cited in
Barnes 1982, p. 33)
Galen concludes that it is absurd to claim that a single grain determines
the existence or inexistence of a heap.8 Diogenes Laertius does not claim
8Actually, this is essentially what today is known as the Forced-March Sorites.
Suppose we are in front of a soritical series like, for example, a series of collections
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that Eubulides is the inventor of these arguments; as a matter of fact, some
authors see the origins of the Sorites paradox in Zeno’s paradox of the Millet
Seed, according to which, since a bushel of seed makes a noise as it falls to the
ground, any individual seed must also make a noise on falling; the thing is,
though, that since Zeno’s reasoning was based on principles of proportionality
rather than on soritical reasoning, it is not very likely that the Millet Seed
was the origin of the Sorites.
In the contemporary discussion on the Sorites, it is presented in the form
of an argument:
1. A man with no hairs on his head is bald.
2. If a man with n hairs on his head is bald then a man with n+ 1 heads
on his head is bald.
3. Therefore, a man with a million hairs on his head is bald.
As we will see in Section 1.5, the Sorites paradox can have many different
formulations. It can be already noted, though, that the argument above needs
only a little amount of logical resources; the only rules that it requires are
universal instantiation and Modus Ponens.
The possibility of constructing this paradox is one of the preeminent fea-
tures of the vague predicates. More specifically, what is in the core of the
Sorites is what Wright (1975, p. 333) calls tolerance. We can find in vague
predicates a certain tolerance with respect to their application to objects
which differ only in some small changes in the relevant aspects. For instance,
in the example presented above, small differences in the number of grains do
not make any difference to the application of the predicate ‘heap’. The para-
dox arises because large changes in the relevant aspects do make a difference
to the application of vague predicates, large changes that can be achieved via
of grains of wheat such that each member of the collection has just one grain more
than the previous one, and suppose that the series begins with a single grain (a
clear case of not being a heap) and ends with a collection of 106 grains of wheat
(a clear case of being a heap). In a Forced-March Sorites we are asked to imagine
an idealized subject S who is prompted to answer the question ‘is this collection
of grains of wheat a heap?’ for each of the members of the series in ascending
order. Then, S’s first answer will surely be ‘No’ (or something equivalent) and we
would expect of S to stick to this answer, since a grain of wheat does not make any
difference for being a heap or not. But there must be a point in which S answer
has to change, unless she wants to be answering ‘No’ to the question ‘is a collection
of 106 grains of wheat a heap?’. The term was first introduced in Horgan (1994);
see also Keefe (2000, p. 25).
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a big number of small ones. Tolerance can be represented by some tolerance
relations which would relate the objects that differ very little with respect to
the relevant aspects used in the formulation of the paradox; thus, for exam-
ple, in the case of the predicate ‘heap’, the tolerance relation, call it R, we
used in Galen’s example is, for any collections of grains of wheat a and b:
Rab iff b has one grain more of wheat than a
Another one of the main features of vague expressions is the existence
of borderline cases; cases in which it is not clear if the term applies or not.
Thus, for example, it seems that no conceptual analysis nor any empirical
investigation can settle whether a 1.8 meter man is tall or not. Thus, for
instance, Max Black, in his (1937), defines the vagueness of a predicate as
“the existence of objects concerning which it is intrinsically impossible to
say either that the [predicate] in question does, or does not, apply” (Black
1937, p. 430). Saying that it is intrinsically unclear whether a given pred-
icate applies or not to an object means that if we cannot determine if the
predicate applies or not to the object is due to the very semantic nature of
the predicate, not to some external condition. Horwich, as we will see in
chapter 6, similarly thinks that the existence of borderline cases is the main
feature of vague predicates; according to him, in front of a given ascription
of a vague predicate F to an object which is a borderline of F we are not
disposed to accept such ascription nor its negation and, moreover, we do not
think further investigation will help solve the matter.
Finally, vague predicates also lack sharp boundaries; not only between the
clear cases and the clear countercases, but also between the clear cases and
the borderline cases, and between the clear cases and the borderline cases of
the borderline cases, and so on. This phenomenon is known as higher-order
vagueness and is another of the main features of vague expressions.
So we can see that the existence of higher order vagueness, borderline
cases, tolerance and the Sorites paradox gives a precise enough idea of what
a vague predicate is.
1.5 Forms of the Sorites
The Sorites paradox comes in many ways.9 We can follow Barnes (1982,
p. 30) and notice that, in order to construct a paradox of vagueness with a
given vague predicate P, it is sufficient to have an ordered series of objects
a1, a2, . . . an such that Pa1, ¬Pan and such that all adjacent objects in the
9In this section I am loosely following Hyde (2011, 2014).
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series must be related by the tolerance relation; that is, for each 0 ≤ i < n,
ai and ai+1 must be indiscriminable with respect to the application of P; in
terms of the tolerance relation R for P, for each 0 ≤ i < n, Raiai+1. Although
these conditions will do for now, in chapter 2 I will defend that they are
sufficient, but not necessary.
We already mentioned the form of the paradox that uses just Modus
Ponens; for a given vague predicate P and a series of objects a1, a2, . . . an
satisfying the conditions stated in the previous paragraph the following is an
schematic representation of what is sometimes called the Conditional Sorites:
Conditional Sorites
1 Pa1
2 If Pa1 then Pa2
3 Hence, Pa2
4 If Pa2, then Pa3
5 Hence, Pa3
...
2n− 2 If Pan−1, then Pan
2n− 1 Hence, Pan.
In this formulation we are presupposing that the adjacent objects in the
soritical series satisfy the tolerance relation, which could have been made
explicit. This version of the paradox can also be formulated with a bicon-
ditional instead of a conditional (clearly, the right to left directions of the
conditionals above are uncontroversial). Following this, Priest (2010a, p. 73)
defends that the Sorites paradox formulated with the material biconditional
is the best way to capture the tolerance of vague predicates; to capture toler-
ance, according to Priest, we need the ascriptions of the predicate to adjacent
objects in the series to have the same truth value. And there is nothing more
to tolerance than that.10
Dummett (1975) presents another version of the paradox that is specially
virulent; we can formulate the paradox using phenomenological predicates
like, for instance, ‘looks red’. Take, for example, a soritical series of patches
of colors indistinguishable between them such that begins with a clearly red
10We will come back to this issue in chapter 4, section 4.2.
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patch (a1) and ends with a clearly yellow patch (an). In this case, we can
consider the relation
Rxy iff x and y look the same color
which, in this case, makes reasonable to allow substitution of x and y in
the predicate ‘looks red’ when Rxy and, thus, we can formulate the paradox
without any appeal to conditionals:
Phenomenological Sorites
1 a1 looks red
2 Ra1a2
3 Ra2a3
...
n Ran−1an
n+1 Hence, an looks red.
In the same line, we can also formulate the paradox using identity (see
Priest 1991, 2010b). Suppose we have a color soritical series as in the previous
example. Let bi be ‘the phenomenological look of ai’ (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n). Then,
in this case, using transitivity of identity and the fact that, for each 1 ≤
i ≤ n, bi = bi+1, we can easily conclude that b1 = bn; that is, that the
phenomenological look of a clearly red patch is equal to the phenomenological
look of a clearly yellow patch.
The paradox can also be formulated using the idea that vague predicates
do not determine sharp boundaries between the objects to which they apply
and the objects to which they do not apply:
No-Sharp-Boundaries Sorites
1 Pa1
2 ¬(Pa1 ∧¬Pa2)
3 Hence, Pa2
4 ¬(Pa2 ∧¬Pa3)
5 Hence, Pa3
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...
2n− 2 ¬(Pan−1 ∧¬Pan)
2n− 1 Hence, Pan.
Notice that, in classical logic, the Conditional Sorites and the No-Sharp-
Boundaries Sorites use equivalent sentences, but that they not need be equiv-
alent in other logics.
We can use some more logical resources, in particular, universal instanti-
ation:
Induction Sorites
1 Pa1
2 ∀x(Pax → Pax+1)
3 Hence, Pan
The same can be schematically represented with an explicit use of the
tolerance relation:
1 Pa1
2 ∀x((Pax ∧Raxax+1)→ Pax+1)
3 Hence, Pan
The second premise is usually called the inductive premise. In the same
way that the Induction Sorites relates to the Conditional Sorites, we can
formulate the No-Sharp-Boundaries paradox using the existential quantifier:
∃-No-sharp-boundaries Sorites
1 Pa1
2 ¬∃x(Pax ∧¬Pax+1)
3 Hence, Pan
Again, we could have explicitly used the tolerance relation.
We can also present the same paradox in a way that stresses the pressure
that the Sorites paradox puts on accepting the existence of sharp boundaries
between the extensions (that is, the objects to which the predicate applies)
and the anti-extensions (that is, the objects to which the predicate does not
apply) of vague predicates:
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Line-drawing Sorites
1 Pa1
2 ¬Pan (n > 1)
3 ∀x(Pax ∨¬Pax)
4 Hence, there is a z (1 ≤ z < n) such that Paz and ¬Paz+1
In the reasoning underlying this formulation the Least Number Principle
is used11 (which, in classical logic, is equivalent to the Induction Principle).
Traditionally, the small changes used to characterize tolerance are dis-
crete. This does not mean, though, that a continuous version of the paradox
cannot be stated. Weber and Colyvan (2010) present a continuous version
of the Sorites paradox, which I am going to sketch in the following.
Given a vague predicate P, we can consider the real-number interval [0, 1]
partitioned in the following way:
A = {x ∈ [0, 1]|P(x)}
B = {x ∈ [0, 1]|¬P(x)}
with the following restrictions:
(i) A and B are non-empty
(ii) 0 ∈ A,
(iii) 1 ∈ B,
(iv) for each x ∈ A and each y ∈ B, x < y,
(v) for each x, y ∈ [0, 1], if x < y and ¬P(x), then ¬P(y) (and its contra-
positive).
That is, A is the left-hand side of the interval [0, 1] and B is its right-
hand side. The properties of R guarantee that A has a least upper bound in
[0, 1], call it sup A and also that B has a greatest lower bound in [0, 1], call
it inf B. Now, tolerance of P allows us to conclude that P(sup A). This is so
11The least number principle states that every non-empty set of natural numbers
has a least element. That is, if the range of the quantifiers is the set of natural
numbers N and Φ is a formula that expresses a given subset of N, then the Least
Number Principle claims that ∃nΦ(n)→ ∃n(Φ(n)∧∀x(x < n→ ¬Φ(x))).
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by what Priest (2006) calls the Leibniz continuity condition; the idea is that
if something is going on as close as we wish to a given limit point, then it is
also going on at the limit point. Of course this is not valid generally, but it
can be taken to be a generalization of tolerance applied to discrete cases. For
the same reason, we can conclude ¬P(inf B). Now we can reason as follows.
If sup A , inf B, then, by the fact that R is linearly ordered, we either
have that sup A < inf B or inf B < sup A. Given that the reals are dense
(that is if x, y ∈ R are such that x < y, then there is a z ∈ R such that
x < z < y) there will be either a z1 ∈ R such that sup A < z1 < inf B, or
a z2 ∈ R such that inf B < z2 < sup A. But notice that, by definition, for
each x, if either x > sup A or x > inf B, then ¬P(x) and, for each x, if either
x < inf B or x < sup A, then P(x). It follows then that P(zi) and ¬P(zi)
(1 ≤ i ≤ 2).
Hence, sup A = inf B. But then, since, by tolerance, P(sup A) and
¬P(inf B), we conclude P(sup A) and ¬P(sup A). Contradiction.
1.6 Vagueness
Some, if not most, of the predicates we use every day in natural languages
are vague; expressions like ‘bald’, ‘rich’, ‘tall’, ‘red’,... are vague predicates
in the sense specified in section 1.4. Among the theories of vagueness that
have been proposed in the endeavor to clarify such phenomenon and solve
the Sorites paradox it is worth to take into account the following.12
Supervaluationist approaches Supervaluationists think the origin of vague-
ness is in the language and they manage to retain classical logic while
accepting truth-value gaps; they can achieve that with the use of Van
Fraassen’s (see his 1966) semantics, which is not truth-functional, ap-
plied to vagueness. Supervaluationists defend that the second premise
in the Induction Sorites is false and, hence, the argument is not sound;
equivalent strategies can be found with respect to the other verions
of the paradox. The view originated with Fine (1975) and has been
defended, among others, in Keefe (2000).
Many-valued approaches These theories, like Supervaluationist accounts,
see the vagueness as a semantic phenomenon, but they preserve truth-
functionality. Some authors defend semantics with three truth-values,
12For an overview of how philosophical research has struggled to cope with vague-
ness see, for example, Williamson (1994), Keefe and Smith (1997), Keefe (2000),
Sorensen (2001), Graff Fara and Williamson (2002), Dietz and Moruzzi (2010),
Ronzitti (2011) or Sorensen (2016).
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like, for example, Hallde´n (1949), Ko¨rner (1960) or, more recently, Tye
(1994) and Field (2003c). On the other hand, other philosophers have
proposed semantics with infinitely many truth-values, like, for exam-
ple, Zadeh (1975), Machina (1976) or Smith (2008). These proposals
typically defend that some of the premises in the Sorites arguments are
not true (how far away of truth they are depends on the theory).
Epistemicist approaches Epistemic theorists claim that vagueness is a type
of ignorance. They retain full classical logic, which commits them to
the existence of sharp cut-off points to the application of vague predi-
cates; that means that, according to this view, there will be a unique
precise point at which a bald man becomes not bald. Consequently, as
in the case of Supervaluationism but for different reasons, the second
premise in the Induction Sorites is false. Different versions of epis-
temicist approaches have been defended by Cargile (1969), Campbell
(1974), Sorensen (1988, 2001), Horwich (1997, 2005b) and, in its most
sophisticated stance, by Williamson (1994). This last author claims
that the view can be traced back to the stoic logicians, in particular to
Chrysippus (Williamson 1994, chapter 1).
Both the Liar and the Sorites are some of the most venerable and sturdiest
paradoxes in philosophy of logic and philosophy of language. We can take the
Line-drawing formulation of the Sorites as showing that this paradox might
not be so hard as the Liar, because its conclusion (that vague predicates
have sharp boundaries) would be less hard to accept that the conclusion of
the Liar paradox (see Field 2008, chapter 5). However, the soritical paradox
involves a kind of predicates that are pervasive in natural languages, which
makes the vagueness paradoxes, in a sense, more dangerous than the Liar.
1.7 This Dissertation
If we consider all the schematic forms of the Sorites paradox presented in the
previous section, it seems natural to expect a unified solution for all of them.
The reason for that seems to be that they use the same characteristic of vague
predicates, its tolerance, in order to achieve an unacceptable conclusion; thus,
all of them point at some tension in what we are willing to accept with respect
to vague predicates. This seems a good enough reason to expect a unified
solution for all of them.
Similarly, most of the philosophers working on paradoxes of self-reference
think that Liar-like paradoxes (like the Liar, of course, but also like the Liar
Cycles paradox or Yablo’s) and Curry’s paradox are consequences of the
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same underlying phenomena and that, consequently, they should be treated
in the same way (see, for instance, among many others, Field 2008, Gupta
and Belnap 1993 or Zardini 2011).
In principle, the Liar and the Sorites seem totally unrelated paradoxes;
on the one hand, self-reference (in some or other fashion) seems to play a
crucial role in the former but not in the latter and, on the other hand, truth
does not seem to be a vague predicate. Nevertheless, some authors have
tried to offer a common solution to both kinds of paradoxes. The aim of this
dissertation is to explore the some of such proposals.
In order to do that, I will look, in chapter 2, into the nature of the notion of
paradox and I will present a new characterization of that notion, more general
than the traditional one. Next, in chapter 3, I will explore what should
be expected, first, from a solution to a given paradox and, second, from a
common solution to more than one paradox. Besides, some consequences
regarding Vann McGee’s account will be drawn. In chapter 4 I will look into
the reasons we might have to expect a common solution to a given collection
of paradoxes. Moreover, I will examine Graham Priest’s proposal with a
view to illustrate the discussion around the notion of a common solution to
different paradoxes. Next, three approaches will be examined in some depth:
Jamie Tappenden’s in chapter 5, Paul Horwich’s in chapter 6 and Harty
Field’s in chapter 7.
CHAPTER
TWO
THE NOTION OF PARADOX
Traditionally, an argument has been considered a paradox if, and only if:
(i) it is an apparently valid argument,
(ii) it has apparently true premises, and
(iii) it has an apparently false conclusion.
This view can be found, for instance, in Quine (1966), Cave (2009) or
Cook (2013), among many others. As far as I can see, though, the traditional
characterization of the notion of paradox is just too narrow; the conditions
listed above are not necessary for being a paradox.
In this chapter I want to show that the traditional characterization does
not apply to a certain kind of arguments that are problematic in essentially
the same way as arguments that do fit the traditional characterization of
being a paradox. Hence, the traditional characterization fails to capture
whatever these two kinds of arguments have in common. In the last sections,
I will offer and evaluate a more general characterization of the notion of
paradox that includes both the arguments that satisfy the traditional one and
those arguments that, even if not satisfying it, are problematic essentially in
the same way.
2.1 A Minor Point
Before showing that the clauses in the traditional definition are not necessary,
let me make one minor point regarding this definition. As it stands, the
traditional definition can easily be understood in a way that does not provide
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us with jointly sufficient conditions for being a paradox. Notice that, in the
traditional characterization, it is used the word ‘apparently’ (see, for example,
Priest 2006, p. 9, Lo´pez de Sa and Zardini 2007, p. 246 or Soames 1999, p. 50)
to convey the idea that, since a paradox seems to be a valid argument with
true premises and false conclusion and that is something that is not possible,
some of these have to be just apparent. There is some sense, though, in which
an argument can be apparently valid which is not meant when characterizing
what a paradox is. The following would be a schema of an argument that is
apparently valid in some reasonable sense of ‘apparently’:
Argument 1
P1 If Paris is in Egypt then it is in Africa;
P2 Paris is not in Egypt.
C Hence, Paris is not in Africa.
The fact that Denying the Consequent is a fallacy shows that any ar-
gument following the structure above must be somewhat appealing, which
means that, at least in some sense, it must be apparently valid.
We can also consider the more interesting case provided by the follow-
ing argument, used by the psychologist Johnson-Laird in Johnson-Laird and
Savary (1999):
Argument 2
P1 One of the following claims is true and the other is false:
– if there is a King in the hand of cards, then there is an Ace,
– if there is not a King in the hand of cards, then there is an Ace;
P2 There is a King in the hand of cards.
C Hence, there is an Ace in the hand of cards.1
1In the experiment, Johnson-Laird presented the premisses of the argument to
the participants and asked what, if anything, followed from them. 100% of the
participants draw the erroneous conclusion that there were an ace in the hand of
cards (Johnson-Laird and Savary 1999, p. 208). I take that to show that they
would have accepted the argument above as valid.
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Although this argument is not valid, most of the people, as showed by
Johnson-Laird and Savary (1999), considered it as valid. So this argument
is another apparently valid argument in a relevant sense of being apparently
valid. But this is not the sense intended in the characterisation of what a
paradox is. It might be slightly better to use the following definition. An
argument is a paradox if, and only if:
(i) it is an intuitively valid argument,
(ii) it has intuitively true premises, and
(iii) it has an intuitively false conclusion.
In the sense used here, an intuitively valid argument is an argument such
that, declaring it invalid, implies giving up strong intuitions about logic. The
idea is that when we accept arguments 1 and 2 above as valid we are just
making a mistake and, once we realise that, we are willing to deny their
validity; thus, the arguments do not challenge our basic intuitions about
logical validity. That is why they do not count as paradoxes according to the
last definition.
But that is not what happens when we are in front of a paradox; in
these cases, even though we realize that there is something wrong, we are yet
not willing to deny the validity of the arguments involved, precisely because
denying it would imply giving up some of our core intuitions about validity.
That is why we say that a paradox do challenge our understanding of validity.
The same happens with the other conditions of the traditional character-
ization. Thus, the premises of a paradox are intuitively true in the sense that
their being not true would violate some of our core intuitions with respect
to some of the concepts involved in them, and the same can be said about
the intuitive falsehood of the conclusion. In the first case, then, if we solve
the paradox by claiming that some of its premises are not true, our previ-
ous acceptance of their truth cannot be explained by a simple mistake; and
analogously with respect to the falsehood of the conclusion in the second
case. In other words, to change our mind with respect to the truth value
of the premises (or the conclusion) we need to throw away some of the core
intuitions of some of the concepts involved in the paradox.
2.2 The Traditional Definition
As we have just seen, thus, the traditional definition of the notion of paradox
is the following one:
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Definition 1. A paradox is an intuitively valid argument with intuitively
true premises and an intuitively false conclusion.
As I said, Definition 1 is too narrow. Let’s see now why. I will offer one
argument that is a paradox but that does not satisfy Definition 1: Curry’s
paradox. Suppose we have a Curry sentence γ, which is a sentence that
asserts that if itself is true then snow is white. Then, given the T-schema,
the following sentence is certainly true:
(1) Tpγq↔ (Tpγq→ snow is white)
and so is this weaker one (its left-to-right direction):
(2) Tpγq→ (Tpγq→ snow is white)
Now we can apply contraction (the principle that says that from any
sentence of the form ‘A→ (A→ B))’ you can infer ‘A→ B’) and obtain:
(3) Tpγq→ snow is white
Again, by the right-to-left direction of (1) we get:
(4) (Tpγq→ snow is white)→ Tpγq
And now we have almost finished. Apply Modus Ponens to (3) and (4)
and get
(5) Tpγq
Finally, we just have to apply Modus Ponens again to (3) and (5) and
conclude that snow is white. Notice now that according to Definition 1,
the argument above is not a paradox, for the conclusion achieved is not
unacceptable. I claim that the argument just presented, though, is a paradox.
In general, the argument above could have been presented with a variable
ranging over sentences in the position of ‘snow is white’; then, it would not
have been a paradox properly, but an schema whose instances would have
been arguments. My claim is that, independently of the interpretation of
the sentence variable in the Curry’s sentence, all instances of the schema
would have been paradoxes. But, since A could have been a true sentence,
we conclude that we will have paradoxes, as the one offered above, with
true and acceptable conclusions, which means that these paradoxes will not
satisfy Definition 1.
Let us present, next, another counterexample to Definition 1 which also
shows that it is too narrow. Consider, for example, the following argument,
where Alice is 100 cm tall and William is 200 cm tall:
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Argument 3
1. Alice is tall, (premise)
2. if Alice is tall, so it is someone who is 1 cm shorter, (premise)
3. someone 1 cm shorter than Alice is tall, (logic)
4. if someone who is 1 cm shorter than Alice is tall, so it is someone who
is 2 cm shorter than Alice, (premise)
...
151. if someone who is 149 cm shorter than Alice is tall, so it is someone
who is 150 cm shorter than Alice, (premise)
152. hence, William is tall. (logic)
According to Definition 1 this is not a paradox; for it would only be
a paradox, a Sorites paradox, in situations where Alice was tall (so that
the premises would be intuitively true) and William was not (so that the
conclusion would be intuitively false). My point is that, even when Alice
is not tall or William is tall, the argument is still a paradox. Hence, the
conditions stated in Definition 1 are not necessary conditions.
At this point, somebody could try to defend Definition 1 replying that the
arguments just presented (the Curry’s argument where the Curry’s sentence
is build using ‘snow is white’ or the Sorites argument where Alice is not tall
or William is) are not paradoxes —so that they are not valid counterexam-
ples to Definition 1—, but something different, although closely related to
paradoxes. Let’s call them, say, pathodoxes (from pathos and doxa, a kind
of ill-formed opinion). The complain might go on by saying that the tra-
ditional characterization was not intended to characterize pathodoxes, but
only paradoxes.
I do not think, though, this distinction helps the proponent of Definition
1; after all, the diagnosis of the problem that a paradox poses or the problem
that a pathodox poses must be the same, and the solution too. That means
that the phenomena underlying both kinds of arguments are the same and
that research involving both paradoxes and pathodoxes helps enlighten the
notions involved in them in the same way. Even more, when we are in front
of a paradox we have the feeling that there is something wrong, a feeling
which constitutes what it is like to be in front of a paradox. This feeling is
the same in front of any Curry’s case, regardless of whether the conclusion is
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acceptable or not; it’s just that when the conclusion is not acceptable, this
feeling might be more pressing.
In any case, if we really have to differentiate between these two notions —
arguments that satisfy Definition 1 and what I’ve been calling pathodoxes—,
then I claim that I am just interested in characterizing a notion that includes
both. I think this discussion, thus, is just a mere linguistic conundrum.
Hence, when I use the expression ‘paradox’ I will be thinking of this more
general notion. Moreover I will call the arguments that fit the traditional
characterization traditional paradoxes. A pathodox, then, will be an argu-
ment that shares the phenomenological character of traditional paradoxes
and that does not satisfy Definition 1.
2.3 Arguments and Premises
Before continuing let me discuss a variation of the Definition 1 that, although
it is eventually prey of necessity problems, it is worth examining in some
detail. This discussion will offer us some insights into what kind of entity a
paradox is.
Lycan (2010) proposes to understand the following characterization of the
notion of paradox:
Definition 2. A paradox is an inconsistent set of [sentences], each of
which is very plausible. (Lycan 2010, p. 618)2
According to Lycan, a paradox is typically obtained by putting together
the premises and the negation of the conclusion in a set, so that the result
is an inconsistent set (because of the paradoxical argument) with plausible
sentences as elements (Lycan 2010, p. 617).
We must be careful, though, about the way we individuate the premises
of a given argument. One possibility is to understand that an argument is
a non-empty set of truth-bearers (for our purposes, sentences) with a (pos-
sibly empty) subset which is the set of premises and a member which is the
conclusion. Often, paradoxes like The Liar or Curry’s are presented as hav-
ing no premises (see, for instance, Visser 1989, p. 621). If it were the case,
then, according to Definition 2, the Liar paradox and Curry’s paradox using
Trpλq∧ ¬Trpλq in the Curry’s sentence would look exactly the same, that
is just a set with the negation of the conclusion (for there are no premises):
2Lycan formulates his definition in terms of propositions. I understand, though,
that the discussion in this chapter is independent of the nature of the truth-bearers.
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{¬(Trpλq∧¬Trpλq)}
They are clearly different paradoxes, though. Hence Definition 2, if we
understand premises this way, would make the Liar paradox and Curry’s
paradox using Trpλq∧¬Trpλq in the Curry’s sentence indistinguishable.
Of course, what happens in these cases is that there are some meta-
premises that are used in the metalanguage in which we present the paradox
and that are assumed in the argument. These meta-premises might be ex-
pressed in the object language by having, for example, in the case of the Liar
paradox, Robinson’s arithmetic (so that we can prove the Diagonal Lemma
and, hence, have the necessary surrogate of self-reference) and all the in-
stances of the T-schema of all the sentences in the language. Thus, in this
case, if Q is Robinson’s arithmetic and T is the T-schema (or some way of
generating it), then the Liar paradox, according to Definition 2, might look
like this:
{Q,T,¬(Trpλq∧¬Trpλq)}
Notice, though, that, as before, we must be careful, for in the case just
presented the Liar paradox would be again indiscernible from the Curry’s
paradox using Trpλq∧¬Trpλq in the Curry’s sentence.
Hence, we need to generalize the way we construct paradoxes beyond
just putting together the premises and the negation of the conclusion. That
is what Lycan (2010) seems to have in mind when he represents the Liar
paradox as the following inconsistent set:
{¬Trpλq, Trpλq}
This set would be a paradox because the Liar reasoning would make very
plausible both that the Liar sentence is true and that it is not. Notice
that Lycan does not think that the premises usually kept implicit in the
metalanguage should be put explicitly in the representation of the paradox,
for it would be “very unnatural” (Lycan 2010, p. 621) and we would have
“different versions depending on exactly how the ultimate premises were
formulated” (Lycan 2010, p. 621). That is why, says Lycan, we should weaken
Definition 2 in the following way:
Definition 2’. A paradox is an inconsistent set of sentences, each of
which is very plausible in its own right or has a seemingly conclusive
argument for it. (Lycan 2010, p. 621)
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Hence, in the case of Curry’s paradox, Curry’s argument must serve as
a “seemingly conclusive argument” if we want that paradox to be a paradox
at all. Notice now that Curry’s paradox with, for instance, 2+ 2 = 5 in the
Curry’s sentence, should be something close to the following (where Γ is the
set of premises, whatever they might be):
{Γ,¬(2+ 2 = 5)}
Then, though, if it is a paradox at all, it must be the case that Curry’s
reasoning is a seeming conclusive argument for 2+ 2 = 5. If this is the case,
though, Definition 2’ becomes trivial; any inconsistent set of sentences would
be a paradox. This is so because any inconsistent set of sentences would
be such that all its members would have a seemingly conclusive argument;
that is, its Curry’s reasoning. This is a general problem that any account of
the notion of paradox that defends that a paradox is a certain inconsistent
set of sentences must face.3 That is, if Curry’s paradox is to be a paradox
at all and it is conceived as an inconsistent set of plausible or seemingly
true sentences, then the Curry’s reasoning must be what gives plausibility
or makes seem true at least one of the sentences. But then any inconsistent
set {A1, A2, . . .An} will count as a paradox, for each Ai will be shown to be
plausible or seemingly true because of the Curry’s argument using Ai in the
Curry’s sentence.4
As a matter of fact, if we look into the examples taken above —like
the Liar paradox and Curry’s paradox using Trpλq∧¬Trpλq in the Curry’s
sentence—, we can see that what differentiates the Liar from Curry’s paradox
are neither the premises nor the conclusion, but the proof than connects
them.
That is why it seems much better to suppose that when we say that a
paradox is an argument, what we mean is that a paradox is a proof (which,
on the other hand, is what is usually meant with ‘argument’). And we can
think of proofs as series of sentences such that each sentence is either accepted
on non-logical grounds (and these will be the premises), or it follows from
logic possibly together with some previous sentences on the series. The last
sentence, then, is the conclusion.
3See, for instance, Rescher (2001, p. 6), Horwich (2010b, p. 226) or Schiffer (2003,
p. 68).
4Incidentally, this line of reasoning also applies to characterizations of the notion
of paradox that defend that a paradox is a single sentence or proposition (see, for
instance, Sainsbury 2009, p. 1) such that we have good reasons both for accepting
it and denying it. In that case, Curry’s reasoning would imply that any sentence
such that we have good reasons for denying it would be a paradox.
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In any case, even if these problems were overcome, Lycan’s Definition
2, as I said, falls prey of the same problems as Definition 1, for Lycan is
supposing that the premises are acceptable and the conclusion is not (so
that its negation is). Then, again, the Curry’s paradox that uses ‘snow is
white’ in the Curry’s sentence might look something close to the following
(where, as before, Γ is the set of premises):
{Γ, snow is not white}
which clearly does not count as a paradox according to Lycan’s proposal
because, although it is an inconsistent set, not all of its members are plausible.
So, as in the case of Definition 1, Lycan’s Definition 2 does not offer necessary
conditions for being a paradox.
2.4 The Logical Form
One possible and, at first sight, natural alternative characterization of the
notion of paradox could be stated along the following lines:
Definition 3. A paradox is an intuitively valid argument whose logical
form can be used to derive an intuitively unacceptable conclusion from
intuitively acceptable premises.
According to this definition, Argument 3 is a paradox even when Alice is
tall, for an argument with the same logical form could be used to get a false
conclusion from true premises. And the same with Curry’s paradox using a
true sentence to build Curry’s sentence.
Definition 3, though, is too broad, for compare the following two argu-
ments:
Argument 4
1. 2 is a natural number, (premise)
2. if a number is a natural number, so it is its successor, (premise)
3. hence, 20564 is a natural number. (logic)
Argument 5
1. 2 grains of sand do not form a heap, (premise)
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2. if n grains of sand do not form a heap, neither do n+ 1 grains of sand,
(premise)
3. hence, 20564 grains of sand do not form a heap. (logic)
which have the same logical form.
Now, according to Definition 3, since Argument 5 allows us to infer an
intuitively unacceptable conclusion from intuitively acceptable premises and
since Argument 4 and 5 share the same logical form, we should claim that
Argument 1 is a paradox, which is not the case. Clearly the paradoxicality
of Argument 5 does not depend solely on its logical form, but also in certain
properties of the predicate ‘heap’.
2.5 A First Attempt
Another way out of this situation has been proposed by Lo´pez de Sa and
Zardini (2007):
Definition 4 What really seems to be of the essence [of a paradox] is
that, despite the apparent validity of the argument, the premises do not
appear rationally to support the conclusion (Lo´pez de Sa and Zardini
2007, p. 67)
This definition, though, is unclear in a way that could result in, again,
being too broad. Consider the following argument:5
Zebra Argument
1. This is a zebra, (premise)
2. if this is a zebra, then it is not a cleverly disguised mule, (premise)
3. this is not a cleverly disguised mule (logic)
In some reasonable sense of not rationally supporting, the Zebra Argument
just introduced is an intuitively valid argument (is an instance of Modus
Ponens) such that the premises do not appear rationally to support the
conclusion. This argument is a prototypical case of an argument that begs
the question. It seems that the Zebra Argument begs the question because
someone who does not accept the conclusion will deny the evidence that
supports 1 —for instance someone who thinks, precisely, that what seems a
zebra is a disguised mule.6
5Tanks to Manuel Pe´rez Otero for suggesting this example.
6The locus classicus for the discussion on the notion of begging the question is
Jackson (1984).
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My point is that if we understand the notion of not rationally supporting
as something on the lines of not giving the right kind of reason —which is
usually taken to be one of the features of begging the question arguments;
see Sinnott-Armstrong (2012, p. 179)—, something that can be typically
tested in terms of not succeeding dialectically, then Definition 4 is too broad.
For arguments like the Zebra Argument, which are not paradoxical, will
count then as cases in which the premises do not rationally support the
conclusion. Even more, plain circular arguments are also arguments such
that the premises do not rationally support the conclusion in the sense just
stated:
Circular Argument
1. snow is white (premise)
2. snow is white (logic)
A proponent of Definition 4 could reply now that the Zebra Argument
and the Circular Argument are paradoxes, in particular, they are some kind
of pathodox. It should be noticed, though, that circular arguments do not
share the phenomenology of paradoxes; in front of them we do not feel the un-
comfortableness we feel when we are in front of a paradox. Let me elaborate
that to see why circular arguments are not pathodoxes.
Take, for instance, a pathodoxical Sorites like the one presented in section
6.4.12, with true premises and true conclusion, and take, also, the Circular
argument. Notice that both are intuitively valid arguments in the sense
stated before; declaring them invalid would require giving up core intuitions
of the notion of logical validity. On the other hand, in each of them, in virtue
of their validity, if I believe its premises I ought to believe its conclusion.
This can be stated in terms of commitment; in both the pathodoxical Sorites
and the Circular argument, if a subject believes the premises then she is
committed, in virtue of the fact that she believes the premises and the validity
of the argument, to believe the conclusion. The crucial difference between the
pathodoxical Sorites and the Circular argument is that, when in front of the
former I do not want to have to believe the conclusion in virtue of the validity
of the argument and the fact that I believe the premises; the commitment
makes me uncomfortable. In contrast, in the case of the latter, I am willing
to believe the conclusion in virtue of the validity of the argument and the
fact that I believe the premises; I embrace the commitment willingly. The
same happens with arguments that beg the question like the Zebra argument;
if I believe the premises and I accept the argument as valid, I embrace the
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commitment to the conclusion willingly. This is why we should not consider
arguments like the Circular argument or the Zebra argument as paradoxes.
We can conclude, hence, that Definition 4 is too broad, for circular argu-
ments satisfy it and, as we have just seen, circular arguments are crucially
different from traditional paradoxes and pathodoxes.
2.6 The Notion of Paradox
Nevertheless, the characterization given by Lo´pez de Sa and Zardini (2007)
seems to follow the correct track. We may try to refine it by making more
precise what do we mean when we say that, when we are in front of a paradox,
the premises do not rationally support the conclusion.
We have seen that what differentiates traditional paradoxes and patho-
doxes on the one hand from begging question and circular arguments on the
other, is the fact that we are only willing to accept the commitment that
follows from the intuitive validity of the argument in the latter case. As a
matter of fact, something stronger can be said. Consider, again, a patho-
doxical Sorites with true premises and a true conclusion; we have seen that,
in this case, we are not willing to accept the commitment that stems from
it. Suppose now that a given subject S who accepts the conclusion, does
not accept it in virtue of the argument. If we are not willing to accept the
commitment that the pathodox generates, then we will not be willing to ac-
cuse S of having done something wrong. But, in this situation, we are not
only unwilling to accuse S of having done something wrong, but we believe
that S would have done something wrong had she believed the conclusion
in virtue of the argument. Consider now the following principle regarding
commitments:
(C) If there is a commitment to accept the conclusion of an argument in
virtue of its validity and the acceptance of its premises, then a sub-
ject that accepts the conclusion in virtue of the argument is not doing
anything wrong.
Then, since, as we just saw, in front of a pathodoxical Sorites we believe
that a subject who believes its conclusion in virtue of the argument is doing
something wrong, (C) implies that there is no commitment implied by the
pathodoxical Sorites. This can be generalized to any paradoxical argument
and, hence, any paradoxical argument is such that when we reflect on the
notion of commitment and on how a subject should behave in front of a
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paradox we realize that there is no commitment to accept the conclusion in
virtue of its validity and the acceptance of the premises.7
Compare this situation with our discussion of traditional paradoxes and
Definition 1 in section 6.4.12. We said that, in front of a traditional paradox
we see that, although the argument seems valid, it should not be, because
it has true premises and a false conclusion. We captured this situation by
stating that the argument is intuitively valid, the premises are intuitively
true and the conclusion is intuitively false; in the sense that denying any of
these claims would involve giving up some core intuitions of either validity
or some of the key notions in the argument.
We are now in front of a similar situation. Traditional paradoxes and
pathodoxes are intuitively valid arguments —and, hence they make us com-
mit to the conclusion in virtue of accepting the premises— such that they
should not be, because the commitment should not be there. Similarly, in the
case of Definition 1 and traditional paradoxes, the conclusion was not true
but it should have been true, in virtue of the validity of the argument and
the truth of the premises. As I just said, we claimed then that the conclusion
was intuitively not true. So, applying the same strategy now, we can capture
the situation posed by a paradox by stating that the argument is intuitively
valid but, intuitively, there is no commitment.
Let us try to spell this out. The idea is that if a given set of premises
Γ imply a sentence δ and a subject S believes this implication, then the
following is the case:
(*) if S believes Γ then S is committed, in virtue of the fact that she believes
Γ, to believe δ.
Now we can present the following definition of the notion of paradox:
Definition 5 A paradox is an intuitively valid argument such that, in-
tuitively, (*) fails; that is, intuitively, someone can believe the premises
while not being committed, in virtue of believing the premises, to the
conclusion.
Hence, when in front of a paradox, we are not committed, intuitively, to
believe the conclusion in virtue of our belief in the premises when we do
believe the premises.
We can try to make this idea more precise and present it in a more com-
pact way with the notion of normative requirement as used in Broome (1999).
Broome defines normative requirements as relations between propositions. I
will follow Broome in writing
7Thanks to Dan Lo´pez de Sa for raising this point.
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p requires q
in order to say that p normatively requires you to q. A consequence of p
requiring q is that you ought to see that if p is the case so is q. We can
abbreviate this as follows:
O(p→ q)
Valid arguments are cases of normative requirements; if a given set of
premises Γ imply a sentence δ we say that believing each sentence in Γ
normatively requires believing δ (using ‘B’ for ‘you believe that’):
BΓ requires Bδ
and, hence,
O(BΓ→ Bδ)
Broome understands the conditional in the characterization of the notion
of normative requirement as the material conditional (Broome 1999, p. 2).
This has as a consequence that the behavior of the material conditional (and
classical logic) is inherited by the notion of normative requirement, with all
its virtues and, more significantly in the present case, with all its defects;
hence, any argument that has some contradiction in the premises or that has
a valid sentence as conclusion will constitute a normative requirement, even
if the premises and the conclusion are not related in any way.
More importantly, if we rephrase Definition 5 in terms of Broom’s ma-
chinery, that is,
Definition 5* A paradox is an intuitively valid argument such that,
intuitively, does not constitute a normative requirement.
then a paradox is an argument such that, intuitively, you do not ought to see
that if it is the case that you believe the premises then it is the case that you
believe the conclusion. That means that, if Γ and δ are the set of premises
and the conclusion of a paradox, respectively, then
¬O(BΓ→ Bδ)
and, hence,
BΓ does not require Bδ
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But if we understand the conditional in the characterization of the no-
tion of normative requirement as a conditional material, then any Curry’s
reasoning that uses a valid sentence as Curry’s sentence, or even some trivial
arithmetic sentence —that is, any sentence that we ought to believe— will
not constitute a paradox, for it will be a normative requirement; thus, in the
latter case, for instance, if δ is a valid sentence it will be the case that
O(BΓ→ Bδ)
independently of which sentences are in Γ. But, having in mind this broad
sense of the notion of paradox we are trying to characterize, a Curry’s paradox
with a valid sentence in the Curry’s sentence is still a paradox, for it has the
characteristic phenomenology of being in front of a paradox. One way to see
this could be to imagine someone trying to convince a non believer in the
Law of Excluded Middle of the validity of this law using Curry’s reasoning.
That is why, if we stick to definition 5* we must understand the condi-
tional in the characterization of the notion of normative requirement,
O(BΓ{ Bδ),
meaning, at least in the case of theoretical reasoning, that you ought to see
that if it is the case that you believe the premises then it is the case that you
believe the conclusion, in virtue of your believing the premises.
Therefore, the idea behind Definitions 5 and 5* is that in front of a para-
dox there are two confronting strong appearances that make us reconsider
some of our basic intuitions of some of the concepts somehow or other in-
volved in the paradox. On the one hand, the rules that constitute our logic
lead us to consider the paradox as a valid argument. But on the other hand,
when we reflect on the commitments that follow from our acceptance of the
premises, we realize that we are not willing to recognize it as constituting a
normative requirement.
Definitions 5 and 5*, thus, can be seen as a generalization of Definition
1. In the latter case the conclusion of the paradox was something that we
were not willing to accept, typically, a contradiction. Similarly, in the former
case we also have something that we are not willing to accept, namely, the
fact that a certain intuitively valid argument intuitively does not constitute
a normative requirement. As a matter of fact, since constituting a normative
requirement is a necessary condition of being a valid argument, we are then
in front of a (higher-order) contradiction.
We can not only consider Definitions 5 and 5* as generalizations of Def-
inition 1, but we can also see that what has to be expected of a solution to
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a paradox with respect to the latter definitions is the same as what has to
be expected with respect to the former one. Therefore, as we will see in the
next section, solving a paradox in the sense defended in this text amounts
to essentially the same as solving a paradox in the traditional sense; that is,
either denying some of the premises, or accepting the conclusion or, finally,
denying the validity of the argument.8
2.7 Two Consequences
According to Definition 5 (or 5*), solving a paradox must involve at least
one of the following claims.
First, in what can be called a type 1 solution, we may show that the
argument is not valid. In this case, it would be immediately explained why
believing the premises does not commit you, in virtue of your belief in the
premises, to believe the conclusion; or, put in another way, it does not con-
stitute a normative requirement. Ideally, we should be able to explain why,
pace the fact that the argument is not valid, it is intuitively valid, so why we
should abandon the intuitions about validity that are involved in its being
intuitively valid and why they are so compelling.
On the other hand, in a type 2 solution we may defend the validity of
the argument. In this case, we claim that, since the argument is valid,
believing the premises commits you, in virtue of believing them, to believe
the conclusion; or, more succinctly,
O(BΓ{ Bδ)
and hence, that their not being a normative requirement, the failure of com-
mitment to the conclusion, must be just an illusion. This illusion would be
prompted, according to type 2 solutions, by the fact that we are offered a case
of an argument in which the premises are intuitively true and the conclusion
is intuitively false. The situation can be described as follows. From
1. OBΓ and O¬Bδ
you conclude
2. ¬O(BΓ{ Bδ)9
8See, for instance, Sainsbury (2009, p. 1).
9The principles needed in this inference are (where → is the material conditional):
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What a proponent of a solution of type 2 would say is that it is this
inference what explains why we think that a paradox is an intuitively valid
argument such that it is not a normative requirement. Then, what type 2
solutions would show is that 1 is not the case, because either ¬OBΓ (because
some of the premises are not true) or OBδ (because the conclusion is, after
all, true) and, thus, we do not have to conclude 2 and, consequently, we can
accept the validity of the argument.
This characterization has a somewhat unexpected consequence. In order
to adopt a type 2 solution you need to have been confronted to a paradox
that fits Definition 1 (i.e. the traditional characterization) for, if not, you
will not be able to identify the truth of the premises and the falsity of the
conclusion as the culprits of your impression that the paradoxical argument
does not constitute a normative requirement. In other words, if you are in
front of a paradox for the first time, and the paradox is one of the examples
we have seen like the Curry’s paradox with a true sentence in the Curry’s
sentence, your first impression will be to blame the logic, not the truth value
of the truth-bearers involved in the argument.
I think this is phenomenologically accurate. It would be very difficult
to blame the inductive hypothesis in a Sorites argument that proceeds, say,
from true premises to a true conclusion although we would still have the
impression that the argument does not constitute a normative requirement.
2.8 Two Objections
In this last section I want to look at two possible problematic issues that can
arise with respect to Definitions 5 and 5*.
First, let us see a reply that a proponent of Definition 1 could give in
response to Curry’s paradox. Recall that we showed that Curry’s paradox
with a true sentence in the Curry’s sentence was a counterexample to Defi-
nition 1. At this point a defendant of Definition 1 could say that when we
use a certain sentence A when formulating Curry’s paradox the unacceptable
conclusion we achieve is not A but that A follows from the premises in the
Curry’s reasoning.10 We would still have, then, an intuitively valid argument
with intuitively true premises and an intuitively false conclusion (namely,
O(α→ β)→ (Oα→Oβ)
O¬α→ ¬Oα
which seem perfectly reasonable, and the fact that O(BΓ{ Bδ)→ O(BΓ→ Bδ).
10This seems to be how Cook (2013, p. 11) understands Curry’s paradox.
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the claim that A follows from the premises in Curry’s argumentation). This
reply seems to work with true sentences like ‘snow is white’; that is, if we
run Curry’s paradox with ‘snow is white’ in the Curry’s sentence and we
conclude ‘snow is white’, we can read the paradox as concluding that ‘snow
is white’ follows from the premises in the Curry’s reasoning. Since this last
claim seems intuitively false, Definition 1 is vindicated.
But notice that, even granting that understanding of Curry’s paradox,
we can also build a Curry’s paradox using a logically valid sentence or a true
arithmetical sentence, say, B. Then even if we understand Curry’s paradox as
having as conclusion that B follows from its premises, such conclusion will no
longer be intuitively false, but plainly true; for, in the case of B being a valid
sentence, it will follow from the premises in the Curry’s reasoning (in fact, it
will follow from any premises) and in the case where B is a true arithmetic
sentence, since arithmetic is present in the premises to prove the Diagonal
Lemma (at least in some of the ways to formulate Curry’s paradox), B will
follow from them.
In conclusion, even assuming that some Curry’s paradoxes can be under-
stood in a way such that they are no longer counterexamples to Definition
1, we still can, with the use of logically valid or true arithmetical sentences,
devise other Curry’s paradoxes that are.11
The second question I want to address has to do with the Preface paradox.
The Preface paradox, first introduced by Makinson (1965), asks us to consider
an author of an academic book who, in the preface of the book, throws a
caveat to the reader about the errors that the book surely contains. At the
same time, though, she is committed to each of the assertions in the book.
Thus, on the one hand she believes that each assertion made in the book, say
a1, a2, . . . , an, is true but, at the same time, given the knowledge of her own
fallibility, also believes that the conjunction of all the assertions in the book
is false; that is, a1 ∧ a2 ∧ . . . ∧ an is false and, hence, ¬(a1 ∧ a2 ∧ . . . ∧ an) is
true. This can be represented in the following way (using ‘B’ for ‘the author
believes that’):
(i) Ba1, Ba2, . . ., Ban (that’s because the author believes all her claims in
the book to be true)
(ii) B¬(a1 ∧ a2 ∧ . . . ∧ an) (that’s because the author is aware of her own
fallibility)
And if we accept now the principle of agglomeration,
11Thanks to Sven Rosenkranz for suggesting this objection.
2.8. Two Objections 38
(Agg) (Ba1∧Ba2)→B(a1 ∧ a2)
then from (i) we can conclude B(a1 ∧ a2 ∧ . . . ∧ an). Hence, the author has
inconsistent beliefs; in particular, if we suppose that B¬φ implies that ¬Bφ
we have a plain inconsistency: B(a1 ∧ a2 ∧ . . .∧ an)∧¬B(a1 ∧ a2 ∧ . . .∧ an).
Consider now, having in mind the situation described above, the following
argument:
Adjunction Argument
1. a1, . . . an (premises)
2. a1 ∧ a2 ∧ . . .∧ an (logic)
which seems to be a perfectly harmless argument. According to Definition
5, though, the instance of the Adjunction argument given by the situation
described in the Preface paradox will be a paradox; for, then, believing the
premises does not commit us, in virtue of believing them, to believe the
conclusion —that’s precisely what the Preface paradox shows; you can believe
all the premises while you believe the negation of the conclusion. But even if
a1, a2, . . . , an are the assertions in the author’s book, the resulting instance of
the Adjunction Argument is not a paradox; it is just a harmless application
of adjunction (the principle according to which φ,ψ ` φ ∧ ψ). What this
means, then, is that Definition 5 is too broad; some arguments that are not
paradoxes are declared as paradoxes.
Notice, though, that the fact that the logical form of an argument seems
innocuous does not mean that the argument is. Consider a soritical paradox
like Argument 5 in section 2.4; its paradoxical status did not depend on its
logical form —which was shared by the trivial arithmetical Argument 4—,
but on certain properties of the notions involved in the argument. The case
is similar with respect to the instance of the Adjunction Argument where
a1, a2, . . . , an are the assertions in the author’s book. In this case, the argu-
ment is a paradox, even if its logical form can be instantiated by perfectly
sound arguments. Its paradoxical status, though, stems from certain prop-
erties of the sentences in the argument, not from its logical form.12
12Thanks to Elia Zardini for suggesting this objection.
CHAPTER
THREE
SOLVING PARADOXES
Once we have stablished what a paradox is, we need to look now at what
should be expected from a common solution to a given collection of para-
doxes. In this chapter I will introduce a distinction between the diagnosis of
a paradox and its prevention in order to illuminate what a solution both to
a single paradox and to a group of paradoxes should be.
In the final part of this chapter I will examine the consequences that
clarifying what a common solution should be will imply for a well known
proposal to deal with vagueness and truth; Vann McGee’s.
3.1 Solving One Paradox
In the previous chapter we have seen that a paradox is an intuitively valid
argument such that, intuitively, does not generate the kind of commitment
we would expect it to generate. This characterization was seen as a gener-
alization of the traditional one and, besides including traditional paradoxes,
also included what I called pathodoxes.
We have also seen some features we should expect from a solution to a
given paradox. We distinguished between the following two kinds of moves
towards solving a paradox, which are essentially the same as in the case of
the traditional view:
Type 1 The argument is not valid.
Type 2 The argument is valid and, hence, the lack of commitment must be
an illusion. Such an illusion is explained away by showing either that
some of the premises are not true or that the conclusion is not false.
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I claim that any solution to a given paradox must involve one of these
two strategies. For convenience, in the discussion below I will distinguish
between type 2p solutions, where it is defended that some of the premises are
not true, and type 2c solutions, where it is defended that the conclusion is
not false.
Other taxonomies for distinguishing between different kinds of solutions
have been proposed. I will discuss two of them that will help illustrate and
develop my own proposal. First, Cook (2013) claims that we can try to solve
a paradox by rejecting some of its premises not because of their falsity, but
on the grounds that some of the concepts involved in the argument are “inco-
herent or faulty in some other manner”(Cook 2013, p. 20). Moreover, claims
Cook, the incoherence involved in the argument might explain, not only of
the rejection of some of the premises, but also the rejection of the reason-
ing involving the faulty concept. He calls this option the reject-the-concept
strategy. The reject-the-concept strategy is different from just rejecting some
premise (Cook calls this strategy the reject-the-premises strategy) or rejecting
the validity of the argument (the reject-the-reasoning strategy), says Cook,
because
we are, on [the reject-the-concept strategy], not merely saying that a
particular premise is false or that a particular logical move is mistaken,
but we are instead claiming that the premise or inference is somehow
nonsensical or incoherent since it involves a nonsensical or incoherent
concept. (Cook 2013, p. 20)
As an illustrative example, Cook considers Aristotle’s view with respect
to Zeno’s Dichotomy paradox. The following is a reconstruction of such
paradox as Aristotle presents and discusses it in his Physics (Aristotle 1984,
239b, 263a):
The Dichotomy
1. Moving from a point a to a point b necessarily requires performing an
infinite number of tasks in a finite time. (premise)
2. It is impossible to perform an infinite number of tasks in a finite time.
(premise)
3. Moving from a point a to a point b is impossible. (logic)
Now, according to Cook, merely rejecting some of the premises would
consist in, for instance, claiming that the Dichotomy is just a valid proof
of the claim that it is possible to perform an infinite number of tasks in a
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finite time (that is, that the second premise is false). This, though, would
be different, claims Cook, from Aristotle’s chosen strategy, the reject-the-
concept strategy:
As a result, Aristotle rejected the first premise of Zeno’s argument,
but his objection to this premise is different from the sort of move
involved in an application of the reject-the-premises strategy. Aristotle
rejected this premise not because he thought it was false, but because
he thought that Zeno’s reasons for accepting this premise were based
on an incoherent understanding of infinity. (Cook 2013, p. 26)
The reason why Aristotle rejected the first premise in the Dichotomy was
rooted in his distinction between actually infinite collections and potentially
infinite collections. The latter are sequences of objects that can always be
extended although, at any step in the construction, they are always finite.
According to Aristotle the notion of a potentially infinite collection was a
coherent one. By contrast, an actually infinite collection contains all its
infinite members at once, or at the “same time”, and Aristotle claimed that
such a notion was incoherent. Now, the first premise in the Dichotomy was
rejected by Aristotle because it was justified by the incoherent notion of
actual infinity.
Even granting Cook’s characterization of Aristotle’s view,1 it is hard to
see why the reject-the-concept strategy is relevantly different from the reject-
the-reasoning and the reject-the-premises strategies; rejecting as incoherent
one of the concepts involved in the paradox is just one of the reasons, prob-
ably among many others, that might be adduced to reject the premise or
reject the validity of the argument. Thus, Cook’s distinction is confusing
a strategy to solve a paradox with a reason to follow a certain strategy.
1This reconstruction seems to be, at the very least, incomplete. Aristotle defended,
as far as we know, a kind of equivocation view about Zeno’s Dichotomy. Accord-
ingly, ‘infinite’ would be an ambiguous expression between the notions of actual
infinity and potential infinity. Then, if we resolved the ambiguity in favor of the
former we would reject the first premise while accepting the second one and, if we
resolved the ambiguity in favor of the latter, we would reject the second premise
while accepting the first one. In Aristotle’s own words:
Therefore to the question whether it is possible to pass through an infinite number
of units either of time or of distance we must reply that in a sense it is and in a
sense it is not. If the units are actual, it is not possible; if they are potential, it is
possible. (Aristotle 1984, 263b3)
Aristotle’s view is discussed in, for example, Cajori (1915), Vlastos (1967) or
Booth (1957). A general discussion of Zeno’s paradoxes is offered in Salmon (2001).
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As I see it, according to Cook’s reconstruction, Aristotle is just offering a
reject-the-premise solution to the paradox; he is proposing to reject the first
premise, on the grounds that its truth can only be justified by an incoherent
understanding of infinity.
It might be argued, though, that declaring a premise false or non true is
not the same as declaring a premise nonsensical, and that Cook’s distinction
serves us to point at this. The objection might proceed by noting that
a characterization like, for example, Type 2 above, would not capture a
situation where the premise is rejected in virtue of involving a nonsensical
concept. In order to respond to this objection, though, it is enough to read
the negation in the expressions ‘not valid’ and ‘not true’ in the Type 1 and
Type 2 clauses above as an exclusion negation (call it ‘note’), so that a
nonsensical sentence (argument) is note true (valid).
Of course, these considerations show that any solution to a given paradox
will have to include an explanation of why the argument is not valid (for type
1 solutions), why some of the premises are not true (for type 2p solutions) or
why the conclusion is not false (for type 2c solutions). Even more, a solution
to a given paradox should be able to explain, not only what is deceiving us
and why it is deceiving us, but also why it is so compelling. Thus, in the case
of a type 1 solution, it has to be able to show why the argument is intuitively
valid, that is, why the intuitions that rejecting the validity of the argument
make us abandon are so compelling. And, similarly, with respect to type 2
solutions; they have to be able to explain away the intuitive truth (falsity)
of the problematical premises (the conclusion).
In his (2003), Stephen Schiffer has proposed another taxonomy for distin-
guishing between different ways to solve paradoxes that is worth mentioning.
He claims that paradoxes can have a happy-face solution or an unhappy-
face solution, which, in turn, can be weak or strong. A happy-face solution,
according to Schiffer,
would do two things: it would identify the odd guy(s) out —that is, it
would tell us that the paradox-generating propositions weren’t really
incompatible or else it would identify the ones that weren’t true, and
then it would explain away their spurious appearance so that we were
never taken in by them again. (Schiffer 2003, p. 5)
The happy-face category contains the type 1 and the type 2p sorts of
solutions; either we claim that the argument is not valid (“the paradox-
generating propositions weren’t really incompatible”) or that some of the
premises are not true (“it would identify the ones that weren’t true”). Notice
that hitherto Schiffer ignores what I am calling the type 2c kind of solution
(the reject-the-conclusion strategy, according to Cook).
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More interestingly, Schiffer describes another kind of solution to a para-
dox, the unhappy-face solutions:
An unhappy-face ‘solution’ is simply an explanation of why the para-
dox can’t have a happy-face solution, and this explanation will appeal
to an irresolvable tension in the underived conceptual role of the con-
cept, or concepts, generating the paradox. (Schiffer 2003, p. 6)
Besides, claims Schiffer, an unhappy-face solution can be either weak or
strong:
A weak unhappy-face solution shows that a paradox-free concept can
be fashioned to do the work we expected from the paradox-generating
concept, whereas a strong unhappy-face solution shows that no such
paradox-free variant is possible. (Schiffer 2003, p. 6)
The characterization of unhappy-face solution prompts, as we will see,
very interesting points that we need to have in mind in order to propose a
solution to a paradox, but it does not seem to characterize any proper kind
of solution different from the ones already considered (as he himself seems to
admit when encloses the word ‘solution’ between quotation marks).
The notion of an unhappy-face solution can be read, as far as I can see, in
two ways. First, we can understand that Schiffer is considering some meta-
claim regarding the fact that no solution can be offered in front of a paradox
and, hence, such meta-claim is not adding anything to any taxonomy on
solutions. Second, Schiffer’s unhappy-face solutions can be understood as
some special cases of type 2c solutions, where we accept the conclusion and,
hence, we endorse what Schiffer calls the ‘irresolvable tension’ in some of
the concepts involved in the paradox; this would be the case, for instance,
in some of the most virulent paradoxes, like the Liar, where accepting the
conclusion means accepting a contradiction. In either way, Schiffer taxonomy
is not adding anything new to the type 1 and type 2 classification.
Nevertheless, the distinction Schiffer draws between weak and strong
unhappy-face solutions brings up an important point that cannot be ignored.
When in front of a paradox, we can ask ourselves how the concepts involved
in it will be changed by the solution in order to avoid the paradoxical result.
These changes might involve some of the concepts explicitly present in the
paradox, or some other concepts that might not appear explicitly like, for
example, the notion of logical validity. As Schiffer claims, once these changes
have been made we can check whether the resulting concepts can be properly
considered as mere revisions of the old ones or rather they represent a deeper
change in the understanding of such concepts.
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These last considerations are what Charles Chihara, in his (1979), tries
to capture with what he calls the prevention of a paradox.
At least since Tarski,2 philosophers have thought of paradoxes as being
analogous to illnesses. This analogy makes it natural to call the kinds of
strategies described in the Type 1 and Type 2 clauses the diagnoses of a
paradox (Chihara 1979, p. 590). But, as Chihara notices, this cannot be
all; we also need to be able to devise, when necessary, safe paradox-free
environments for the concepts involved in the paradoxes. The prevention of
a paradox, thus, is the logico-semantic frame we need to adopt in order to
block the paradox.
As Chihara claims, the diagnose of a paradox and its prevention are
independent, in the sense that having found one of them does not imply
having solved the other. As I see it, only the diagnose is a necessary condition
for having a solution to a paradox; that is so because, in some cases, the
prevention might not be needed. We need to issue a caveat here; I want to
stress the fact that a solution to a paradox might not prompt the necessity of a
prevention. For example, epistemicist solutions to the Sorites (like Horwich’s
one in chapter 6) typically endorse classical logic to deal with vague predicates
—as a matter of fact, they take preserving classical logic as one of their
main advantages— and do not need any change in the language or in the
logic. In this sense, the prevention is not needed and, since epistemicists
still are putting forward a solution, this means that having a prevention is
not a necessary condition for being a (full) solution to a paradox. I could
have presented this situation differently and claimed that, although offering
a prevention is a necessary condition for having a solution, such a prevention
might be vacuous, in the sense that the prevention consists in the logico-
semantic frame we already had. I do not see any important point hanging
on these two different ways of introducing diagnoses and preventions. But in
connection to that it is important to notice that although in general having
a prevention is not necessary in order to being able to offer a solution to
a paradox, in a particular case it might be; if the diagnose of a solution
implies the necessity of a prevention and the solution does not offer it, then
the solution will be incomplete. I am leaving the characterizations of the
diagnostic and the prevention of a paradox somewhat vague. I do not think
they can be made much more precise; in any case, I expect that the examples
we will see throughout this dissertation will help enlighten them.
In sum, a solution to a paradox must offer a diagnose of the paradox,
which will consist of declaring the argument not (or, if you prefer, note)
valid, in which case we will have a type 1 solution, or of declaring the argu-
2“The appearance of a [paradox] is for me a symptom of disease”(Tarski 1969, p. 66)
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ment valid, in which case we will have a type 2 solution. In turn, when the
argument is declared valid, either we can show that some of the premises are
not (note) true or that the conclusion is not false.
Besides the diagnostic of a given paradox, a solution might have to offer
a prevention of the paradox in question, which will consist of a safe paradox-
free environment. The proposal of this section can be represented by figure
3.1 below.
Solution to
a paradox

1. Diagnostic

1.1. Who?

1.1.1. The argument
is not valid (Type 1 solution)
1.1.2. Some premise
is not true (Type 2p solution)
1.1.3 The conclusion
is not false (Type 2c solution)
1.2. Why?
1.3. Why is it compelling?
2. Prevention
Figure 3.1
3.2 Solving more than One Paradox
Let us turn now to what features should we expect from a common solution
to a given set of different paradoxes.
Think of a screwdriver; it can be used to fix, say, an electrical problem
and a plumbing problem. Would we say, though, that the screwdriver is
a common solution to both problems? We may say it, but it would be
hardly illuminating; anyway, it is not this sense of ‘common solution’ that
I have in mind; rather, I want to be able to see that the paradoxes can be
solved by a common solution because the phenomena underlying them have
something in common. And it is this something in common that the solution
should point at. That seems to be part of the diagnostic problem posed
by a paradox; the diagnose should give us the feature (or features) of the
concepts involved in the paradox that are responsible for the deception in
the paradoxical argument.
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This does not mean, of course, that, given a paradox A and a paradox B,
a common solution to both paradoxes must offer exactly the same diagnose.
As a matter of fact, if the paradoxes are different enough, this will hardly be
the case. Notice that even in the case of the Sorites paradox, a solution that
would be of type 2p with respect to the Induction Sorites, would be of type
1 with respect to the Line-drawing Sorites.
So, which factor of the diagnose must be shared by the different paradoxes
to which a given solution is supposed to be common? I think that the natural
answer here is 1.2 in figure 3.1; for a solution to be a common solution to a
certain group of paradoxes it must offer a common reason about why there
is a deception in the paradoxes, whether in some of the premises, in the
conclusion or in the validity of the argument. Any solution to a paradox will
involve the necessity of rejecting some well entrenched and strong intuitions
governing some of the concepts involved in the paradox. A common solution
to a collection Γ of paradoxes must offer a common reason why we must
reject these strong intuitions (that will very likely involve different concepts in
different paradoxes) concerning the members of Γ. I do not see, in principle,
that the reason why the deception is compelling should also be common,
although it might be natural to expect so.
Let us see another example. Consider the following four paradoxes:3
1. A conditional Sorites with the predicate ‘bald’,
2. a line-drawing Sorites with the predicate ‘bald’,
3. a phenomenological Sorites with the predicate ‘looks red’,
4. the Liar.
Now, consider the following claims:
(i) 1 and 2 should have different solutions.
(ii) 1 and 3 should have different solutions.
(iii) 1 and 4 should have different solutions.
We would very likely reject claim (i) out of hand, because it seems clear that
1 and 2 should both have a common solution. With respect to claim (ii), we
might not want to reject it out of hand but, still, we would be expecting some
explanations why 1 and 3 do not have a common solution. Finally, we would
3Thanks to Dan Lo´pez de Sa for suggesting this example.
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probably be inclined to accept claim (iii) and we would expect further reasons
to deny it. As far as I can see, the best way to explain our reactions to claims
(i)-(iii) is the fact that we expect a common solution to give a common reason
for paradoxicality. Thus, we think it is very unlikely that the reasons of the
paradoxicality behind 1 and 3 could be different in one case and another, so
that is why we would not accept claim (i). Moreover, it might be the case
that there were something crucial in the phenomenological character of 3
that made plausible that the root of its paradoxicality was different from the
root of 1’s paradoxicality; that is why we do not reject claim (ii) immediately,
although we expect some explanations. These explanations should provide
us with good arguments to expect that the reason why 1 is paradoxical is
different from the reason why 3 is paradoxical. Finally, we do not think, in
principle, that 1 and 4 share the reason why they are paradoxes and, hence,
that is why we would not expect, at first sight, a common solution to both
of them. So these examples suggest that, as I said, for a solution to be a
common solution to a certain group of paradoxes it must offer a common
reason about why there is a deception in the paradoxes.
What about the prevention of the paradoxes? Should a common solution
to a certain group of paradoxes offer the same prevention to all of them? In
answer to that question I propose to distinguish between a strong common
solution and a weak common solution. A strong common solution to a group
of paradoxes will offer a unified diagnose and a unified prevention; that is, it
will point to some features of some of the concepts involved in the paradoxes
that will explain the source of the paradoxicality and it will offer a unified
paradox-free model for such concepts. A weak common solution to a group
of paradoxes will just offer a unified diagnose.
It is clear from what has been said that the only necessary condition to
have a common solution is to have a unified diagnose. As Mark Colyvan puts
it: “we want to treat the disease, not merely the symptoms” (Colyvan 2009,
p. 35).
In the next section I am going to use the characterization of common
solution we have discussed so far in order to argue that the approach in
McGee (1991) is not a common solution to the Liar and the Sorites.
3.3 Van McGee: Truth as a Vague Notion
3.3 The Sorites in Partially Interpreted Languages
McGee (1991) uses partial predicates in order to cope with vagueness and,
hence, explain away the Sorites paradox. Suppose you have a first order
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language L to which you want to add a partially defined predicate P not
present in L and suppose that L+ = L∪ {P}. A partial interpretation, then,
is an ordered pair 〈M, Γ〉 such thatM is a model for L and Γ is a first-order
theory in L+. M fully interprets L while P is left uninterpreted. Γ is to be
understood of as the theory that specifies the meaning of P.4
Then, according to McGee, a sentence φ of L+ is definitely true under
the partial interpretation 〈M, Γ〉 (in symbols 〈M, Γ〉 |= φ) if, and only if, it
is true in any expansion of M to a model of Γ. Accordingly, φ is definitely
untrue if, and only if, 〈M, Γ〉 |= ¬φ. An expansion of a first order model is
obtained by adding new symbols to the language and specifying the references
of these new symbols while leaving unchanged both the meaning of the old
symbols and the domain of the model. In McGee’s own words, 〈M, Γ〉 |= φ
if, and only if
φ will come true under any method for assigning references to the
remaining symbols which makes the sentences in Γ all come out true.
(McGee 1991, p. 150)
Thus, in the case we were considering, Γ will determine which interpre-
tations of P are admissible, that is, the ones that make true all sentences in
Γ.
If we apply these ideas to vague predicates, what we obtain is, essentially,
Supervaluationism. As I said in page 17 Supervaluationism is a view about
vagueness that was first developed in Fine (1975) using some work in van
Fraassen (1966). We will see in some detail Supervaluationism in chapter 5,
but let us now see the basics of it.
Suppose that the predicate we want to introduce inL is a vague predicate,
say, ‘bald’. Then, Γ would be the set of sentences governing the meaning of
‘bald’. Γ would contain sentences that would determine which of the objects of
the domain are clear cases of being bald and which are clear cases of not being
bald; it would also contain sentences like ‘if somebody with n hairs is not bald,
then somebody with n+ 1 hairs is not bald either’, and so on. All the possible
expansions of M to a model of Γ, then, would be all possible admissible
ways —in the sense of making true all sentences in Γ— of making completely
precise ‘bald’. Supervaluationists call these expansions ofM precisifications.
Although Fine (1975) considered the precisifications as primitive, McGee, as
we have seen, considers the theory Γ governing the predicate as primitive and
defines admissible precisifications in terms of it. In chapter 5 we will wee how
Jamie Tappenden also considers the sentences governing the meaning of the
predicate, which he calls preanalytic, as primitive.
4McGee uses the technical terminology of Chang and Keisler (1973).
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The main reasons McGee offers in favor of applying Supervaluationism
to vagueness are, first, that it preserves classical logic, which is seen as an
advantage because “the basic logical properties of vague predicates are not
appreciably different from those of precise predicates” (McGee 1991, p. 155).
Second, since McGee considers vague predicates as predicates whose applica-
bility is left indeterminated by the rules of our language, Supervaluationist
semantics fits in naturally with the use of partially interpreted languages in
order to capture the semantics of vague predicates (McGee 1991, p. 8).
Although McGee (1991) does not explicitly cope with the Sorites para-
dox, what we have seen up to now shows that the diagnostic for this paradox
is based on the idea that vague predicates are partial predicates, in the sense
that our linguistic conventions do not assign any truth value to ascriptions
of vague predicates to their borderline cases. The prevention of the soritical
paradox uses the Supervaluationist semantics, which allows McGee to pre-
serve classical logic. For my purposes here it is not necessary to go deeper
into the details.5 So let us proceed now with the Liar paradox.
3.3 The Liar and vagueness
McGee (1989, 1991) defends an inconsistency view about the Liar. He claims
that our naive understanding of truth is inconsistent and that, consequently,
it has to be replaced by a new, consistent and scientifically precise notion.
I will present, first, what I understand to be McGee’s diagnostic of the Liar
and, afterwards, I will introduce his prevention to that paradox. The main
goal of this section is to show that, as it stands, McGee’s proposal cannot be
considered a common solution to the Sorites and the Liar.
The Diagnostic As McGee (1991) points out, we all tend to agree, at first
sight, that any theory of truth must at least imply some-
thing on the lines of the T-schema; that is, says McGee, because, pre-
theoretically, we see truth ascriptions as expressing the same thought as
the sentences they are ascribing truth to. Theories of truth that contain the
T-schema unrestrictedly are sometimes called naive theories of truth. What
the Liar shows is that no naive theory of truth can be right, because the
former reveals how the latter is “inconsistent with manifestly observable em-
pirical facts” (McGee 1991, p. 2); namely, the fact that λ =‘λ is not true’.
Thus, McGee claims:
The logical paradoxes show that our naive understanding of truth,
5A thorough defense of Supervaluationism can be found in Keefe (2000). Some
criticisms can be found in, for instance, Williamson (1994, chapter 5).
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which includes the acceptance of the [T-schema], is inconsistent. (McGee
1989, p. 532)
Hence, McGee’s diagnostic of the Liar paradox consists in rejecting the
unrestricted use of the T-schema that stems from our naive understanding
of the notion of truth:
[M]y response to the diagnostic problem is short and simple: theories
that have observably false consequences are incorrect; this rule ap-
plies to informal prescientific theories no less than to scientific ones.
(McGee 1991, p. 2)
McGee endorses what Charles Chihara calls the inconsistency view of
truth, which, besides Chihara himself, has been suggested by a number of
authors (see, specially, Tarski 1983, Chihara 1979, 1984, Eklund 2002 and,
more recently, Scharp 2013). According to Chihara, the consistency view of
truth is a basic position in the debate about truth which is usually taken for
granted and, hence, it is hardly argued for. Such view holds that
an accurate statement of what ‘true’ means will be logically consis-
tent with all known facts, and in particular with all known facts of
reference. (Chihara 1979, p. 607)
The inconsistency view of truth holds that the consistency view is wrong,
and that truth is an inconsistent notion, in the sense that it is inconsistent
with certain facts about reference. This is the position adopted by McGee
as can be seen from the quotes above.
The inconsistency diagnostic is not free of problems. Specially, it has to
offer a plausible explanation of how we manage to coherently use an incon-
sistent predicate without being led to accept unreasonable conclusions. In
any case, I do not wish to investigate this issue here. For my purposes it is
enough to have succeeded in showing that McGee defends an inconsistency
view of truth as diagnostic to the Liar.6
The Prevention According to McGee, once we realize that our naive pre-
theoretic understanding of the notion of truth is inconsis-
tent we must
replace our demonstrably incorrect prescientific theory of truth with
a scientific theory that is consistent with the evident empirical and
mathematical facts. (McGee 1991, p. 3)
6It is worth noting that McGee is not usually presented, in the literature on para-
doxes, as an author defending the inconsistency view (see, for instance, Eklund
2002, p. 252, Patterson 2009, p. 387 or Scharp 2013, p. 22).
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The prevention of the paradox, then, will consist of a new theory of truth
that, according to McGee, must satisfy the following three constraints (McGee
1991, p. 158):
I Material adequacy requirement
II Ordinary usage requirement
III Integrity of language requirement
I will sketch them in the following.
The father of the contemporary debate on the Liar paradox is Alfred
Tarski. Tarski (1944, 1969, 1983) look for a definition of truth which must
be formally and materially correct. The latter condition means that our
definition must specify the actual meaning of the notion of truth. Tarski
takes as a point of departure what he considers the most natural definition
of truth:
A true sentence is one which says that the state of affairs is so and so,
and the states of affairs indeed is so and so. (Tarski 1983, p. 155)
This characterization, though, can hardly be considered appropriate, for
it is not clear and precise enough. Nevertheless, it expresses the underlying
idea of what a semantical definition should be and the task that Tarski has
in mind is to make this idea more definite and formally correct.
It is in this framework that Tarski proposes the T-schema (he calls it
equivalence of the form (T)) as a necessary condition for being a materially
correct definition of truth. So a definition of truth for a language L (the
object language) in a language L′ (the metalanguage) is materially correct
if it implies the following biconditional for each sentence φ of L:
X is true (in the language L) if, and only if, p
where X has to be replaced by the standard name in L′ of φ and p has to
be replaced by the translation in L′ of φ.
What the Liar paradox shows is that, if the object language and the met-
alanguage are the same, and they are rich enough to achieve self-reference,
then no materially adequate definition of truth can be offered. Tarski’s strat-
egy to cope with the Liar consists, essentially, in accepting the impossibility
of having the language identical with the metalanguage when defining truth.
In contrast, constraint III demands that McGee’s truth theory for partially
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interpreted languages must be given within the languages themselves.7 This
means, of course, that the conditions for material adequacy must be weak-
ened. Let us see exactly how McGee weakens Tarski’s requirement by replac-
ing it with requirement I above, the Material adequacy requirement.
As I said, McGee’s prevention for the Liar consists in introducing a new
consistent and scientifically precise truth predicate. In order to do that, he
proposes to treat ‘true’ as a vague predicate:
I shall develop a formal model of the logic of vague terms [(partially
interpreted languages)], then use this formal model to give a theory
of truth which treats ‘true’ as a vague term. (McGee 1991, p. 7)
McGee claims that vague predicates are such that the rules governing
their meaning leave indeterminate some of their ascriptions. This, he claims,
is not always the case with truth, for, sometimes, the rules determining the
applicability of ‘true’ yield conflicting answers; thus, notably in the case of
the Liar sentence, the rules governing ‘true’ determine that such sentence
is true and also that it is false.8 McGee’s proposal, hence, is to “adopt a
reformed usage of ‘true’ which treats all the problematic cases as unsettled”
(McGee 1991, p. 8).9
If ‘true’ must be seen as a vague predicate, that means that the tripartite
division definitely true/definitely untrue/unsettled also applies to truth as-
criptions as well as to ascriptions of vague predicates; which means, in turn,
that our naive understanding of truth must be replaced by two notions: truth
and definite truth. McGee goes on arguing:
That ‘true’ is a vague predicate should come as no surprise. Intuitively,
when we assert or deny that ‘Harry is bald’ is true, we are saying the
same thing as when we assert or deny that Harry is bald. If that
is so, then, if the linguistic conventions that govern the use of the
vague term ‘bald’ leave it unsettled whether or not Harry is bald, the
linguistic conventions that govern the use of the term ‘true’ likewise
7Most of the technical work in McGee (1991) is aimed to achieve this goal. Whether
he succeeds or not is a controversial question; see Yablo (1989) and Simmons (1993,
section 4.3).
8This is not entirely true; the Forced-March Sorites introduced at page 10 shows
that the rules governing vague predicates can also produce conflicting answers.
Thus, is we have a soritical series a1, a2, . . . , an for, say, the predicate ‘red’, we
might be forced to accept, for some 1 < i < n that ai is red —when we begin the
forced march with a1— and that it is not red —when we begin the forced march
with an and we go backwards in the series.
9See also McGee (1989, p. 535).
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leave it unsettled whether or not ‘Harry is bald’ is true. [...] Thus,
‘true’ inherits the vagueness of all the vague nonsemantical predicates
of our language. (McGee 1991, p. 217)
The sentence ‘Harry is bald’ is indeterminate when Harry is a borderline
case of being bald, and this can be naturally explained, says McGee, with
partially interpreted languages. Then, we realize that the sentence ‘the sen-
tence ‘Harry is bald’ is true’ is also indeterminate, due to the fact that it is
a truth ascription to an already indeterminate sentence —whose indetermi-
nacy was prompted, in the first place, by vagueness. We have, hence, truth
ascriptions that are already indeterminate. What McGee proposes is to treat
the indeterminacy that stems from sentences like the Liar as the same as the
one that indirectly stems from vagueness.
Now, if vague predicates and truth interact in the following way:
(a) If Harry is definitely bald, ‘Harry is bald’ is definitely true.
(b) If Harry is definitely not bald, ‘Harry is bald’ is definitely not true.
(c) If it is unsettled whether Harry is bald, it is unsettled whether ‘Harry is
bald’ is true.
and ‘true’ must be treated as a vague predicate, then clauses (a)-(c) applied
to ‘true’ give the following analogous clauses:
(i) If φ is definitely true, Trpφq is definitely true.
(ii) If φ is definitely not true, Trpφq is definitely not true.
(iii) If φ is unsettled, Trpφq is unsettled.
Clauses (i)-(iii) constitute McGee’s material adequacy conditions for truth
and definite truth. McGee uses Kripke’s fixed-points techniques and Super-
valuational semantics10 in order to define a truth predicate Tr and a notion
of being definitely true that are materially adequate. This means that re-
quirement I is achieved.
The second requirement, the ordinary usage requirement, is intended to
guarantee that the new notion of truth agrees “with ordinary usage about
the applicability of ‘true’ in a wide range of particular cases” (McGee 1991,
p. 159). According to McGee, we use truth to convey agreement (or disagree-
ment) to statements without having to repeat the statement again; we just
10We will see these techniques in some detail in chapter 6.
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need to have some way of naming the statement in order to endorse it. McGee
agrees with deflationists on this point and we will introduce in some detail
in chapter 6 how the truth predicate allows us to express blind agreement
(and disagreement). So for now an example will serve our purposes.
Suppose that Charlie is a friend of mine and that I completely trust him
in political matters. Suppose further I know that yesterday Charlie gave a
spirited speech on political issues. Now, although I do not know exactly what
Charlie said, I want to express my full agreement to whatever he said; for I
trust him blindly. One way to achieve my goal is to say:
(*) Everything Charlie said about politics yesterday is true.
In order to succeed in expressing with (*) my commitment to anything
Charlie said yesterday about politics I need the following rule of inference:
(RI) Trpφq implies φ
So that in committing myself to the truth of every relevant sentence φ I am
committing, thanks to RI, to φ itself. RI and other similar rules of inference
are definite-truth preserving given the adequacy principle stated above and,
hence, they are valid in McGee’s framework. (see McGee 1991, pp. 174–179
and McGee 1989, p. 534). Hence, requirement II is fulfilled.11
3.3 Solving the Paradoxes
It is easy to see, now, that McGee (1991) does not offer a common solution to
the Liar and the Sorites. This is so because McGee puts forward two different
diagnostics for these paradoxes; the inconsistency of our naive theory of truth
for the Liar and indeterminacy based on our linguistic conventions for the
Sorites.
We have further reasons to suppose that McGee himself would not accept
the same diagnostic for the Liar and the Sorites. As I said, when we offer a
common solution to more than one paradox we realize that their paradoxi-
cality stems from the same root. Recall that, as I claimed at page 52, McGee
thinks that vagueness always generates indeterminacy while truth can some-
times generate overdeterminacy, which suggests that the reason behind the
11This is also a controversial question for, some authors, like for example Field (2008,
chapter 13), argue that, in order to be able to express agreement and disagreement,
truth must have to obey the Intersubstitutivity Principle (see page 6), which, in
the case of McGee, is not satisfied.
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Liar and the Sorites paradoxicality might be different and, hence, the neces-
sity of different solutions to the paradoxes generated by these concepts might
be needed. What that means is that McGee might not be considering the
Liar and the Sorites as having a common origin and, consequently, he might
not see them as needing a common solution.
We conclude, hence, that, as it stands, McGee’s proposal in Truth, Vague-
ness and Paradox does not offer a common solution to the Liar and the
Sorites.12
12Notice, though, that McGee’s proposal could be taken to offer a common preven-
tion to the Liar and the Sorites, which, as we are going to see in the net chapter,
might imply some methodological advantages.
CHAPTER
FOUR
WHY A COMMON SOLUTION
In this chapter I will also discuss when and why, in general, a common
solution to more than one paradox should be expected and, in particular,
when and why a common solution to the Liar and the Sorites should be
expected. In order to help enlighten the discussion I will sketch one proposals
of common solution to the Liar and the Sorites; Graham Priest’s.
4.1 Why a Common Solution?
The following natural question is to wonder when a common solution to a
given set of paradoxes is to be expected. There are at least two different
groups of reasons in favor of the idea that some paradoxes might have a
common solution.
First, there is one group of reasons related to methodological issues such
as simplicity and uniformity. It might be argued that it is worth to seek
common solutions to different paradoxes because that would be a way to deal
with all of them with a minimum of resources. This is especially pressing
in the case of paradoxes for, the fact that paradoxes involve very strong but
incompatible intuitions implies that some high price will have to be paid in
order to solve them. Hence, if we offer a single solution for some different
paradoxes, we will have to pay the toll just once. In Dominic Hyde’s words:
[H]aving paid the price thought necessary to accommodate the one
paradox we achieve the virtue of having to pay no additional price to
accommodate the other. (Hyde (2013))
A necessary condition for achieving uniformity when dealing with several
paradoxes is having a single prevention for all of them. But, as we have
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seen, a common prevention is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition
for having a common solution; given some group of paradoxes Γ, we might
have a single prevention for all the members of Γ without having a common
solution for all of them and, conversely, we might have a (weak) common
solution to the paradoxes in Γ that uses different preventative strategies for
dealing with different paradoxes in Γ.1 Nevertheless, methodological points
such as uniformity and simplicity constitute a good reason for beginning the
investigation, for if we achieve a strong common solution we will have gained
simplicity and uniformity, and if we fail, the chances that we still get some
insight to jointly prevent the members of Γ will increase.
In the second place, sometimes a certain group of paradoxes are taken to
be of the same kind and, hence, they should be treated, it is claimed, in the
same way. Graham Priest has put this idea in the form of a principle:
Principle of Uniform Solution, first version (PUS)2
If a given collection of paradoxes are of the same kind, they should all
have the same kind of solution.
At first sight, PUS seems true beyond any reasonable doubt. Think, for
example, of the different versions of the Sorites paradox offered in chapter
1; it would be very weird to defend, say, an epistemicist solution to the
Conditional Sorites and a Supervaluational solution to, say, the No-Sharp-
Boundaires Sorites. It would hardly make any sense because, clearly, both
the Conditional and the No-Sharp-Boundaries paradoxes are of the same
kind; both are soritical paradoxes.
But on closer inspection, PUS is not so obviously correct. The problem
is that in order to assess it we need to know what counts as being the same
kind of paradox and what counts as being the same kind of solution.
With respect to what counts as being the same kind of solution, there are
at least two senses in which this can be understood. First, being the same
1Horiwch’s proposal, as we will see in chapter 6, constitutes an example of this
latter kind; he defends an epistemicist account both for vagueness and truth that
will need a prevention only with respect to the latter. Horwich thinks that vague
predicates have sharp boundaries and that, hence, the main premise of the Condi-
tional Sorites is plain false. Accordingly, he claims that there is no need to change
the logic and that no contradiction-free environment has to be offered. In the case
of the Liar, though, Horwich needs to use something akin to the notion of ground-
edness and a sophisticated fixed-point construction in order to fully develop his
solution.
2See, for example, Priest (1994, p. 32) or Priest (2002, p. 166).
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kind of solution can mean just having the same prevention, in which case
PUS becomes:
Principle of Uniform Solution, second version (PUSP)
If a given collection of paradoxes are of the same kind, they should all
have a common prevention.
Second, being the same kind of solution can be taken to mean being the
same solution, so that if two paradoxes are of the same kind they should
have a common (single) solution, in the sense stablished before, either weak
or strong. In this case, which I think is the most reasonable way of under-
standing it, the Principle of Uniform Solution becomes:
Principle of Uniform Solution, third version (PUSC)
If a given collection of paradoxes are of the same kind, they should all
have a common solution.
What about what counts as being the same kind of paradox? Are the Liar
and Curry’s paradox the same kind of paradox? Or, thinking of the subject
of this dissertation, are the Liar and the Sorites the same kind of paradox?
These questions have no easy answer. In order to offer a fully satisfying
answer to them we would need a theory of similarity of paradoxes, which is
far beyond the scope of this dissertation. As a matter of fact, even a theory
of identity of paradoxes is something that does not seem easily achievable at
all.
Nevertheless, given a group of paradoxes, we can find some features of
them that can be taken to suggest that they might be of the same kind or,
at best, we may find some sufficient conditions for being of the same kind.
Curiously enough, some of these considerations point to a principle that
is almost the converse of PUS:3
Prevention Principle of Uniform Kind of Paradox (PPUKP)
If a given collection of paradoxes have a common prevention, they are
of the same kind.
PUKP is much less plausible than PUS, but it is not meant to provide
knock-down reasons for establishing the sameness of different paradoxes, it is
just meant to suggest that, given that some collection of paradoxes seem to
3See, for instance, Cook (2013, p. 194)
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behave equally well in front of a given proposal of prevention, we have good
reasons to think that these paradoxes might be of the same kind. PPUKP
allows us to have an argument to the best explanation.
This move might seem circular or question-begging; after all, we con-
clude that some paradoxes are of the same kind from the fact that they have
a common prevention, in order to conclude that they must have a common
solution, which might imply that they have a common prevention! I do not
think this is circular, though. Because, as I said, we need to understand
PPUKP in a weak way, so that the fact that some paradoxes have a com-
mon prevention just suggests that they are of the same kind. We will need
some other considerations in order to confidently claim that the paradoxes
in question are of the same kind. Then, if we eventually accept that they are
of the same kind, and we accept PUS, we cannot but accept that they must
have a strong common solution.
We can be a bit subtler and, following Colyvan (2009), say that it is not
the fact that they have a common prevention what makes reasonable to think
of a bunch of paradoxes that they are of the same kind, but the fact that they
behave similarly when tried to be solved, either by successful or unsuccessful
treatments:
Prevention Principle of Uniform Kind of Paradox, second version (PPUKPP)
If a given collection of paradoxes respond in a similar way to different
preventions, they are all of the same kind.
Let us see an example, taken from Colyvan (2009), of the role this kind
of considerations has in the literature. Suppose we advance a solution to the
Liar that uses truth value gaps. We will see in more detail some solutions of
this kind in chapters 5 and 7, but suffice to say now that they claim that the
Liar sentence is neither true nor false. So we are in a situation where we have
three semantic statuses for sentences: true, false and neither true nor false.
As we will see in some depth in chapter 5, most if not all the solutions to the
Liar suffer from what are called revenge problems. In this case, the revenge
can be seen to come in the form of a certain sentence, usually called the
strengthened Liar, whose construction will depend on the details of the theory
used to cope with the original Liar. Even in the framework of a given theory,
there might be several ways to construct such a sentence; thus, for example,
when the theory posits truth value gaps like in our example, we can construct
the strengthened Liar by defining a new predicate, determinately true, that
collapses two of the semantic categories the solution is using. Hence, the
true sentences will be determinately true but the false and the neither true
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nor false sentences will not be determinately true. Now, using a sentence
that says of itself that it is not determinately true, we get into trouble again.
Therefore, in front of solutions that use truth value gaps, the Liar behaves
in such a way so that new problems arise that stem from the definition of a
new predicate that turns the tripartite division of the semantic statuses into
a bipartite one.
The idea now is that something analogous happens with the Sorites para-
dox when the prevention used to solve it uses truth value gaps. Suppose we
accommodate the borderline ascriptions of vague predicates by claiming that
such ascriptions are neither true nor false. This implies, as in the case of
the Liar, a tripartite division of semantic statuses; sentences can be true
—the clear cases of application of the vague predicate in question—, false
—the clear countercases— or neither true nor false —the borderline cases—.
The problem that emerges now, and that can be seen as analogous to the
strengthened Liar, is higher-order vagueness. As we saw in chapter 1 vague
predicates do not only lack sharp boundaries between the clear cases and the
clear countercases, but also between the clear cases and the borderline cases,
and between the clear cases and the borderline cases of the borderline cases,
and so on. In the first level (that is, the lack of sharp boundaries between
the clear cases and the borderline cases) we can produce, given a certain
vague predicate P, a strengthened paradox by introducing a new predicate,
determinately P, so that this new predicate, as in the case of truth, collapses
two of the semantic categories the solution is using: clear cases of P will
be determinately P but clear counter-cases and borderline cases of being P
will not be determinately P. Now, it is easy to build a new Sorites paradox
using determinately P. The analogy thus established between the Liar and
the Sorites that shows that they behave similarly when in front of a solution
that uses truth value gaps can be taken as evidence to the conclusion that
both paradoxes should receive the same treatment.
Another feature that has been taken, specially by Graham Priest, as a
sufficient condition for being the same kind of paradox is having the same
internal structure:
Structure Principle of Uniform Kind of Paradox (SPUKP)
If a given collection of paradoxes have the same internal structure, they
are all of the same kind.
Of course, what having the same structure means or how sameness of
structure can be established is under dispute. We can, for example, conclude
that some collection of paradoxes have the same structure from the fact that
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they share some structural properties. We find this idea applied specifically
to the Liar and the Sorites in, for instance, the work of Jamie Tappenden.
Tappenden (1993) calls attention to the fact that one can decide somewhat
arbitrarily the extension of both vague predicates and the truth predicate.
We will see in more detail this characteristic of vagueness and truth in chapter
5
Another important structural similarity between vagueness and truth that
has been stressed in the literature is the fact that in both cases some kind or
other of indeterminacy is involved. This idea can be found in many places
like, for example, McGee (1991), Tappenden (1993), Field (2003c, 2008),
Priest (2010a) or Hyde (2013). The indeterminacy present in both vagueness
and truth can have a semantic nature (we will see examples of this in chapters
5 and ??), an epistemic nature (we will see an example in chapter 6) or it
can even be, in fact, overdeterminacy, as in the case of approaches to the
paradoxes that defend the existence of truth value gluts; sentences, like that
Liar and the borderline ascriptions of vague predicates, that are both true
and false (we are going to see an example of such an approach in this chapter).
All these last considerations suggest that there are enough structural sim-
ilarities between the Liar and the Sorites to at least begin the investigation
into a common solution for both of them.
Apart from using structural similarities in order to support the claim that
some paradoxes share the structure, we can, more directly, offer the under-
lying structure. This is what Graham Priest has done with all paradoxes
involving self-reference. In order to further illuminate this last claim and the
considerations discussed so far in this chapter, we are going to sketch in the
next sections Graham Priest’s proposal of a unified treatment for the Liar
and the Sorites.
4.2 Graham Priest: Inclosures and Contradictions
4.2 The Inclosure Schema
Graham Priest has defended that many of the paradoxes in the landscape of
philosophy of logic have a common underlying structure, which is taken to
imply that they are of the same kind. Then, given PUS, he concludes that
they should have the same kind of solution. Finally, Priest defends a solution
to all these paradoxes that uses truth value gluts.
Priest has defended that paradoxes that somehow involve self-reference
(the Liar among them) all have a common underlying structure that is cap-
tured by what he calls the inclosure schema (see, specially, Priest (1994,
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2002)). More recently, Priest (2010a) has proposed that the Sorites also sat-
isfies this schema, which means that both the Liar and the Sorites have a
common underlying structure. Hence, claims Priest, they are of the same
kind and, following PUS, they should be treated in the same way.
Let us present, first, the inclosure schema and, afterwards, we will show
how Priest defends that the Liar and the Sorites satisfy it.
Inclosure Schema. There are two monadic predicates φ(x) and ψ(x) and a
one place function δ(x) such that:
1. There exists a set Ω such that Ω = {x : φ(x)} and ψ(Ω)
2. If X ⊆ Ω and ψ(X), then:
(a) δ(X) < X;
(b) δ(X) ∈ Ω.
The first thing to notice is that if there are φ, ψ and δ satisfying 1 and
2, then the limit case where X = Ω produces a contradiction, for then, by
2a, δ(Ω) < Ω and, by 2b, δ(Ω) ∈ Ω.
Next, we need to check whether both the Liar and the Sorites satisfy the
inclosure schema. Consider the following interpretations for φ, ψ and δ:
- φ(x) is the truth predicate, Trpxq,
- ψ(x) is a definability predicate, so that ψ(x) if, and only if, x is referred
to by a non-indexical noun-phrase,
- δ(x) is the function that, given a definable set of sentences X, assigns
to X a sentence σ identical to σ < X.4
With these interpretations, Ω is the set of all truths, which can be reason-
ably taken to be definable, so that 1 is satisfied. In order to check whether
the clauses in 2 hold, suppose we have a definable set of sentences X such
that X ⊆ Ω. Then, δ(X) will be the following sentence σ:
(σ) σ < X
4I am simplifying and taking X as a name of itself. For readability I am also being
loose on the use/mention distinction.
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Now, what is essentially the Liar reasoning shows that 2a and 2b are
satisfied. Notice, first, that since X ⊆ Ω and Ω is the set of true sentences,
all sentences in X must be true. But if σ were in X it would not be true,
for σ says, precisely, that is not in X. Hence, σ < X, which shows that 2a
holds. But if σ < X, this means that Trpσq and, hence, that σ ∈ Ω, which
shows that 2b holds. The contradiction we get in the limit case, then, is
δ(Ω) ∈ Ω∧ δ(Ω) < Ω. Notice, besides, that δ(Ω) is the sentence λ identical
to λ < Ω; now, since Ω is the set of all true sentences, λ is just claiming
of itself that is not a member of the true sentences. Hence λ is just the
Liar sentence and the contradiction we get from the inclosure schema is the
conclusion of the Liar paradox, Trpλq∧¬Trpλq. Hence, the Liar paradox is
an inclosure paradox.
Let us turn now to the Sorites. In order to show that it is also an inclosure
paradox, suppose P(x) is a monadic vague predicate and A = {a0, a1, . . . , an}
is a soritical sequence for P; that is, Pa0, ¬Pan and tolerance holds: for any
x, 0 ≤ x < n, if Pax then Pax+1.
Consider now the following interpretation of the inclosure schema:
- φ(x) is the predicate P(x) (restricted to A),
- ψ(x) is the vacuous condition, say, x = x,
- δ(x) is the function that, given a set X ⊆ Ω, assigns to X the first
object in A that is not in X.
Interpreting the inclosure schema that way, Ω is the collection of the
objects in A that are P. Notice that Ω , ∅, for at least a0 ∈ Ω and,
besides, Ω ⊂ A, for an < Ω. Ω clearly exists and, hence, 1 is satified.
Take now any set X ⊆ Ω. By definition of δ, δ(X) < X, so that 2a is also
satisfied. It just remains to show that δ(X) ∈ Ω. We have two options, if
X = ∅, then δ(X) = a0 and, hence, δ(X) ∈ Ω by definition of a0. Second,
if X , ∅, then δ(X) = a j+1, where 0 ≤ j < n, such that P(a j). Then,
by tolerance of P, we conclude that a j+1 = δ(X) ∈ Ω, so that 2b is also
satisfied. In this case, the contradiction we obtain at the limit when X = Ω
is, as before, δ(Ω) ∈ Ω∧ δ(Ω) < Ω. Since Ω is the set of objects that are P,
the contradiction we reach is that the first object in the sequence A that is
not P —which is δ(Ω)— is P. So far, thus, we have seen that, according to
Priest, both the Liar and the Sorites are inclosure paradoxes.
4.2 PUS
Priest defends that PUS is a reasonable principle (see specially Priest (1994,
p. 32) and Priest (2002, p. 166)) and, furthermore, that all inclosure para-
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doxes are of the same kind. Both claims imply, then, that all inclosure
paradoxes should have the same kind of solution. As I said, the acceptance
of PUS hangs on what we understand by being paradoxes of the same kind.
And being a paradox of the same kind is analyzed by Priest in terms of the
inclosure schema. The inclosure schema, defends Priest, captures the under-
lying nature or structure of the paradoxes that satisfy it and it is this sharing
of the underlying structure what justifies their being of the same kind. The
problem with this line of argument, though, is that when two paradoxes both
satisfy the inclosure schema, what can be really concluded is that they are
of the same kind at a given level of abstraction. I agree with Nicholas J.J.
Smith that Priest does not take into account the fact that
two objects can be of the same kind at some level of abstraction and
of different kinds at another level of abstraction. (Smith 2000, p. 118)
Consider the following sentences:5
(i) Bill loves Ben.
(ii) Bob loves Maisy.
(iii) Nancy is standing next to Susan.
(iv) Earth orbits the Sun.
Are the facts described by them of the same type? It depends on the level of
abstraction. At a lower level of abstraction, all (i)-(iv) facts are of different
type; they just involve different objects. At a further level of abstraction,
though, (i) and (ii) are of the same type; that is, they are facts consisting
of a person loving another person. At an even further level of abstraction,
(i), (ii), and (iii) are facts of the same kind; they consist of pairs of persons
instantiating a relation. Finally, at a higher level of abstraction, all facts
(i)-(iv) are of the same kind; they all are facts that consist of two objects
instantiating a relation.
Smith proposes to reformulate PUS so that
[p]aradoxes that share a characterization at a certain level of abstrac-
tion should indeed have solutions which likewise share a characteriza-
tion at that level of abstraction. (Smith 2000, p. 119)
Hence, we can reconstruct now the principle of uniform solution following
Smith’s suggestion:
5The example is adapted from Smith (2000).
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Principle of Uniform Solution, fourth version (PUSS)
If a given collection of paradoxes are of the same kind at some given
level of abstraction, they should all have the same kind of solution at
the same level of abstraction.
As Smith himself states, PUSS is trivial. To see why, suppose we have
a solution, call it C, to the Liar that somehow restricts the T-schema. At
a given level of abstraction C might involve details concerning truth, truth-
bearers, contexts of use, etc. The strategy C follows in order to block the
Liar paradox is the restriction of the T-schema, so that the prove of clause
2 in the inclosure schema cannot go through. Hence, at a suitable level of
abstraction, C will be circumventing the inclosure schema by refusing the
clause 2. In principle, the level of abstraction just used to describe C, where
it is considered how C blocks the inclosure schema, seems the most natural
candidate to be the same level of abstraction in which the Liar and the Sorites
satisfy the inclosure schema.
But if this is so, then any solution that solves the Sorites by refusing 2
in the inclosure schema will be of the same type (at the appropriate level of
abstraction, which is the same at which the Liar and the Sorites are of the
same kind) of C. But there are many solutions to the Sorites that solve the
paradox by rejecting clause 2. We have introduced some of them in chapter
1: Supervaluationism, Epistemicism or many-valued approaches all of them
solve the paradox by rejecting some of the premises in the usual forms of the
Sorites, so that all of them block the argument that allow us to conclude, in
the inclosure schema, that the first object that has not the vague property
actually has the vague property. So all of them circumvent the inclosure
schema by refusing the clause 2. But that means that C, Supervaluationism,
Epistemicism, many-valued approaches and many other solutions to both
the Liar and the Sorites are of the same kind in the appropriate level of
abstraction in which both paradoxes are of the same type. This trivializes
PUSS.
Priest’s response to the triviality of PUSS is the following one:
[T]he appropriate level at which to analyze a phenomenon is the level
which locates underlying causes. (Priest 2000, p. 125)
According to Priest, Smith’s objection to PUS was not fair in the first
place, because not all the levels of abstraction are equally important; the
principle of uniform solution must be applied to the level of abstraction that
captures the underlying nature of the paradoxes, takes into account ‘the
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essence of the phenomenon’ (Priest (2000, p. 124)) and ‘locates the underly-
ing causes’ (Priest (2000, p. 125)) of their paradoxicality. Thus, with respect
to what counts as being the same kind of solution Priest’s understanding of
the principle of uniform solution is closer to the one I called PUSC, where
the same kind of paradoxes should have a common solution, in the sense de-
fended in section 3.2; for a solution to be a common solution to certain group
of paradoxes it must offer a common reason about why there is a deception
in the paradox. This is so because being the same kind of solution must
be considered, now, at the level of abstraction that locates the underlying
causes of the paradoxes. And with respect to what counts as being the same
kind of paradox, two paradoxes will be of the same kind when both have a
common reason about why they are deceptive; for being the same kind of
paradox means now, according to Priest, to be the same kind at the level of
abstraction that locates these reasons.
Putting all this together, we can see that what the principle of uniform
solution should be stating is the following:
Principle of Uniform Solution, fifth version (PUSP)
If a given collection of paradoxes have a common reason about why
they are deceptive, they should all have a common solution.
I think PUSP is a natural and reasonable principle, abut it is almost a
platitude.6 The fact that Priest defends PUS as a “little more than a truism”
(Priest 2002, p. 287)7 suggests that his understanding of that principle is close
to PUSP. Moreover, if Priest can show that all inclosure paradoxes share a
common reason for their paradoxicality, PUSP is sufficient to conclude that
they should have a common solution; so that nothing stronger is needed. In
particular, since he claims to have shown that the Liar and the Sorites both
satisfy the inclosure schema, and he claims that the inclosure schema is the
6Valor Abad (2008) also claims that PUS is “trivially true” because “the expression
‘same kind’ is too vague” (Valor Abad 2008, p. 191). What I’m defending here,
though, is that the principle is a trivial one even when we narrow down the sense
of ‘same kind’.
7Priest (2002, p. 287) compares the principle of uniform solution to an analogous
principle: “same kind of illness, same kind of cure” and argues that his last prin-
ciple is clearly correct:
[I]f we have one illness in the two people, this must be due to the same cause.
So the two people must be cured in the same way, namely, by attacking that
cause.(Priest 2002, p. 288)
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reason why they are paradoxical, he concludes that both paradoxes should
have a common solution.
To my mind, the situation is the following one. In order to make PUS
plausible, it must be weakened so that is becomes a platitude in the line
of PUSP. But there is a price to be paid; the notion of same kind must
be understood then in a very strong sense: to be the same kind of paradox
means to have the same underlying reason behind paradoxicality and to be
the same kind of solution means to be the same (common) solution. That
means that Priest needs to show that the Sorites and the Liar are of the
same kind in this sense.
I want to argue now that the inclosure schema does not capture the reason
why the Sorites is paradoxical. So that even granting that the inclosure
schema does capture the reason why the Liar is paradoxical, which is highly
debatable,8 Priest cannot apply PUSP to the Liar and the Sorites. The reason
why this is so is related to the discussion in chapter 2, where the notion of
pathodox was introduced. Remember that a pathodox was an argument that
shared the phenomenological character of traditional paradoxes but that did
not satisfy the traditional characterization, according to which a paradox is
an intuitively valid argument with intuitively true premises and an intuitively
false conclusion. One of the examples we saw was a Sorites pathodox build
up with a certain series A = {a0, a1, . . . , an}, a vague predicate P such that
¬Pa0 and Pan and a tolerance principle stating that for any x, 0 ≤ x < n,
if Pax then Pax+1. We concluded that the argument built in this way was
essentially the same as the soritical argument build with a series A′ like A
but with Pa0 and ¬Pan. If the two arguments thus built share the reason
why they are paradoxical (in the broad sense defended in chapter 2), then,
according to Priest, if one is an inclosure paradox so it should be the other.
But the one built with A′ is an inclosure paradox, according to Priest, and
the one built with A is not.
We conclude that, at the level of abstraction in which we are trying to
capture the reason why the Sorites is paradoxical, such a paradox is not an
inclosure paradox.
4.2 Paraconsistency
In order to continue the exposition of Priest’s proposal, let us suppose that he
succeeded so far in showing that both the Liar and the Sorites are inclosure
paradoxes and that this implies that they should have a common solution.
Priest defends that that common solution is the adoption of a logic that allows
8See Grattan-Guinness (1998), Valor Abad (2008), Badici (2008) and Zhong (2012).
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us to accept the contradiction δ(Ω) ∈ Ω ∧ δ(Ω) < Ω. What this means is,
on the one hand, that the Liar is true and not true and, on the other hand,
that the first object in the soritical series that has the vague property also
does not have it, so that ascriptions of vague predicates to borderline cases
are both true and false. A view like that that accepts that some sentences
are both true and false or, alternatively, that some contradictions are true,
is called dialetheic.
In classical logic anything follows from a contradiction; we say that clas-
sical logic has the explosion or ex contradictione quodlibet principle (for any
sentences φ and ψ):
(ECQ) φ,¬φ |= ψ
Hence, any dialetheic view will need a logic that tolerates contradictions and
rejects ECQ. Such logics are called paraconsistent logics. Graham Priest has
notoriously defended a paraconsistent approach to the Liar (see, for example,
Priest (1979) or Priest (2006)) and his view has been the object of a lively and
heated discussion (see, for instance, Priest, Beall, and Armour-Garb (2004)
or the last chapters in Field (2008)). With respect to the Sorites, Priest
(2010a) has defended a dialetheic framework for vagueness. For the purpose
of this chapter there is no need to enter into the details and it will suffice to
put forward the essentials of such a view.
Notice, first, that ECQ is an easy consequence of another logical principle
also present in classical logic, disjunctive syllogism:
(DS) φ∨ψ,¬φ |= ψ
That is why paraconsistent logic also rejects DS. Now, if we define, as
usual, the material conditional φ→ ψ as ¬φ∨ψ, the failure of DS implies the
failure of Modus Ponens for→. Moreover, Priest defends that the conditional
used for expressing tolerance and, hence, for formulating the Sorites paradox,
is the material one (he uses a biconditional, but nothing important hangs on
this for our discussion):
The next question is what this biconditional is. The correct under-
standing is, I take it, that it is a material biconditional [...]. Consec-
utive statements have the same truth value. This is what tolerance is
all about. (Priest 2010a, p. 73)
Besides, if a conditional that obeys modus ponens is used in the formu-
lation of the Sorites, claims Priest, “the argument [...] has less plausibility”
(Priest 2010a, p. 73) because “then the truth of the sorites premises are much
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less plausible” (Priest 2010a, p. 74). Priest points out that any other condi-
tional that can be defined in a paraconsistent framework will be too strong
to capture tolerance. For example, in Priest (2006, chapter 6) an entailment-
expressing conditional is proposed to capture the notion of logical implication
which, as such, obeys Modus Ponens. This conditional, though, makes the
conditional premises of the Sorites not plausible at all; ‘someone with n hairs
is bald’ clearly does not entail ‘someone with n+ 1 hairs is bald’.9
To sum up, in order to be a paradox the Sorites must be formulated with
a conditional that expresses tolerance, which, according to Priest, means
that such a conditional must be the material one. That is so, he claims,
because there is nothing more to tolerance than the thought that the ascrip-
tions of the vague predicate to successive members of the sorites series must
have the same truth value —both true or both false— and that is precisely
what the material conditional expresses. Now, he goes on, since the mate-
rial conditional does not obey modus ponens in a paraconsistent framework,
he concludes that the Sorites argument, in its most common Conditional or
Induction forms, is not valid.
Recall that, when we showed why Priest thinks the Sorites is an inclosure
paradox, we interpreted φ(x) as a vague predicate P, Ω as the things in
the soritical series A that are P, ψ(x) as the vacuous condition and, for any
X ⊆ Ω, δ(X) as the first object in A that is not in X. It was straightforward
to show that δ(X) < X, for it followed directly from the definition of δ(x),
but we needed a more elaborated argument in order to show that δ(X) ∈ Ω.
In the more interesting case where we had a set X ⊆ Ω and X , ∅, the
argument ran as follows:
Ω-step Argument
1. δ(X) = a j+1, 0 ≤ j < n (By nonemptyness of X and definition of Ω)
9Of course, whether there is or not a conditional obeying Modus Ponens and sup-
porting soritical arguments is debatable. As Priest (2010a) points out, the kind
of conditionals used for paraconsistent semantics and set theory (see Priest (2006,
chapter 18 )) are the ones used in weak relevant logics, which are such that, if they
are true, then the antecedent entails the consequent. This means, as we have seen,
that they are too strong to capture tolerance (Priest (2008, chapter 10)). Still,
Priest is begging the question in favor of paraconsistent approaches, for, what is at
stake is whether the natural language contains a conditional that obeys modus po-
nens and supports tolerance. If this is so, then paraconsistent logics, not only fail
to offer a plausible solution to the Sorites, but also fail to capture the conditional
in question. In any case, I will not pursue this issue here and I will suppose Priest
succeeded in showing that the conditional in the Sorites does not obey Modus
Ponens.
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2. a j ∈ Ω (By definition of A and Ω)
3. If a j ∈ Ω, then a j+1 ∈ Ω (a j-instantiation of the tolerance relation)
4. a j+1 ∈ Ω (Modus Ponens to 2 and 3)
It can easily be seen that a conditional obeying Modus Ponens is used
in step 3. But, according to Priest, the conditional that expresses tolerance
for vague predicates does not obey Modus Ponens and, hence, the Ω-step
Argument above is either not valid (if we understand the conditional in 3 as
the material one and, hence, as one not obeying Modus Ponens) or it has
one of the premises, the third one, “much less plausible” (if we understand
the conditional as a stronger one obeying Modus Ponens). In both cases,
Priest cannot use the argument in order to show that the Sorites paradox is
an inclosure paradox.
It does not help either to claim that the conditional in 3 pertains to the
meta-language, for the problem is that, in order to dialectically succeed, Ω-
step Argument must use a a conditional that obeys Modus Ponens and that
expresses tolerance, which, as we have seen, is the kind of conditional Priest
denies to exist. Besides, if we had this conditional in the meta-language,
the Sorites paradox would be formulated again. Since in this case, in the
meta-language, we would not be able to resort to a conditional not obeying
Modus Ponens (for then we would not be able to show that the Sorites is an
inclosure paradox), we would have to solve this paradox using other resources,
in which case we would not even have a unified solution for it.
4.2 Solving the Paradoxes
In this section we have seen that Graham Priest endorses PUS and thinks
that the Liar and the Sorites are paradoxes of the same kind, because they
have the same internal structure —captured by the inclosure schema. These
considerations make him believe that the Liar and the Sorites need a uni-
fied treatment. We have seen, though, that PUS is a much less interesting
principle than it appeared to be. Moreover, we have seen why the Sorites
paradox cannot be counted as an inclosure paradox; first, because we have
good reasons to think that the inclosure schema does not capture the inter-
nal structure of the Sorites and, second, because the argument Priest does
to favor such claim is, by his own lights, unsound. The fact that the Sorites
is not an inclosure paradox means that PUS cannot be applied, even in his
weakened version PUSP.
Still, we can ask ourselves whether, had it been successful, Priest’s ac-
count would have constituted a common solution to the Liar and the Sorites.
4.2. Graham Priest: Inclosures and Contradictions 71
I think the answer is yes; specifically, it would have been a strong common
solution to both paradoxes. That is so because Priest offers a solution that
identifies the same reason why the Liar and the Sorites are paradoxical; that
is, their internal structure, captured by the inclosure schema. And moreover,
he provides a unified prevention in the from of a paraconsistent logic.
CHAPTER
FIVE
JAMIE TAPPENDEN: TRUTH-FUNCTIONAL
AND PENUMBRAL INTUITIONS
One of the first authors to entertain the possibility of a common solution
to the Liar and the Sorites was Jamie Tappenden. In Tappenden (1993) he
suggested a line of thought according to which vague predicates and the truth
predicate are similar enough to support a special speech act that Tappenden
called articulation.
In this chapter we are going to see the general framework Tappenden ac-
cepts for the Liar, which is Kripke’s proposal build with the Strong Kleene
semantic scheme for the logical constants. We will also present how Tappen-
den applies such scheme to vagueness and the Sorites and how, using the
supervaluational framework, explains away the existence of what is usually
called the penumbral intuition; that is, the intuition underlying the idea that
there are certain sentences which we are strongly inclined to consider as true
that, according to the Strong Kleene evaluations, lack truth value.
We will discuss some objections to Tappenden’s approach about vague-
ness; some of them will be considered successful and others not. Finally, we
will examine whether the ideas that stemmed from vagueness can be applied
to the Liar case so that Tappenden’s proposal, although not being a common
solution to the Liar and the Sorites, might be seen as the first step towards
a joint solution to them.
5.1 Kripke and SK
Saul Kripke presented, in his seminal paper Outline of a Theory of Truth
(Kripke (1975)), one of the most influential approaches to the Liar paradox.
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Kripke’s proposal can naturally be read as proposing a logic to deal with truth
that rejects the Principle of Bivalence, according to which each sentence is
either true or false. Kripke presents a system where some sentences lack
truth value, which, in turn, has as a consequence the rejection of the Law
of Excluded Middle (LEM); that is, it rejects some sentences of the form
φ∨¬φ.
Why, though, should we expect that rejection of excluded middle might
help prevent the Liar paradox? Recall from the Introduction (page 9) that
the Liar paradox allows us to conclude Trpλq↔ ¬Trpλq which, as we said,
is equivalent in classical logic to Trpλq ∧ ¬Trpλq. Following Field (2007,
p. 81), we can reconstruct how we would naturally reason in classical logic
from the validity of a sentence of the form φ ↔ ¬φ to the validity of a
sentence of the form φ∧¬φ:
1. ` φ↔ ¬φ (Supposition)
2. φ ` φ∧¬φ (Reflexivity and Modus Ponens to 1)
3. ¬φ ` φ∧¬φ (Reflexivity and Modus Ponens to 1)
4. φ∨¬φ ` φ∧¬φ (reasoning by cases to 2 and 3)
5. ` φ∧¬φ (Validity of LEM and transitivity)
This line of argumentation suggests that restricting LEM might help pre-
vent the Liar paradox, although, in principle, there is no guarantee that this
should be so; it is well known that intuitionistic logic, which also restricts
LEM, falls prey of the inconsistencies generated by the truth predicate.
Following Hartry Field, I will call logics that restrict LEM paracomplete
logics. In this section, we are going to present a certain version of Kripke’s
proposal that uses the strong Kleene scheme (SK henceforth), which does
not validate LEM. In chapter 6 we will see in some detail another version
that uses the supervaluational scheme (which does validate LEM and, hence,
does not constitute a paracomplete approach).
The goal Kripke wants to achieve is a language with its own truth pred-
icate; that is, he wants a language with a certain monadic predicate, Tr,
that can be applied to sentences containing Tr itself and that satisfies the
Intersubstitutivity Principle we introduced at page 6, which we saw should
be naturally expected from a truth predicate.
In a well-known passage, Kripke states which is the intuition underlying
his proposal:
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We wish to capture an intuition of somewhat the following kind. Sup-
pose we are explaining the word ‘true’ to someone who does not yet
understand it. We may say that we are entitled to assert (or deny) of
any sentence that it is true precisely under the circumstances when we
can assert (or deny) the sentence itself. Our interlocutor then can un-
derstand what it means, say, to attribute truth to (6) (‘snow is white’)
but he will still be puzzled about attributions of truth to sentences
containing the word ‘true’ itself. [...]
Nevertheless, with more thought the notion of truth as applied even to
various sentences themselves containing the word ‘true’ can gradually
become clear. Suppose we consider the sentence,
(7) Some sentence printed in the New York Daily News, October 7,
1971, is true.
(7) is a typical example of a sentence involving the concept of truth
itself. So if (7) is unclear, so still is
(8) (7) is true.
However, our subject, if he is willing to assert ‘snow is white’, will
according to the rules be willing to assert ‘(6) is true’. But suppose that
among the assertions printed in the New York Daily News, October
7, 1971, is (6) itself. Since our subject is willing to assert ‘(6) is true’,
and also assert ‘(6) is printed in the New York Daily News, October
7, 1971’, he will deduce (7) by existential generalization. Once he
is willing to assert (7), he will also be willing to assert (8). In this
manner, the subject will eventually be able to attribute truth to more
and more statements involving the notion of truth itself. There is
no reason to suppose that all statements involving ‘true’ will become
decided in this way, but most will. Indeed, our suggestion is that
“grounded” sentences can be characterized as those which eventually
get a truth value in this process. (Kripke 1975, p. 701)
The idea behind Kripke’s proposal, hence, is that the semantical status
of an ascription of truth to a sentence φ, Trpφq, will be established once
the semantical status of φ itself is established. The process described in the
quote will eventually evaluate many sentences containing ‘true’, but some
others, like the Liar, will remain undecided. One crucial point to notice is
that it must be clarified what is meant by Kripke when he states that there
will be a certain set of sentences that will eventually get an evaluation in the
process.
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In order to make this claim precise Kripke proposed to consider a formal
first-order language L, the base language, as an idealization of the natural
language without the truth predicate. Then, Kripke showed how that base
language can be expanded with a truth predicate, Tr. In order to do that,
let us suppose that we expand L to L+ = L∪ {Tr}, a language with a new
monadic predicate Tr. Suppose, furthermore, that for every formula φ ∈ L+
we can express its canonical name pφq in L via some codification. I will
suppose that L is strong enough to prove the Diagonal Lemma.
Given a classical model N for the base language with domain D, I will
use 〈N , A〉 to refer to the model of the expanded language L+ whose inter-
pretation of Tr is A, which will be a set of codes of formulas of L+. I will
use |α|M = 1 to mean that the formula α has semantic value 1 in the model
M (and the same for having semantic value 0).
As I mentioned before we are going to use SK, which is a three-valued
scheme, | |sk, that will take as semantic values 0, 1⁄2 and 1. For any φ,ψ ∈ L+,
any classical model N for the base language L and any set of (codes of)
sentences X, |φ|sk〈N ,X〉 is defined in the following way:
1. If φ is an atomic formula of L, then |φ|sk〈N ,X〉 = |φ|〈N〉.
2. If φ = Trpψq, then
(i) |φ|sk〈N ,X〉 = 1 if, and only if, ψ ∈ X;
(ii) |φ|sk〈N ,X〉 = 0 if, and only if, ¬ψ ∈ X or ψ is not a sentence;
(iii) |φ|sk〈N ,X〉 = 1/2 otherwise.
3. |¬φ|sk〈N ,X〉 = 1− |φ|sk〈N ,X〉
4. |φ∨ψ|sk〈N ,X〉 = max{|φ|sk〈N ,X〉, |ψ|sk〈N ,X〉}
5. |∃xφ|sk〈N ,X〉 = max{|φ(d/x)|sk〈N ,X〉 : d ∈ D}, where φ(d/x) is the result of
replacing all free occurrences of x in φ with d.1
The other logical constants (∧,→,∀) are defined in the usual way.
With SK at hand, we can now define a series of sets of sentences that
represent the provisional extensions of the truth predicate that the learning
subject of the previous quote is trying to grasp.
1I am supposing that every member d of the domain serves as a name of itself.
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K0 = ∅
Kσ+1 = {φ ∈ L+ : |φ|sk〈N ,Kσ〉 = 1}
Kλ =
⋃
α<λ
Kα
where λ is a limit ordinal.
We will see in more detail such kind of constructions in Chapter 6, but let
us say, for the moment, that Kripke (1975) showed that this construction is
monotonic, that is, for any ordinals θ and ρ, if θ ≤ ρ, then Kθ ⊆ Kρ. As we
will see, this means that there exists a fixed point of the construction; that
is, there is an ordinal ρ such that Kρ = Kρ+1. I will call this fixed point K.
As a fixed point, the most important feature of K is that, under SK, when
we interpret K as the extension of the truth predicate, the semantic status
of a given sentence φ is always identical to the semantic status of its truth
ascription; that is, |Trpφq|sk〈N ,K〉 = |φ|sk〈N ,K〉. This guarantees that the Inter-
substitutivity Principle introduced at page 6 holds and, hence, Tr has one
of the main characteristics we expect from a truth predicate. Consequently,
we achieved Kripke’s goal: we just presented a language with its own truth
predicate that does not generate contradictions.
Returning now to Kripke’s quote, notice that the zero stage in the con-
struction, K0, which is the empty set, captures the situation Kripke’s subject
is in when he does not understand ‘true’ at all; that is, the extension of
the truth predicate is empty. Then, the first stage, K1, contains everything
having semantic value 1, provided that the extension of the truth predicate
is empty; that is, K1 is an elegant way of capturing the first step Kripke’s
subject has to follow in order to comprehend the word ‘true’, which consists
of incorporating to the extension of the truth predicate everything he is ‘en-
titled to assert’ given what he knows about truth, which is nothing. And, of
course, idealizing the subject to have access to all non-semantic facts, what
the subject is entitled to assert at the first stage is just all the sentences
that will have semantic value 1 independently of the extension of the truth
predicate; that is, K1. When we eventually reach a limit ordinal, we take
stock and we just collect everything from the previous stages, so that the
construction can be seen as idealizing the process of generalization at limit
ordinals. The process, hence, goes on indefinitely.
Another important point in Kripke’s proposal is the use of the notion of
groundedness, which Kripke attributes to Herzberger (1970). In the previ-
ous quote, Kripke presents what can be called, following Kremer (1988), an
upwards view of the notion of groundedness; the idea is that, from a given
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collection of non-semantic facts, we can begin a process that allows us to
conclude the semantic value of more and more sentences involving the notion
of truth. In the quote above, Kripke is describing how such a stage-by-stage
process might be accomplished. At the end, we can characterize as grounded
the sentences that ‘get a truth value in the process’.
Additionally, the notion of groundedness can also be explained from a
downwards point of view. In Kripke’s own words:
In general, if a sentence [...] asserts that (all, some, most, etc.) of
the sentences of a certain class C are true, its truth value can be
ascertained if the truth values of the sentences in the class C are as-
certained. If some of these sentences involve the notion of truth, their
truth value must in turn be ascertained by looking other sentences,
and so on. If ultimately this process terminates in sentences not men-
tioning the concept of truth, so that the truth value of the original
statement can be ascertained, we call the original statement grounded;
otherwise, ungrounded.(Kripke 1975, p. 693)
That is, a sentence is grounded when its semantic value eventually de-
pends, even if indirectly, on non-semantic facts.
Kripke defines grounded sentences to be those such that they or their
negation are in K, which allows him to capture the intuitions embodied in
both views about groundedness stated above.
It is worth mentioning here that K is not the only fixed point that can be
constructed over a given base model. As a matter of fact, K is the minimal
fixed point; there are many different fixed points that can be achieved and K
is the smallest one, in the sense that it is included in all the other ones. One
way to see this is to consider generalizations of the construction above that
start, not from the empty set, but from other appropriate sets of sentences.2
Consider, for example, the Truth-teller, a sentence τ that is identical to its
own truth ascription:
(τ) Trpτq
Notice that we could define a series of sets of sentences like the one above
but beginning with K′0 = {τ} or also with K′′0 = {¬τ} instead of K0. In
both cases we would get two different fixed points, K′ and K′′ that would be
supersets of K. Although Kripke does not commit himself to any particular
2More specifically, the construction can start with any set of sentences X such that
X ⊆ {φ : |φ|sk〈N ,X〉 = 1}. This is necessary to guarantee that the 0-stage of the
construction is a subset of the 1-stage.
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fixed point, the minimal fixed point K is usually considered the most natural
candidate to be the extension of the truth predicate.3
Kripke’s proposal with SK, though, is not free of problems; let me present
two of them.
5.1 Weakness of the Logic
First, the use of SK makes the theory too weak, as SK fails to validate some
elementary laws such as φ → φ.4 Actually, it is well-known that SK has
no tautologies at all. This also means that there will be instances of the
T-schema (for example, the λ-instance) that will be assigned the semantic
value 1⁄2 and, hence, the T-schema will fail as a principle governing truth.
A natural question we might raise now is whether a new biconditional ⇔
can be added to the language so that the T-schema gets value 1; since Tr
satisfies the Intersubstitutivity Principle, it would be sufficient to have an
appropriate conditional (in a sense to be specified shortly) that validates
φ → φ, for any φ. Let us show now that this is not possible if we suppose
some basic features that this biconditional should satisfy. If we want ⇔ to
be a natural generalization of the classical biconditional and we want the
T-schema to have value 1 in Kripke’s framework, we should expect ⇔ to
satisfy the following conditions, for any sentences φ,ψ of L+ and any set of
sentences X:
(i) |φ⇔ ψ|sk〈N ,X〉 = 1 if, and only if, |φ|sk〈N ,X〉 = |ψ|sk〈N ,X〉.
(ii) ⇔must be normal, that is, it must agree with the classical biconditional
on the classical values.
(iii) ⇔ must be commutative.
If we take into account these three conditions we obtain the connectives
satisfying the following table:
⇔ 0 1 1/2
0 1 0 a
1 0 1 b
1/2 a b 1
3See, for instance, Soames (1999) or Kremer (1988).
4This last sentence is, as a matter of fact, just an instance of LEM, since φ→ ψ is
defined as ¬φ∨ψ.
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where a, b ∈ {0, 1/2}.5
Let us see now why any biconditional satisfying conditions(i)-(iii) cannot
be added to L+ in Kripke’s system. Suppose we add the biconditional ⇔
to L+ and that we get a fixed point X with SK together with the rules for
⇔, so that for any sentence φ ∈ L+, |φ|sk′〈N ,X〉 = |Trpφq|sk
′
〈N ,X〉, where sk
′ is
the new evaluation including ⇔. Consider now the following two sentences,
where ψ is any sentence such that |ψ|sk′〈N ,X〉 = 0:
(α) ψ⇔ Trpαq
(β) Trpαq⇔ Trpβq
We have now three possible cases, all leading to a contradiction.
• First, if |Trpαq|sk′〈N ,X〉 = 0, then |ψ⇔ Trpαq|sk
′
〈N ,X〉 = 1, that is, |α|sk
′
〈N ,X〉 =
1 and, since we are supposing that X is a fixed point, |Trpαq|sk′〈N ,X〉 = 1.
Contradiction.
• Second, if |Trpαq|sk′〈N ,X〉 = 1, then, by X being a fixed point, |α|sk
′
〈N ,X〉 = 1
and, hence, by definition of α, |Trpαq|sk′〈N ,X〉 = 0. Contradiction.
• Finally, suppose that |Trpαq|sk′〈N ,X〉 = 1/2, in which case |α|sk
′
〈N ,X〉 = 1/2.
We have to consider, now, |Trpβq|sk′〈N ,X〉.
– If |Trpβq|sk′〈N ,X〉 = 1 then |β|sk
′
〈N ,X〉 = b and, hence, |Trpβq|sk
′
〈N ,X〉 = b.
Contradiction.
– If |Trpβq|sk′〈N ,X〉 = 0 then |β|sk
′
〈N ,X〉 = a and, by he fact that X is a
fixed point, a = 0. But, if |Trpαq|sk′〈N ,X〉 = 1/2 and |ψ|sk
′
〈N ,X〉 = 0,
then |α|sk′〈N ,X〉 = a which, by supposition, is 1⁄2. Contradiction.
– If |Trpβq|sk′〈N ,X〉 = 1/2, then |β|sk
′
〈N ,X〉 = 1 = |Trpβq|sk
′
〈N ,X〉. Contra-
diction.
This means that we cannot add a suitable biconditional to the language
—using Kripke’s construction as it stands— in order to have the T-schema.
5There are two relevant connectives that satisfy this table; in the first, a = b = 0,
which makes it strengthen condition (i) to (i’):
(i’) |φ⇔ ψ|sk〈N ,X〉 = 0 if, and only if, |φ|sk〈N ,X〉 , |ψ|sk〈N ,X〉.
The other relevant connective is Łukasiewicz 3-valued biconditional, which assigns
1⁄2 both to a and b. We will discuss again Łukasiewicz logics in chapter 7.
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5.1 Revenge
The second problem of Kripke’s approach with SK I will introduce falls under
what is usually called revenge phenomena. Most if not all approaches to
the Liar paradox suffer from expressive weakness; there are some semantic
notions that cannot be expressed in the language of the theory under pain
of inconsistency. Kripke’s proposal is not an exception. Eventually, the
solution Kripke is advancing for the Liar conundrum consists in claiming
that the Liar lacks truth value and hence, a fortiori, that it is not true. That
makes natural to expect one to be able to express Kripke’s solution within
L+; that is, to express that the Liar sentence is not true, which would be
asserted by ¬Trpλq. Unfortunately, this is not possible, for, given a base
model N , |λ|sk〈N ,K〉 = 1/2 and, consequently, |Trpλq|sk〈N ,K〉 = 1/2, which means,
of course, |¬Trpλq|sk〈N ,K〉 = 1/2, so that this last sentence is not assertable.
In order to be able to express that the Liar is not true, we could introduce
to the language an exclusion negation, ¬e, which assigns 1 to sentences with
semantic value 1⁄2 (and behaves as expected for a negation with respect to the
other values), so that |¬eTrpλq|sk〈N ,K〉 = 1. Unfortunately, if we added ¬e to
the language we would be able to create a new paradox (a revenge paradox);
notice that, in this case, φ ∨ ¬eφ would be valid and, hence, the Diagonal
Lemma would allow us to create a sentence λe such that λe ↔ ¬eTrpλeq.
Then, by the usual Liar reasoning together with Trpλeq∨¬eTrpλeq we would
get Trpλeq∧¬eTrpλeq, which is a contradiction.
Alternatively, we could try to express that the Liar is not true using a
determinately operator D and ordinary SK negation. In order to do that, it
would be sufficient that D satisfied, for any sentence φ of L+ and any model
M for L+, the following conditions:
(i) |Dφ|sk〈M〉 = 1 if, and only if, |φ|〈M〉 = 1
(ii) |Dφ|sk〈M〉 = 0 if, and only if, |φ|〈M〉 , 1
With the use of the D and ¬ we could express, now, Kripke’s solution
to the Liar by claiming that the Liar is not determinately true, that is,
¬DTrpλq. But, again, D would be a source of inconsistency. Notice that, as
before with ¬e, LEM holds of D: for any φ, Dφ ∨ ¬Dφ. Again, a sentence
λd could be defined such that λd ↔ ¬DTrpλdq, which, together with the λd-
instance of the T-schema would yield Trpλdq ↔ ¬DTrpλdq, which, as can
be easily shown, is inconsistent with (i)-(ii) rules governing D.6 This means
6As a matter of fact, we could define the determinately operator in terms of exclu-
sion negation, so that Dφ =de f ¬¬eφ.
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that, under pain of inconsistency, we cannot express exclusion negation nor
a determinately operator in Kripke’s approach.
Tappenden (1993) proposed to apply SK both to truth and vagueness, so
that both the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes could be solved. Tappenden
accepted the general framework proposed by Kripke to cope with the Liar.
We are going to see how Tappenden dealt with the first of the problems that
affect SK stated above; he used a new speech act called articulation to explain
away the apparent truth of some sentences that are assigned 1⁄2 in SK. In the
next section we are going to see how Tappenden’s approach applies to vague-
ness and the Sorites paradox. We will introduce it, following Tappenden, as a
way to resolve the tension that arises between two intuitions underlying cer-
tain assignments of semantic values to sentences involving vague predicates:
the truth-functional and penumbral intuitions.
5.2 Intuitions and Sharpenings
Imagine that you do not know what to say in front of the sentences ‘John is
tall’ and ‘Joe is tall’ due to the fact that John and Joe are two borderline
cases of being tall. You can say, then, that these sentences are gappy7;neither
true nor false. Imagine now that you are confronted to the sentence ‘if John
is tall, then Joe is’. As far as you know, and having in mind the truth value
of its constituents, you would be unable to assign any truth value to this
second sentence. Hence, it would also be neither true nor false.
Now imagine that you know that Joe is taller than John. Then, it seems
that you would say that the previous sentence, ‘if John is tall, then Joe is’,
should be true. So, which is its truth value?
There are two intuitions underlying cases like these. The first one is
the truth-functional intuition: we tend to see sentential connectives as truth
functions; the truth value of a sentence with a sentential connective should
depend on the truth value of its parts and this value should be uniform in
the sense that, if sentences φ and ψ have the same form and their sentential
constituents have the same truth values, then φ and ψ should share the same
truth value.
The second intuition is the penumbral intuition: there are sentences that
seem almost analytic to us and we are strongly inclined to assign truth to
7In other chapters I will use the term ‘indeterminate’ in cases like these, but since
Tappenden uses this term, as we will see, in a non-standard way I prefer to use,
in this chapter, the expression ‘gappy’ to refer to sentences that are neither true
nor false. Moreover, since the term ‘indefinite’ is frequently used interchangeably
with ‘indeterminate’, the use of the former would also be inappropriate.
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them, although, according to the truth-functional intuition, they should not
have any truth value. Tappenden (1993), following Fine (1975), calls penum-
bral sentences sentences like ‘if Joe is taller than John, then, if John is tall,
Joe is’. In order to see how Tappenden defines the concept of penumbral
sentences, we need to see first what is, according to him, a pre-analytic sen-
tence.
One of the features of vague predicates is that their extensions can vary
according to circumstances: we can increase in precision a vague predicate
if it is necessary in a specific context. These increases in precision are, on
the one hand, arbitrary for, usually, when a certain context demands sharper
boundaries, we can choose them among a certain set of possibilities. But, on
the other hand, not all increases in precision are equally valid. Tappenden
proposes one example that will serve as an illustration of that. Suppose we
introduce into English the predicate ‘tung’ whose use is governed only by
these rules:
(i) ‘tung’ applies to anything of mass greater than 200 Kg.
(ii) ‘tung’ does not apply to anything of mass less than 100 Kg.
If we compare this predicate with ‘heavy’ we can see, first, that both
behave in certain respects in the same way but, second, that they differ in
a crucial one; the idea is that, provided that all our understanding of ‘tung’
is given by (i) and (ii), we can increase its precision in such a way that,
given two objects a and b, b heavier than a and both unsettled with respect
to the predicate, b counts as non tung while a counts as tung. We cannot
increase the precision of ‘heavy’ in this way; if b is heavier than a, then our
understanding of the predicate imply that, if a is heavy, so is b. We can say,
then, that a precisification (a way of precisifying a predicate) is admissible
if the sharper boundaries drawn are acceptable according to the meaning of
the predicate.
Now, taking into account that constraints on increases in precisions can be
seen as assignments of truth values to sentences, the latter example suggests
that one of the collections of constraints in precision is one whose members
can be formulated thus:
Never make words w1, ....., wn more precise in such a way that sentence
φ become false.
Sentences like φ in the example are called pre-analytic by Tappenden.
Hence, if a sentence is pre-analytic then anyone who understands φ knows
not to draw more precise boundaries to any expressions in φ in such a way
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that φ would be false. An example of a pre-analytic sentence in Tappenden’s
sense is ‘if Joe is taller than John, then, if John is tall, Joe is’ or, follow-
ing him and simplifying, ‘if John is tall, Joe is’. Notice that pre-analytic
sentences are never false but, depending on the semantic frame, they do
not need to be always true. Moreover, Tappenden considers the notion of
pre-analytic sentence as basic and the notion of admissible precisification as
derived.8 It needs to be noticed that, according to that, the characterization
of pre-analytic sentences given above cannot be a definition, for pre-analytic
sentences cannot be defined if they are primitive; we might say only things
like that they receive its semantic status (whatever it be) as a consequence
of the very meaning of the predicates or some other charaterization close to
that.
Now, what Tappenden calls penumbral sentences are pre-analytic sen-
tences that, relative to some assignment respecting the truth-functional in-
tuitions, are considered neither true nor false, even though we are strongly
inclined to regard them as true9. This tendency to consider penumbral sen-
tences true is what underlies the penumbral intuition.
5.3 Gaps and Supervaluations
We will present, now, Tappenden’s gap theory. We will do that in contrast
with Supervaluationism; as we will see, the former tries to capture the truth-
functional intuition while the latter elaborates the penumbral one.
Tappenden uses a partial model, called the pre-assignment, that assigns
to any predicate P an extension, that is, a set of objects to which the predicate
clearly applies, and an anti-extension, that is, a set of objects to which the
predicate clearly fails to apply.
Tappenden defines having semantic value 1 (for our present purposes we
can consider that having semantic value 1 is just being true) in the pre-
assignment using SK. The crucial difference with the previous section is
that, in Kripke’s solution to the Liar the truth predicate was the only partially
defined predicate, while in Tappenden’s view all vague predicates are partially
8Cf. chapter 3, section 3.3.
9According to Kit Fine, who introduced the expression ‘penumbral connection’, a
penumbral connection is a logical relation that holds among sentences that do
not receive any classical truth value. Then, the truths that arise from penumbral
connections are penumbral truths. According to Tappenden, though, penumbral
sentences are a subset of pre-analytic sentences and, since by definition are assigned
no truth value, there is no need to distinguish between penumbral sentences and
penumbral truths.
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defined. A sentence, then, is true if it is true in the pre-assignment and false
if it is false in the pre-assignment. It can be seen now that in an account
of vagueness such as this one, the truth-functional intuition plays a central
role.
Supervaluationism bases truth valuation, not upon the pre-assignment,
but upon the set of admissible ways of precisifying vague predicates10 in the
pre-assignment. Such precisifications must be admissible and complete. A
precisification is complete when it behaves classically; that is, when there are
no unsettled cases of the predicates. Additionally, a precisification is admis-
sible when it does not make any member of the set of pre-analytic sentences
false (so, in particular it must not make any member of the set of penum-
bral sentences false); that is, it does not conflict with our intuitions about
the meaning of the predicates. The supervaluationist claims, then, that a
sentence is true if, and only if, it is true on all complete admissible precisi-
fications and it is false if, and only if, it is false in all complete admissible
precisifications.
We can see now that penumbral sentences are true under this framework,
for they are true on all complete admissible precisifications. Thus, in a super-
valuationist account of vagueness the penumbral intuition is fully respected.
Actually, Kit Fine presents it as one of the main motivations for his account;
if we have a blob that is a borderline case of being red and of being pink,
we must be capable of explaining why we tend to say that the sentence ‘the
blob is both pink and red’ is false while we tend to say, when the blob is also
a borderline case of being small, that the sentence ‘the blob is both pink and
small’ is neither true nor false. It seems that no truth functional approach
can explain that. But one possible way of explaining it is to take into account
that if we make the relevant predicates more precise we will not be able to
make the blob a clear case of ‘pink’ and ‘red’ at the same time, while we will
be able to make the blob a clear case of both predicates ‘pink’ and ‘small’.
Fine dialectically presents Supervaluationism as a way of making rigorous
the last suggestion that differences in truth-values reflect differences in how
the predicates can be made more precise.
Now, returning to Tappenden and in order to finish the presentation of
his approach, it is important to notice that, as a matter of fact, it can be
seen as a position between the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions.
Let’s see why.
10Kit Fine considers the notion of admissibility as primitive, but Tappenden, as we
have seen, considers the notion of pre-analytic sentence as basic and the notion of
admissible precisification as derived; thus, an admissible precisification is one that
does not make any penumbral sentence false.
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First, it has to be said that Tappenden uses the supervaluationist ma-
chinery we have just seen in order to solve the fact that his framework cannot
distinguish between predicates like ‘tung’ and ‘heavy’; that is, it cannot ex-
press how constraints on increases in precision are embodied in the meaning
of predicates. After all, if a and b are borderline cases of the predicates ‘tung’
and ‘heavy’, and both predicates have the same extension and anti-extension,
the sentence ‘if a is tung so is b’ has the same status as the sentence ‘if a
is heavy so is b’ (that is, both are neither true nor false). But then, how
can we express the intuitive difference in meaning between the predicates
‘tung’ and ‘heavy’? The point is that, when we say that two predicates
behave in the same way, we do not only mean that they have the same ex-
tension and anti-extension, but also that it is necessary that, in case they
need to be sharpened, must be sharpened in the same ways. But that means
that, if we want to show that two predicates with the same extension and
anti-extension behave in different ways, we need to show that they can be
sharpened in different ways.
Here Tappenden wants to save one of the motivations for Supervaluation-
ism: the regimentation of the notion of constraint on increases of precision.
He uses the supervaluationist machinery in order to define indeterminate
sentences, which are those that are true and false depending on the precisi-
fication. That means that penumbral sentences are not indeterminate, but
have a very special status; they are never appropriately called false, they are
never false in any precisification. Nevertheless, both penumbral and indeter-
minate sentences are neither true nor false (I called them gappy).
That is why it can be said that Tappenden follows a position that can
be located between the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions; he
concedes to the latter the special status of the penumbral sentences:
[Penumbral sentences] are never appropriately called false. But contra
the penumbral intuition, they are not always correctly called true.
(Tappenden 1993, p. 569)
Thus, the general idea that Tappenden has in mind is the following one.
Sentences can have two truth values; they can be true (that is, true in the
pre-assignment) or false (false in the pre-assignment). On the other hand,
they can lack truth value, so that they are neither correctly called true nor
correctly called false. Now, among sentences that lack truth value we can
distinguish indeterminate sentences (if there is an admissible complete pre-
cisification where they are true and an admissible complete precisification
where they are false) and penumbral sentences (they are a subset of the
pre-analytic sentences and are never false in any complete admissible pre-
cisification). Although Tappenden’s terminology is rather confusing, I think
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this is the best way to make sense of his account. Notice that the use of the
supervaluationist machinery is necessary if we want to incorporate somehow
the penumbral intuition.
5.4 Some Unsuccessful Objections
5.4 The Penumbral Intuition
Tappenden has to answer an immediate criticism: his approach does not fully
respect the penumbral intuition. In his account, as we have seen, a sentence
like ‘the blob is not both red and orange’, where the blob in question is a
borderline case of being red and being orange, has to lack truth value, even
if we are strongly inclined to regard it as true. The same happens with our
first example; a sentence like ‘if Joe is taller than John, then, if John is tall,
Joe is’ lacks truth value when Joe and John are borderline cases of being tall.
Thus, we have to answer the question about the reason why we have such a
strong intuition.
Tappenden offers the following answer. The use of a language in a given
population is a very complex phenomenon. Hence, it is easy that it degen-
erates in a confusion of tongues. That explains the necessity of maintaining
the stability of the conventions of a language by correcting the linguistic mis-
takes of other people. And that can be made, precisely, using pre-analytic
sentences. The idea is that, if you hear somebody that, knowing Joe is taller
than John, utters ‘John is tall and Joe is not’, then you, in order to show her
that she has not correctly grasped the use of the word ‘tall’ and correct her
mistake, will utter ‘look, if Joe is taller that John, then if John is tall Joe is’.
According to Tappenden, the general pattern of this activity is the following
one:
[W]e utter a declarative sentence S in order to induce the withdrawal
of a mistaken utterance of ¬S, or the withdrawal of other utterances
that can only be true if ¬S is true, or to ward off anticipated mistaken
utterances of ¬S, by indicating that ¬S is never correctly assertable.
(Tappenden 1993, p. 570)
Now, since (i) a condition of correctness for a literal assertion of a sentence
φ is that φ must be true and (ii) φ is false when ¬φ is true and, consequently,
¬φ is not true when φ is not false, we can conclude that it is sufficient to
show that φ is not false in order to show the incorrectness of the assertion of
¬φ. When a sentence φ is used in this way to correct a mistaken utterance
of ¬φ, we say that φ has been articulated, not asserted. The main difference
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is that, while assertion implies truth, articulation only implies non falsity.
Then, according to Tappenden, penumbral sentences are typically articulated
and, therefore, do not need to be true, but only non false —which they are,
as they are not false in any precisification. If we sometimes mistakenly judge
that they can assert something and, hence, that they need to be true, is
because we are confused about assertion and articulation due to the fact
that the behavior by which its goals are attained (that is, to say something
about the world, and to correct a linguistic mistake) is the same; but it is
the same by a happy coincidence. So if the new speech act of articulation is
accepted, Tappenden can explain the existence of the penumbral intuition.
We will come back to articulation later.
Let’s see now two other possible objections to Tappenden’s view, one of
Rosanna Keefe and another one of Delia Graff Fara, which I think are not
successful.
5.4 Articulation and Implicatures
Rosanna Keefe wonders why we could not pragmatically justify a false sen-
tence in the same way as Tappenden does. And she continues:
If I am interested only in preventing assertion or acceptance of false
q, and the best way to communicate this is via p because it has the
implicature that ¬q, then p could be a suitable thing to assert whatever
its truth-value. (Keefe 2000, p. 184)
Remember, though, that the kind of process that Tappenden is defending
is that, provided that if φ is not false, ¬φ is not true, it is sufficient that
φ be non false to accept that ¬φ is not correctly assertable (for a literal
assertion of φ needs φ to be true). That is why the sentence used to correct
a linguistic mistake in articulation must be not false in order to imply that
its negation is not true (and, then, make its assertion incorrect). There is no
implicature here; Keefe is describing something that is not articulation.11
Moreover, when Grice (1975) characterizes the notion of conversational
implicature, one of its main features, apart from (i) the presupposition of the
observance by the speaker of the conversational maxims and (ii) the fact that
only the implicature makes sense of a supposed blatant failure of a maxim, is
that the speaker thinks and the hearer is supposed to think that the speaker
11Maybe I could articulate something that implies φ in order to withdraw some-
thing equivalent to ¬φ, but it is not still the same thing that Keefe is talking
about. Moreover, Tappenden could accept that because he is not claiming that
articulation is the only possible way to maintain the stability of languages.
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thinks, that the hearer can be aware of the requirement of (ii). Now, in
the case Keefe is putting forward, since the maxim to be failed to fulfill is
the quality maxim of trying to make the contribution to the conversation
one that is true, the speaker utters a false sentence and, then, the hearer
must recognize it to be false and must be capable of being aware of a kind
of requirement like the one described in (ii) and, only then, an implicature
may appear. But in Tappenden’s account, we do not only fail to recognize
that the articulated pre-analytic sentences should not be called true (and
even less we work out condition (ii)); we mistakenly judge them to be true,
without realizing that they only need to be not correctly called false in order
to succeed.12 We can see, hence, that it is false that the articulation of a
false sentence could be equally pragmatically justified in the same way as
Tappenden’s.
5.4 The Sorites
Delia Graff Fara proposes, in Graff Fara (2000, p. 50), some questions that
must be answered in front of the Sorites paradox.
In Tappenden’s account, the Induction Sorites argument is perfectly valid,
but the inductive premise lacks truth value (Tappenden (1993, p. 574)), which
makes the argument unsound (notice that, within the supervaluationist ac-
count, this premise is plain false, for every complete admissible precisification
has a sharp limit and, hence, the inference is also incorrect).
Now, according to Graff Fara, there is, first, a semantic question to be
answered: if the inductive premise of the paradox, a kind of sentence like
∀xy((Fx∧Rxy) → Fy)13, is not true, what happens with its classical nega-
tion ∃xy(Fx ∧ Rxy ∧ ¬Fy)? If it is true, since it seems to deny that vague
predicates have borderline cases, we have a problem, for vague predicates
have borderline cases. On the other hand, if it is not true, we have a non
true sentence with a non true negation, which seems to demand some expla-
nations. Tappenden uses SK in order to defend that the induction premise
and its negation are both not true because both lack truth value.
There is also the psychological question: why are we so inclined to accept
12Even more; one of the main features of conversational implicatures is that they can
be cancelled. Nothing seems to be cancellable in Tappenden’s articulation, though.
When I articulate a sentence φ I utter φ in order to induce your withdrawal of
¬φ and I use the fact that φ’s non falsity implies ¬φ’s non truth. And I cannot
cancel an implication.
13Recall that F is the vague predicate and R is the tolerance relation.
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the conditional premise ∀xy((Fx∧Rxy)→ Fy) if it is not true? Articulation
allows Tappenden to solve this question; as we said, we are confused about
articulation (that needs only non falsity) and assertion (that needs truth).14
Finally, there is what Fara calls the epistemic question: if the conditional
premise of the paradox ∀xy((Fx∧Rxy)→ Fy) cannot be true, then we should
be capable of saying which instances are not true; since it seems that we
cannot, an explanation is required. Graff Fara (2000, p. 79) claims, moreover,
that Tappenden cannot offer any response to that question.
Tappenden, though, can give an answer to the epistemic question for,
according to him, the instances that are not true are those which lack truth
value; that is, the ones where either ‘Fx ’ or ‘Fy’ lack truth value and that,
according to the strong Kleene scheme, the result is neither true nor false;
that is, the ones where x or y are borderline cases of F (simplifying a bit and
supposing that R is not vague).15 But we can know that. So we can know
which instances are not true: the ones that, due to the lack of truth value
of its constituents, lack truth value. Thus, if we can know which things are
borderline cases of a given predicate (our own response in front of them tells
us that) and we can know the semantic rules that govern logical connectives
(we know that), we can know which instances of the conditional premise
are not true.16 Hence, we can see that Tappenden can answer Graff Fara’s
epistemic question.
5.5 Some Objections
Tappenden, on the other hand, criticizes the supervaluationist approach and,
indirectly, the necessity of embracing the penumbral intuition. One of the
problems for the supervaluationist approach is that, in claiming that the
conditional premise of the Sorites paradox is false, it is committed to the
truth of the claim that there is an n such that n has a certain vague property
14Actually, as we will see, things are not so simple here.
15To be more precise, according to strong Kleene, the conditional premise will lack
truth value (i) when x is a clear case and y a borderline case of F, (ii) when x is a
borderline case and y a clear counter-case or (iii) when both are borderline cases
(always supposing that Rxy is not vague and true).
16I am ignoring higher-order vagueness throughout the chapter. I think that, in
general, it is not essential to the points that I am discussing. Nevertheless, it
might be important here; if there were higher-order vagueness we could not be
capable of deciding whether some objects are borderline cases. But even in this
situation we may be able to point out some if not most of the non true instances
of the inductive premise, for there will be clear borderline cases.
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and its successor does not. But there is not such an n. And a similar thing
happens with disjunctions; a disjunction can be true while we are incapable
of saying which disjunct is true.
This is one of the main criticisms that Supervaluationism has to face. As
Keefe (2000) states:
One striking departure from classical semantics is the way that there
are, in Fine’s phrase, ‘truth-value shifts’, where a disjunction is true
though there is no answer to which disjunct is true because the true
disjunct shifts from one to another on different [precisifications], or
similarly where the true instance of an existentially quantified state-
ment shifts. (Keefe 2000, p. 181)
Supervaluationists have a standard response that can face, at least up
to a point, this problem. First, since these truth-value shifts do not appear
when we remain within clear cases, and since we already knew that we had to
accept something counter-intuitive (the Sorites paradox shows that), we can
accept this disadvantage because of its role in the whole supervaluationist
theory.17
17It is interesting to consider an argument of Dummett (1975) that is aimed to
show, independently of the supervaluationist machinery, that the law of excluded
middle is true even if its components are neither true nor false. Suppose we have
a vague predicate P and an object a which is a borderline case of P. According to
Dummett, it seems plausible to accept that we can find a predicate Q such that
it is incompatible with P and such that the sentence ‘a is either P or Q’ is true.
Now, since P and Q are incompatible, Q implies not P and, hence, whenever ‘a
is either P or Q’ is true, ‘a is either P or not P’ is also true. Using this idea
Dummett claims that it is reasonable to say that, for any sentence A involving
vague expressions, and independently of its truth value, the sentence of the form
‘A or not A’ may be seen as true. That is why he says: ‘when vague statements are
involved, then, we may legitimately assert a disjunctive statement without allowing
that there is any determinate answer to the question which of the disjuncts is true’
(Dummett (1975, p. 107)). Moreover, this argument could prompt the suspicion
that sentences involving vague predicates behave classically and, hence, it could
be seen as a reason in favor of any approach that tries to respect classical logic (v.
gr. Supervaluationism or some epistemicist approaches that keep classical logic,
like Horwich’s approach we are going to see in Chapter 6) . It remains to be seen,
though, if the argument succeeds; after all, if we want the argument not to be
question-begging we need to find, given a vague predicate P and a borderline case
a of P, another predicate Q incompatible with P such that a is not a borderline
case of Q, which does not seem that plausible. That is, if we want to show that
(a) ‘Paul is tall or Paul is not tall’ is true even when Paul is a borderline case of
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Second, Supervaluationism can distinguish between the truth of the nega-
tion of the inductive premise of the Sorites paradox (that is, that there is an
n that has a certain property and its successor does not) and its having a
true instance. That can explain, claims the supervaluationist, our mistaken
intuitions.
The idea is that when we accept the negation of the inductive premise we
are not actually accepting the existence of a sharp boundary. The problem
is that we get confused between the claim that (i) it is true that, for some n,
n has a property and n+1 does not, and the claim that (ii) for some n, it is
true that n has a property and it is false that n+1 does. These two claims
do not need to have the same truth value; the second can be false while the
first is true. The confusion is a confusion of the scope of the truth predicate;
when it appears outside the existential quantifier, the resulting sentence can
be true without an instance making it true. Now we can see that in the
objection above we are confusing (i) and (ii).
The problems for the supervaluationist, though, do not end here. We have
seen that the precisifications over which she quantifies in order to evaluate
sentences must be complete; that means that it is necessary to draw sharp
boundaries between the extension and the anti-extension of vague predicates.
Tappenden claims that there is a certain kind of predicates, the essentially
vague ones, whose understanding implies the impossibility of drawing such
sharp boundaries. He defines essentially vague predicates in the following
way:
Call a predicate P essentially vague if there is a sequence a1, a2, . . . ,
an, and a relation Q, such that a1 is a clear case of P, an is a clear
counter-case, for each i¡ n+1, Qaiai+1 is true, and each instance of ‘If
Qaiai+1 then (Pai if and only if Pai+1)’ is a local consistency rule.
where a local consistency rule is a pre-analytic sentence, that is, according
to Tappenden,
a sentence which anyone who understands [it] knows not to draw more
precise boundaries [to P (supposing that Q is not vague)] in such a way
that [the sentence] would be false in any circumstances. (Tappenden
1993, p. 557)
being bald, it is not enough to appeal to the sentence (b) ‘Paul is tall or Paul is
short’. Although it is true that being short implies being non tall and, that, hence,
if (b) is true so is (a), the problem is that, if Paul is a borderline case of being tall
he will also be a borderline case of being short and, hence, someone who defends
that (a) is not true will very likely think that (b) is not true either.
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That means that there are predicates (essentially vague predicates like
‘roughly heavy’, ‘roughly within walking distance of Barcelona’ or ‘roughly
a handful of sand’) which do not accept complete precisifications in virtue of
its meaning.18
This criticism is very close to one presented by Michael Dummett. He
claims that, although vagueness somehow invests language with intrinsic in-
coherence, it is also an essential feature of language. Then, the problem with
Supervaluationism is that it regards vagueness as if it were eliminable and,
thus, it does not take vagueness seriously enough; it could seem that, accord-
ing to Supervaluationism, the fact that our language is vague is just due to
our laziness to make it precise.
The supervaluationist can respond that, after all, her theory is a semantic
account that quantifies over precisifications and that it is this quantification
what tries to capture the meaning of vague predicates, not the individual
precisifications. That means that it does not matter if it is impossible to use
in practice one of the precisifications (for example, due to the fact that our
language is essentially vague).
Nevertheless, the criticism of essentially vague predicates is more worri-
some for Supervaluationism. After all, we need to precisify vague predicates
in order to evaluate vague sentences; we may do that without committing
ourselves to the entities over which we quantify, but we cannot do that if we
are not able to give the rules that constrain such precisifications. And that is
what happens with predicates whose meaning entails a consistency rule; the
very meaning of the predicate prevents us from drawing sharp boundaries.
That means that the set of all complete admissible precisifications is empty
and that, consequently, we cannot evaluate any vague sentence (as a matter
of fact, all of them would be true and false).
In more detail, the worry is the following one. When we are in front of an
essentially vague predicate, we have sentences (local consistency rules) of the
form ∀xy(Rxy→ (Px↔ Py)) that, in virtue of the meaning of the predicate
18Other authors like, for example, Eklund (2001) propose similar predicates. Ac-
cording to Eklund, predicates like ‘smallish’ or ‘roughly red’ present a serious
problem to Supervaluationism because they challenge the rationale for singling
out a particular set of precisifications as acceptable: “according to the supervalu-
ationist analysis, vagueness is a matter of what we have failed to lay down. But
it appears that the conventions associated with ‘roughly’ and ‘-ish’ say exactly
that constructions with these expressions are supposed to be vague”(Eklund 2001,
p. 366). Eklund seems to consider that problem as unsolvable and, hence, the
only possibility for Supervaluationism is to treat such predicates as special cases
to which precisifications cannot be applied. That means that then Supervalua-
tionism cannot offer a unified account of the phenomenon of vagueness.
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P cannot be false; that is, they are pre-analytic according to Tappenden.
In contrast, suppose that P is a non essentially vague predicate, say, ‘tall’,
and that Rxy if and only if y is one millimeter taller than x. Then, one
of the directions of the biconditional, namely (i) ∀xy(Rxy → (Px → Py)),
is clearly pre-analytic in Tappenden’s sense. But the other direction, (ii)
∀xy(Rxy → (Py → Px)) is not (that is why it can be false within the
supervaluationist frame). The latter is pre-analytic, though, if P is ‘roughly
tall’; that is, (ii) is never false, and that happens in virtue of the very meaning
of P.
Notice that (ii) is the conditional premise of the Sorites paradox. And
we are strongly inclined to consider it as true —if we were not, we would not
have a paradox. Why? Well, when P is a non essentially vague predicate
like ‘tall’ we would say that the very meaning of the predicate P seems to
suggest that it is true. But, that is precisely what happens with (ii) when
P is an essentially vague predicate like ‘roughly tall’. The predicates ‘tall’
and ‘roughly tall’ are certainly different but they seem to provide (ii) with
the same semantic status; in both cases (ii) seems true in virtue of its vague
expressions. Hence, it is not clear at all in what could consist the difference
between essentially and non essentially vague predicates and in what sense
their supposed differences in meaning could prevent sharp boundaries from
being drawn in the former case and not in the latter. Let us help illuminate
the situation with an example.
Take the predicate ‘roughly tall’, why cannot we precisify this predicate
saying that it increases the extension of the predicate ‘tall’ in, say, three
centimeters? The idea is, then, that there will be a set of admissible precisi-
fications of the first predicate that will extent the extension of the second
predicate. That means, of course, that somebody of two meters will be
roughly tall; that could sound weird, but it does not seem very difficult to
give a plausible pragmatic story capable of explaining such a weirdness: as
Matti Eklund proposes, when we say that Goliath is roughly tall, we are flout-
ing the Gricean maxim Be specific, but we are not saying anything untrue
(Eklund 2001, p. 366).
In light of these considerations, we conclude that there is no difference
between essentially and non essentially vague predicates; both allow precisi-
fications and, more importantly, both are governed by the same pre-analytic
sentences. Hence, Tappenden has two options; first, he can accept that there
are no essentially vague predicates, in which case his objection to Supervalua-
tionism based on this kind of predicates cannot get off the ground or, second,
he can claim that all vague predicates are essentially vague predicates. Then,
his criticism collapses into Dummett’s one that precisifying vague predicates
does not respect their meaning. And we have seen that Supervaluationism
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has a response to Dummett’s worry.
Now the supervaluationist must say that (ii) is false even when the pred-
icate is essentially vague; I do not see why that is harder to accept than
the cases where the predicate is non essentially vague; denying (ii) is equally
weird (if weird at all) independently of the degree of vagueness of the predi-
cate.
Besides, the situation does not change if we consider precisifications as
primitive; after all, if we can stipulate, within a great amount of arbitrariness,
sharp boundaries for the predicate ‘tall’ it is not clear why we cannot do the
same with the predicate ‘roughly tall’ (recall that the supervaluationist does
not need to commit herself to the use in practice of any of the precisifications).
Thus, finally, the supervaluationist can claim that there are not essentially
vague predicates and that Tappenden’s local consistency rules are not only
no pre-analytic, but false.
Consequently, if we do not accept the existence of essentially vague pred-
icates, Tappenden’s argument against Supervaluationism fails. Additionally,
we will see now that if we accept the existence of essentially vague predi-
cates, not only the supervaluationist has to face a serious problem, but also
has Tappenden.
Recall that the supervaluationist machinery was essential to Tappenden’s
approach. So if it is true that the set of complete admissible precisifications
is empty, Tappenden also has a problem for, how can he distinguish between
the predicates ‘roughly tung’ and ‘roughly heavy?’ They behave in very
similar ways but, without the supervaluationist machinery, it seems difficult
to express the ways in which they differ. Now Tappenden cannot use the set
of complete admissible precisifications in order to differentiate indeterminate
sentences from penumbral sentences and then, how can he distinguish them?
They are sentences with exactly the same status: neither true nor false.
Thus Tappenden, in accepting the existence of essentially vague predicates,
is refuting his own point of view, or at least he is weakening it.
Hence, even if we suppose that there are predicates that cannot be sharp-
ened, Tappenden’s view is, at least, as problematic as Supervaluationism.
Another noticeable feature of Tappenden’s account is related to the reason
why the deception of the paradoxes is so compelling, which, as we saw in
chapter 3, should be part of any solution to the paradoxes. As we have
seen, articulation is what allows Tappenden to solve this question; we are
confused about articulation (that needs only non falsity) and assertion (that
needs truth). But we can see now that this proposal works only in the case of
essentially vague predicates, where the main premise of the Induction Sorites
is a pre-analytic sentence, that is, it is never false in any precisification. In
contrast, this is not the case when the predicate is not essentially vague,
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for then, the inductive premise of the Induction Sorites is not pre-analytic,
for it is false in some precisifcations, which means that it is indeterminate.
The problem is that only the pre-analytic sentences can be articulated and,
hence, the main premise of the Induction Sorites cannot be articulated, which
implies that we cannot explain why it seems true to us. Tappenden’s response
is that, since in most contexts we do not want to draw boundaries sharply
enough for the sentence to be false, it seems true to us. This suggests that
precisifications might not be complete; this, tough, means that, either we
must give up the supervaluationist machinery, which, as I said is a serious
problem for Tappenden, or we must find another way of evaluating sentences
in non complete precisifications. I will come back to this last point in the
next section.
There is still another problem with Tappenden’s use of articulation. He
says that what explains the fact that we tend to see penumbral sentences as
true is that we confuse assertion and articulation. Thus, if we believe that
the sentence ‘it is not the case that the blob is red and the blob is not red’
uttered in front of a borderline case of being red is true is due to the fact that
we typically use it in situations were we think it has to be true (we think
that we are asserting it) but, actually, it has to be only non false (we are
articulating it). It seems true that, if we imagine a situation where somebody
utters ‘this blob is red and not red’, then, in order to correct her we could
say ‘it is not the case that the blob is red and not red’ and, moreover, that
this latter sentence only need to be non false in order to succeed. But can
we really rely on this kind of situations in order to justify the existence of
the very strong intuition that penumbral sentences are true? The confusion
between assertion and articulation that helps Tappenden support the truth-
functional intuition seems to rely on the fact that we have to be in situations
like these very often, sufficiently often to explain our mistake. But that does
not seem to be the case; most of us are confronted to sentences like ‘if Joe
is taller than John, then, if John is tall, Joe is’ for the first time when we
begin to read papers about vagueness and, in spite of that, we are strongly
inclined to believe them true. I do not see any room for confusion here.
That suggests that offering an account of the penumbral intuition is still
a problem for Tappenden’s approach to vagueness.
5.6 The Liar
As we said at the beggining, Tappenden accepts Kripke’s framework in order
to cope with the Liar. We also saw two of the main problems this approach
has to face. Let us put the first one in another way.
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Recall that the Liar reasoning allows us to conclude that the Liar is true
if, and only if, it is not true. Now imagine yourself explaining this paradox
to someone who does not seem to understand it. As Tappenden observes, in
a situation like that,
[y]ou might well say: “Here is what is funny about [the Liar]. If [it]
is true, then it is not true, and if [it] is not true then it is true”.
(Tappenden 1993, p. 552)
Although this might seem contradictory, it is the appropriate thing to say
in this situation; we seem to be asserting it appropriately. But as we saw at
the beginning, the sentence Trpλq↔ ¬Trpλq (the formal counterpart of the
previous claim) has value 1⁄2 in Kripke’s construction, what implies that it
should not be assertable. This is just a consequence of the weakness of the
conditional in SK we already discussed above.
Now, Tappenden’s strategy consists in defending that “some of the consid-
erations that pertained to vague predicates may be carried over” (Tappenden
1993, p. 575) to the truth predicate, so that articulation can be used in order
to explain away why certain sentences that have no truth value according
to Kripke’s approach seem true to us; that is, Tappenden wants to explain
away the penumbral intuition applied to the truth predicate. Some of the
sentences Tappenden thinks fall under the penumbral intuition are, apart
from the already noticed Trpλq ↔ ¬Trpλq, instances of LEM applied to
ungrounded sentences and, of course, the instances of the T-schema of un-
grounded sentences. All these sentences are pre-analytic; that is, they are
never false, in a sense to be specified shortly. Besides, since they receive
value 1⁄2 in SK they are penumbral sentences.
Let us see, first, which are the features of the truth predicate that make
Tappenden claim that we can carry over to truth the results we got about
vagueness. The main such feature Tappenden puts forward is the arbitrari-
ness that can be found when we try to determine which is the extension of
the truth predicate. Specifically, Tappenden mentions the Truth-teller, the
sentence τ introduced just at the beginning of this chapter that is identical
to its own truth ascription. As we saw, and so Tappenden claims, we can
consistently assign τ to the extension of Tr and we can also consistently as-
sign ¬τ to this extension. This suggests, according to him, that there will
exist constraints on how these different stipulations of the extension of the
truth predicate might be. Among these constraints there will be sentences
like ‘for any sentence x, Trpxq∨¬Trpxq’ or, indeed, any sentence of the form
Trpφq ↔ φ. These sentences are evaluated as having semantic value 1⁄2 in
Kripke’s framework and, hence, they are not assertable. Why, then, in situ-
ations like the one described above, we seem to assert them? Why do they
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seem true to us? How can we explain away the penumbral intuition applied
to truth? Here is where Tappenden uses the notion of articulation:
As with vague predicates, we may explain away the penumbral intu-
ition by noting the way the patterns of use of the relevant sentences
lead us to take them unreflectively to be true. The Tarski bicondi-
tional with liar instances [...] might well be uttered in the course of
an attempt to demonstrate why it is unacceptable to assert [the Liar]
and unacceptable to assert the negation of [the Liar]. The imagined
utterance of Tarski biconditional is successful if the hearer recognizes
that certain other sentences cannot be correctly asserted; so the ac-
count of articulation [...] extends naturally to this expanded setting.
(Tappenden 1993, p. 576)
Recall now how articulation worked: essentially, we uttered a sentence φ
in order to show that it was unacceptable to assert ¬φ. But since in order to
show that ¬φ cannot be asserted it is enough to show that it is not true, and
since φ being not false implies that ¬φ is not true, we concluded that showing
that φ is not false is enough to show that ¬φ cannot be asserted. Now, in the
case of vagueness, pre-analytic sentences were typically articulated, according
to Tappenden, because they were never false in any precisification. Can we
adapt this idea to truth? I do not think so.
As I said at the presentation of Kripke’s approach, K is just the minimal
fixed point; there are many other fixed points that extend K and that, as
fixed points, validate the Principle of Intersubstitutivity (so that they can
be claimed to be a possible extension for a truth predicate). Kripke (1975)
also showed that every fixed point can be extended to a maximal fixed point,
where a maximal fixed point, in Kripke’s words, is “a fixed point that has no
proper extension that is also a fixed point. Maximal fixed points assign “as
many truth values as possible”; one could not assign more consistently with
the intuitive concept of truth” (Kripke 1975, p. 708).
Now, if Tappenden’s use of articulation applied to the Liar has to make
sense, the instances of the T-schema will be pre-analytic sentences; that is,
sentences that cannot be evaluated as false in any way of making more precise
the truth predicate. What that means is that the most natural candidates
to be the admissible ways to make more precise the truth predicate are, pre-
cisely, the fixed points, because they never make false any instance of the
T-schema. Recall, though, that, apart from being admissible, the precisifica-
tions of the vague predicates had to be complete; all cases had to be decided.
In the case of truth, this is not possible, if the instances of the T-schema
are regarded as pre-analytic. To see why, suppose X is a complete way of
making the truth predicate precise and N is a model for the base language
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L as introduced in section 5.1. Now, if X is complete, either |λ|〈N ,X〉 = 1
or |λ|〈N ,X〉 = 0. Suppose |λ|〈N ,X〉 = 1 (the other case is analogous). Then,
by definition of λ, |¬Trpλq|〈N ,X〉 = 1 and, hence, |Trpλq|〈N ,X〉 = 0. Conse-
quently, |Trpλq↔ λ|〈N ,X〉 = 0. So, if the truth predicate is made completely
precise some instances of the T-schema will be false and, hence, the T-schema
cannot be pre-analytic. That means that the ways of making precise the truth
predicate cannot be complete, which, in turn, means that classical logic can-
not be used in them, in sharp contrast with vagueness. It is to be expected,
then, that in order to evaluate the semantic value of the sentences in the
fixed points, we will have to use SK.
Hence, the picture we are unraveling is the following one. The semantic
value of the sentences involving truth is determined by K, the minimal fixed
point. Then some sentences that have no truth value are such that we are
strongly inclined to believe them true. This inclination, though, is an illusion
prompted by the fact that, although they do not have truth value, they
cannot be false, which is what is needed to correct linguistic mistakes. Now,
since given that they are never false and, hence, they are used to correct
linguistic mistakes and given that correcting linguistic mistakes with such
sentences (articulating them) is so similar to asserting them, we confusingly
conclude that they are asserted, which in turn implies that they are true.
In order to make sense of the idea of a sentence with vague predicates that
cannot be false, Tappenden used the Supervaluational machinery. Then, the
suggestion is to make a similar move for the truth predicate; pre-analytic
sentences involving truth will be the sentences that are not false in any way
of making precise the truth predicate that does not conflict with its meaning,
that is, the sentences that are not false in any fixed point. But the fact that
the ways of making the truth predicate more precise are not complete is fatal
for, although it is true that sentences like (i) ‘for any sentence x, Trpxq ∨
¬Trpxq’ are never false in any fixed point, the same happens, for example, to
(ii) ‘for some sentence x, Trpxq∧¬Trpxq’. This means that if we characterize
pre-analytic sentences as the sentences that are never false in any way of
making ‘true’ precise, (ii) will be pre-analytic. But pre-analytic sentences
were supposed to capture some important features of the meaning of the
predicates involving them, which in the case of (ii) is clearly not the case.
This means that Tappenden should provide us with a new characterization
of pre-analytic sentences that is not clear at all how could proceed.
The truth predicate, thus, becomes something on the lines of an essen-
tially vague predicate; there are no complete and admissible ways of making
the truth predicate precise. That makes difficult to imagine how can we
apply the strategy that Tappenden used for vague predicates to the truth
predicate.
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5.7 Solving the paradoxes
It remains to be seen whether Tappenden is defending something on the lines
of a common solution to the Liar and the Sorites. Recall that in chapter 3
we defended that a common solution to both paradoxes must offer at least
a common reason about why there is a deception in them. We also distin-
guished between a strong and a weak common solution to the Liar and the
Sorites; the former offers the same prevention to both paradoxes while the
latter does not.
In this chapter we have seen that what Tappenden seems to propose is
the following:
(a) First, he offers preventions to the Liar (Kripke’s proposal) and the Sorites
(SK) which have in common the use of SK. Still, even if both preventions
use SK, they are not the same; all the sophisticated machinery about
fixed points used in the case of truth does not play any role in the case
of vagueness.
(b) Second, Tappenden offers a common explanation of the reason why the
deception in the paradoxes (the non-truth of the inductive premise in the
case of the Sorites and the invalidity of LEM in the case of the Liar) is
compelling, which in Tapenden’s framework is equivalent to explaining
away the penumbral intuition. As we have seen, Tappenden uses ideas
of Supervaluationism and a new speech act, articulation, in order to do
that. We have also seen that, unfortunately, it is not clear at all whether
this strategy can be soundly applied to the truth predicate.
Does any of (a) or (b) above imply that we are in front of a common solution
to the Liar and the Sorites? Having in mind the previous considerations
the answer is no; no common reason about why there is a deception in the
paradox is offered.
Nevertheless, Tappenden’s proposal, if successful, would be a tool that
could be used by certain common solution to the Liar and the Sorites. Imag-
ine we have a solution to both paradoxes that proposes that the Liar and
borderline vague ascriptions are undetermined and that points to a common
source of this indeterminacy, so that such a solution can be considered a
common solution. Suppose, further, that some logic similar enough to SK
was used in the preventions of both paradoxes so that, due to its weakness,
the penumbral intuition remained unanswered. In cases like these, Tap-
penden’s articulation might be used in order to explain away this intuition,
what amounts to explaining away why the culprits of the Liar and the Sorites
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paradoxes are so compelling; that is, why the T-schema (and LEM) and the
inductive premise seem true to us.
CHAPTER
SIX
PAUL HORWICH: SEMANTIC EPISTEMICISM
Paul Horwich defends an epistemic account for vagueness and its paradoxes.
He and other authors have tried to look into the possibility of applying the
strategy Horwich devises for vagueness to truth. In this chapter I will present
Horwich’s approach to vagueness, which preserves classical logic, and I will
discuss whether and how it can be applied to the case of the Liar.
I will need to introduce Horwich’s deflationary theory of truth, called
Minimalism, and present the solution Horwich offers for the Liar. It will
turn out that such a solution proceeds by restricting the T-schema and, as
a consequence of that, it will need a constructive specification of which in-
stances of the T-schema are to be excluded from the minimalist theory of
truth. Horwich has presented, in a very informal way, one such construction
that would specify the minimalist theory. In the last part of the chapter I
will try to make it precise. It will turn out that the construction is the min-
imal fixed point of Kripke’s construction with the supervaluationist scheme.
Finally, some properties of Horwich’s construction and some amendments to
it will be discussed.
6.1 Vagueness
Horwich defends an epistemic account of vagueness according to which vague
predicates have sharp boundaries which we are not capable of knowing. Fur-
thermore, he wants to preserve the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM), which is
seen as a basic law of thought, and, consequently, he claims, the Principle of
Bivalence, or BIV (see, for example, Horwich 1997, 2005a). He needs, hence,
a theory of vagueness capable of accommodating all these features and of
explaining the phenomenology that underlies the phenomenon of vagueness;
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that is, according to him, our tendency to be unwilling to apply both the
predicate and its negation to certain objects although being aware of the fact
that no further investigation could be of any usefulness.
Horwich admits that the following claim is counterintuitive:
(*) vague predicates have sharp boundaries, that is, they divide the world
into two sharp groups of things; the ones that have the property ex-
pressed by the predicate and the ones that haven’t.
He claims, though, that in front of the Sorites paradox only two reasonable
responses are possible: abandon classical logic or accepting (*). Since the
former strategy is seen by Horwich as desperate, he proposes to follow the
latter one: we must accept (*). But the intuition that vagueness is at odds
with sharp boundaries is very strong and, if we try to solve the Sorites para-
dox by posing sharp boundaries on vague predicates, we still need to explain
away why we have such a strong intuition. One of the main roots of our
reluctance to the acceptance of sharp boundaries for vague predicates is the
fact that it seems impossible to find them; it seems impossible to find out
the line that divides the objects that have a given property expressed by a
vague predicate and the objects that do not have that property. But the fact
that we are not able to find out the sharp boundaries of vague predicates
can be best explained by the fact that there are no such sharp boundaries.
Horwich’s response to this line of thought consists of an explanation of why
we cannot know where the sharp boundaries of our vague predicates are and,
consequently, why we can’t know the extensions of such predicates. Let’s see
how this account is articulated.
Horwich proposes to look at the fundamental regularities implicit in our
linguistic practice that underly our use of vague predicates. His proposal is
to understand this fundamental regularity as
approximated by a partial function [...] which specifies the subjective
probability of its applying as a function of the underlying parameter
n (i.e. ‘number of grains’ for ‘heap’, ‘number of dollars’ for ‘rich’,. . . ).
(Horwich 1997, p. 933)
Such regularities would explain all our uses of vague predicates; they would
be complete in the sense that any “decision” (Horwich 1997, p. 934) about
the borderline cases of a given vague predicate P would have to be a con-
sequence of the underlying partial function A(P). Such function would have
been implicitly acquired by exposure to sentences reflecting clear instances of
P, of not-P, and of not so clear cases close enough to the clear ones. The par-
tial function A(P) is determined, thus, by our acceptance of certain sentences
containing the word for P. That’s why Horwich says:
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the explanatorily fundamental acceptance property underlying our use
of ‘red’ is (roughly) the disposition to apply ‘red’ to an observed sur-
face when and only when it is clearly red. (Horwich 1998a, p. 45)
These partial functions are the fundamental facts about our use of vague
predicates; they are fundamental in the sense that they must be in the basis of
any explanation of any fact concerning our use of vague predicates (Horwich
2005a, p. 94, 1997, p. 934). The fact that these fundamental facts are
functions that remain silent with respect to the application of the predicates
to certain objects explains why we also must remain silent in front of such
applications and why we are confident that acquiring new information will not
solve the matter, which is, according to Horwich, the basic phenomenology
underlying vagueness.
These considerations also explain why we cannot know whether border-
line cases are in the extensions of vague predicates; the only way we can be
justified in applying a given vague predicate to an object is via the funda-
mental facts underlying the vague predicate and that, as we have seen, is not
possible. Hence, believing an ascription of a vague predicate to a borderline
case will never be able to constitute knowledge.
Horwich then defines a notion of determinateness based on his account of
meaning. He uses, first, the claim that meanings are concepts and, second,
that meaning properties are constituted1 by use properties, which, in turn,
stem from some given fundamental acceptance properties (Horwich 1998a,
p. 44). The idea, then, is that some ascription of a predicate P to an object
o is indeterminate when it is conceptually impossible to know whether o is
P; that is, when the unknowability of the ascription has its roots in the facts
(that is, the fundamental acceptance properties) that make our words mean
what they mean.
I will not focus here on the virtues or defects of Horwich’s account of
vagueness, but rather, I will investigate whether this approach can be applied
to truth and the Liar, as Horwich himself seems to defend.
1According to Horwich (1998a, p. 25) a given property A is constituted by another
property B when their coextensiveness is the basic explanation of facts involving
A; thus, for example, if the property of being water is constituted by the property
of being composed of H2O, it is because (i) they apply to the same things and (ii)
that this fact (namely, (i)) explains all facts about the property of being water.
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6.2 Minimalism and Semantic Epistemicism
6.2 Deflationism
Horwich’s theory of truth, called Minimalism, follows the Wittgensteinian
rule against overdrawing linguistic analogies; although for some predicates
(‘table’, ‘dog’,...) it makes sense to inquire into the shared characteristics
of the things to which they apply, for some others, like the truth predicate,
it does not. If it makes sense to seek some kind of underlying nature in
the case of the former kind of predicates, it is because they are used to
categorize reality; we cannot presuppose, though, that this is the function of
the truth predicate. Actually, Horwich is a deflationist about truth, which
means that, according to him, truth is not a genuine property; the truth
predicate is not used to describe anything, the true truth-bearers do not
share any common property. As a matter of fact, the truth predicate is just
a device of disquotation. Truth, hence, is a semantical, or logical, notion that
is in no need of metaphysical or epistemological analysis. A locus classicus for
the view that the truth predicate is just a device of disquotation that enables
us to express, by means of quantification, certain infinite conjunctions and
disjunctions is Quine (1986):
We may affirm the single sentence by just uttering it, unaided by quo-
tation or by the truth predicate; but if we want to affirm some infinite
lot of sentences that we can demarcate only by talking about the sen-
tences, then the truth predicate has its use. We need it to restore the
effect of objective reference when for the sake of some generalization
we have resorted to semantic ascent. (Quine 1986, p. 12)
Why would we need to express such infinite lots of sentences? Suppose I, for
some reason, believe all you said yesterday. I can express this belief using the
following infinite conjunction, where each φn is to be replaced for a sentence
in the language:
(If you said yesterday: ‘φ1’, then φ1) and (If you said yesterday: ‘φ2’,
then φ2) and ...
Now, since we cannot handle infinite conjunctions, it is tempting to di-
rectly generalize on φ’s position above using ordinary pronominal variables,
and obtain:
For every x, if you said yesterday: ‘x ’, then x.
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This will not work, though, because on the one hand, the second occurrence
of the variable x above is in an opaque context and, thus, cannot be bound by
usual quantifiers and, on the other hand, pronominal variables can be substi-
tuted only by singular terms and the third occurrence of the variable appears
in a sentence position and, thus, it cannot be substituted by a singular term.
We can easily solve the problem for the second occurrence of the variable
in the last generalization and get:
For every x, if you said yesterday: x, then .
Where the second occurrence of x is used now in a name position (the name
of the sentence uttered). If we could do the same with respect to the third
occurrence of the variable, we would have reached the desired goal. And that
is what the truth predicate allows us to do. The key idea is that a sentence
φ and the sentence that says that φ is true are always interchangeable salva
veritate and, hence, the truth predicate, via its disquotational character,
allows us to transform a given sentence φ into another sentence which makes
an ascription of a predicate (the truth predicate) using a name for φ and,
thus, allows us to use ordinary pronominal variables:
For every x, if you said yesterday: x, then x is true.2
Or, plainly
All you said yesterday is true.
As Gupta (1993a, p. 61) puts it, the truth predicate “enables us to generalize
over sentence positions while using pronominal variables such as ‘x’ and,
thus, endows us with additional expressive power”.
2There is another way to circumvent this problem; we can use substitutional quan-
tification. Substitutional quantifiers can bind variables of an arbitrary substitution
class and hence, in particular, they can bind sentence variables and predicate vari-
ables. According to Horwich, though, the advantage of the truth predicate over the
substitutional quantification is that the former is a simpler linguistic device than
the latter, which would be a “cumbersome addition to our language” (Horwich
1998b, p. 32). I do not think, though, that a deflationist needs to commit herself
to claims about the higher efficiency of the truth predicate over other similar lin-
guistic devices. The truth predicate is the device we have in natural languages to
overcome certain expressive limitations but, as fas as I can see, the proponent of
the deflationary point of view about truth does not need to defend that it is the
only device (not even the best one) that can do that.
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6.2 Minimalism
This was a general explanation of why deflationists about truth think we have
the truth predicate in our language. But different deflationary approaches
to truth develop these intuitions in different ways. Thus, for example, al-
though some deflationists think that the truth-bearers are utterances (see,
for example Field 1994) some others, like Horwich himself, think that the
truth-bearers are propositions. Besides, the idea of the interchangeability
of a sentence and its truth ascription is usually captured by deflationists
with the T-schema, which in the case of Horwich, is applied, as I said, to
propositions:3
(T-schema) < p > is true iff p.
Horwich (1998b, 2001, 2010c) has presented and defended Minimalism.
One of its main theses is that the instances of the T-schema are epistemolog-
ically, explanatory and conceptually fundamental. Thus, in the first place,
they fix the meaning, they implicitly define the truth predicate (Horwich
1998b, p. 145); this is so because the basic and fundamental regularity of
use that determines the meaning of ‘truth’ (which is the concept of truth,
for meanings are concepts, according to Horwich) is our disposition to ac-
cept all instances of the T-schema, so they are conceptually fundamental. In
the second place, the instances of the T-schema are all we need to explain
all our uses of ‘true’, so they are explanatory fundamental.4 And, finally,
the instances of the T-schema are “immediately known” (Horwich 2010c, p.
36), they cannot be deduced from anything more basic, so they are episte-
mologically fundamental. In other words, according to Horwich, the role of
the T-schema with respect to the truth predicate is the same as the partial
functions of section 6.1 with respect to vague predicates.
Considering all that, therefore, it is not surprising that Horwich’s the-
ory of truth, Minimalism, contains as axioms all instances of the T-schema
applied to propositions, and nothing else.5
3The symbols ‘<’ and ‘>’ surrounding a given expression e produce an expression re-
ferring to the propositional constituent expressed by e. Thus, when e is a sentence,
‘< e >’ means the proposition that e.
4This is an exaggeration; strictly speaking, we will need other theories besides the
truth theory to explain all facts about truth, because some of these facts will
involve other phenomena. As Horwich says, Minimalism “provides a theory of
truth that is a theory of nothing else, but which is sufficient, in combination with
theories of other phenomena, to explain all the facts about truth” (Horwich 1998b,
pp. 24-25).
5That characterization is not completely accurate; as Horwich admits, the theory
should also have an axiom claiming that only propositions are bearers of truth (see
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Now, as we know, the proposition that asserts its own untruth makes
the theory consisting of just all instances of the T-schema inconsistent in
classical logic. Until recently, Horwich’s response to this problem had been
very succinct. In his (1998) he claims that the lesson the Liar tells us is that
not all the instances of the T-schema are to be included as axioms in the
theory (Horwich 1998b, p. 42). Thus, the minimalist theory of truth consists
of a restricted collection of instances of the T-schema; only those that do
not engender Liar-like paradoxes. Which of the instances of the T-schema
should be removed, though, was left undetermined.
A proposal of a full solution to the Liar based on the previous consider-
ations has been made explicit by Armour-Garb (2004), Beall and Armour-
Garb (2005), Restall (2005) and, though succinctly, by Horwich himself in
his (2010). Beall, Armour-Garb and Restall has called it Semantic Epistemi-
cism. Horwich claims:
[W]e can and should preserve the full generality of the Law of Excluded
Middle and the Principle of Bivalence: [The Liar] is either true or false.
Of course we cannot come to know which of these truth values it has.
For confidence one way or the other is precluded by the meaning of
the word ‘true’ — more specifically, by the fact that its use is governed
by the [T-schema] (subject to the above restrictions). Thus, just as
it is indeterminate whether a certain vague predicate applies, or does
not apply, to a certain borderline case (although certainly it does or
doesn’t), so (and for the same reason) it is indeterminate whether [The
Liar] is true or whether it is false. (The emphasis is mine)(Horwich
2010c, fn. 11 in page 91)
We can now present the two tenets of Semantic Epistemicism, the mini-
malist stance in front of The Liar:
1. The Liar is true or The Liar is false.
2. It is conceptually impossible to know whether The Liar is true and it
is conceptually impossible to know whether The Liar is false.
Let’s see the rationales for these two points.
First Tenet First, 1 is an instance of the Principle of Bivalence. Horwich
(1998b, p. 71) justifies this principle applied to all propositions
in the following way. Define, first, falsity in terms of “absence of truth”:
< p > is false iff it is not the case that < p > is true.
Horwich 1998b, fn. 7 in page 23, page 43).
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Then, the Law of Excluded Middle gives us the desired result. For given a
proposition p we have that p or not-p (LEM) and, hence, in particular when
p is of the form q is true , we obtain that either q is true or it is not the case
that q is true; that is, either q is true or q is false. Notice that we did not need
to use the instance of the T-schema for p. The problem is that Horwich seems
to be begging the question when he defines falsity as non-truth, because he
is supposing that the only way in which a proposition can be not true is
by being false; but that is, precisely, what is at stake here. Consider, for
example, a view that posits truth value gaps (like, for example, some form
of Supervaluationism); such a view will not accept Horwich’s definition of
falsity, because propositions that are neither true nor false are, in particular,
not true, but they are not false either; so falsity cannot be absence of truth.
A more neutral way of defining falsity is in terms of truth of the negation:
< p > is false iff <not p > is true.
The problem is that, if Horwich had defined falsity in terms of truth of
the negation rather than in terms of non-truth, then he would have needed
to use the instance of the T-schema for p and, since some of the instances
of the T-schema are not in the theory (in particular the Liar instance) he
would not have been able to derive 1. So Horwich seems to be in front of a
dilemma; either he does not use the T-schema but begs the question, or he
offers a more dialectically robust argument which turns out to be unsound
due to the restriction on the T-schema. 6We will see, towards the end of this
chapter, another way to obtain bivalence for the Minimalist theory.
Second Tenet The reasons for accepting 2 are closely related to our previous
discussion of vagueness. As Horwich says in the quote above,
the reasons why the truth value of the Liar is indeterminate are the same as
in the case of vagueness. Hence, the reasons for accepting 2 are rooted in
the fact that the instances of the T-schema are explanatorily fundamental
in the sense that they must be in the basis of any explanation of any fact
concerning our use of the truth predicate and, moreover, that they fix the
meaning of ‘truth’, that is, the concept of truth.
As in the vagueness case, Horwich can define a notion of determinateness
based on his account of meaning. He uses, first, the claim that meanings
are concepts and, second, that meaning properties are constituted by use
6Even with the T-schema unrestricted, it is contentious that BIV can be vindi-
cated using LEM, specially when the T-schema is formulated in a congenial way
to Supervaluationism. See Andjelcovic´ and Williamson (2000) and Lo´pez de Sa
(2009).
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properties, which, in turn, stem from some given fundamental acceptance
properties (Horwich 1998a, p. 44), which, in the case of the truth predicate,
are our dispositions to accept the instances of the T-schema. Some of these
dispositions, though, are overridden by the fact that we realize that some of
the instances of the T-schema lead to inconsistency. These instances, then,
will not be in the minimalist truth theory.
The idea, once we have restricted the truth theory, is that some ascription
of the truth predicate to a given proposition p is indeterminate when we do
not know whether p is true or not and the unknowability of the ascription
has its roots in the facts (that is, the fundamental acceptance properties; our
dispositions to accept the instances of the T-schema, in the case of truth)
that make our words mean what they mean, and that happens because the
instances of the T-schema needed to know whether p is true or not are not
present in our truth theory; Horwich claims that, then, it is conceptually
impossible to know whether p is true.
In sum, since we do not accept the paradoxical instances of the T-schema
and, hence, the minimalist theory of truth does not contain them as axioms,
it is conceptually impossible to know any fact concerning the truth value of
the paradoxical propositions; its truth value is indeterminate in Horwich’s
sense.
At this point, though, the contingent Liar seems to be a problem for
Horwich’s proposal. As I just said, we are not disposed to accept some of the
instances of the T-schema because we realize that they lead to inconsistency.
According to the sometimes called Simple Conditional Analysis7, a sub-
ject S has the disposition to accept a given instance of the T-schema when
confronted with it iff S would accept it if it were the case that S was con-
fronted with it. So, to say that we do not have the disposition to accept the
paradoxical instances of the T-schema is to say that we would not accept
such instances in case we were confronted with them. That may be so in
the case of The Liar; we may claim that when a subject S is in front of the
instance of the T-schema applied to The Liar, S can conclude a priori that
such instance is not acceptable, because it leads to a contradiction.
As we saw in chapter 1, some paradoxical sentences are not intrinsically
paradoxical; that means that they are paradoxical depending on some fea-
tures of the world; take, for example, the sentence
(3) the sentence written on the blackboard of room 202 is not true.
If the world is such that a token of this sentence is written on the blackboard
of room 202, then the sentence is paradoxical but if, for example, the sentence
7Defended, for example, in Quine (1986).
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written on the blackboard of room 202 is ‘2+2=4’, then (3) is just false. Now,
when a subject S is confronted with the instance of the T-schema applied to
(3), she cannot say a priori if this instance is acceptable or not.
Horwich could try to overcome this difficulty by idealizing the situation;
we could idealize the subject S and suppose that she has access to all the
relevant facts (in our example, she would have access to room 202). This,
though, will not do due to the notion of indeterminacy that Horwich has in
mind; it is not just that we are not able to know the semantic value of the
Liar sentence (or the ascriptions of vague predicates to borderline cases), but
it is conceptually impossible to know it. Let’s elaborate this point.
As Field (2010b) has noticed, Horwich’s proposal implies that “the con-
cept of an omniscient being is conceptually incoherent” (Field 2010b, p. 2).
For an omniscient being would know the location of the boundary between
the objects that satisfy a given vague predicate and the objects that do not
but, since it is conceptually impossible to know such boundary, we must
conclude that the notion of an omniscient being cannot be conceptually co-
herent. Indeed, Horwich claims that an omniscient being (and any being
with a different language of ours) with a language L can only judge whether
a given term α (of our language) is true of a given object k via a term β of L
with the same meaning as α. That means, having in mind Horwich’s theory
of meaning, that α and β must have the same “conceptual role” (Horwich
2005a, p. 96). But, then, α and β will be governed by the same fundamental
facts about use and, therefore, if α is a vague predicate, then the speaker of
L will not be able to find the location of its sharp boundaries, for he will be
neither capable of finding the location of the sharp boundaries of β.8
The same story applies to the truth predicate; since the instances of the
T-schema are the fundamental facts about the use of the truth predicate,
any being capable of knowing the truth value of the Liar would have to be
using a truth predicate governed by a theory containing the Liar instance of
the T-schema, but then this being would not be using our truth predicate,
and what this being would have knowledge of would not be the truth value
of the Liar sentence, but something else.
8This account, as Field (2010b) claims, has at least two problems: first, it is not
clear how we can acquire new terms from terms that are untranslatable to our
language and, second, even if I have not found yet a synonym of a given expression,
it seems clear that I am perfectly capable of pointing to some objects to which
it does not apply; for instance, following Field’s example, if I hear a bunch of
mathematicians employing a word whose meaning is unknown to me I do not need
to find a synonym in my own idiolect to legitimately believe that the word does
not apply to, say, snails.
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Returning now to the problem that the contingent Liar poses to Minimal-
ism, recall that Horwich could try to idealize the situation and suppose that
when we evaluate whether a given instance of the T-schema is in our theory
of truth we know all the relevant facts. We can create now a contingent Liar
whose paradoxicalitiy depends on an indeterminate sentence in Horwich’s
sense. Take, thus, the proposition expressed by the following sentence:
(L) A and L is not true
where A is any sentence whose truth value is essentially unknowable to us; A
can be the Liar sentence itself, or any paradoxical sentence, or an ascription
of a vague predicate to a borderline case. Now, since L is paradoxical (that
is, its instance of the T-schema can be used to obtain a contradiction via
liar-like arguments) just in case A is true and it is conceptually impossible
to know the truth value of A, it is conceptually impossible to know whether
the L instance of the T-schema should be in the minimalist theory of truth.
Hence, even idealizing the situation and supposing that the subject S who
is taking the decision whether to incorporate or not a given instance of the
T-schema into her theory of truth has all the possible information available
in front of her, even in a case like that there will be undecided cases like L.
As we will see in section 6.4, Horwich has abandoned the idea of de-
termining which instances of the T-schema are in the minimalist theory of
truth by using dispositional ideas and has tried, instead, to use the notion of
grounding.
6.3 The Generalization Problem
6.3 The Generalization Problem and Minimalism
I want to have a look, now, at one of the main problems of Minimalism,
which is related to the Liar paradox; the Generalization Problem. As Gupta
(1993a,b), Soames (1997, 1999), Armour-Garb (2004, 2010) and Raatikainen
(2005), among others, have noted,9 Minimalism is too weak and has serious
problems for explaining many generalizations about truth. That is a major
difficulty for minimalists, for it means that the instances of the T-schema are
no longer explanatorily fundamental. Consider, for example, the following
claim:
(ID) Every proposition of the form α→ α is true.
9A version of the same problem was put forward by Tarski (1983, p. 257).
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Can (ID) be derived from all the instances of the T-schema, that is, from
the minimalist theory of truth? Certainly, we can derive each instance of
(ID), for every proposition p, but that does not mean that we can derive the
general fact, expressed by (ID), that all propositions imply themselves. As
Scott Soames puts it:
Because the minimal theory is just a collection of instances, it is con-
ceivable that one could know every proposition in the theory and still
be unable to infer [(ID)] because one is ignorant about whether the
propositions covered by one’s instances are all the (relevant) proposi-
tions there are. For example, given only the minimal theory, one might
think: perhaps there are more propositions and the [truth predicate]
applies differently to them. A person in such a position has no guar-
antee of [(ID)] and might lack sufficient justification for accepting it.
(Soames 1999, p. 247)
The idea is nicely captured in proof-theory. Let me sketch it. Suppose
you have a truth theory, T , that consists of all the instances of the T-schema
applied to a certain language L which, for simplicity, we can suppose does
not contain the truth predicate. Let N be a model for L that fixes the truth
values of the sentences without the truth predicate. Suppose, now, in search
of a contradiction, that in T we have a proof, say P, that every sentence of
the form α → α is true. P, since it is a proof, will be finite and, hence, it
will contain a finite number n of instances of the T-schema, say:
1. < φ1 > is true iff φ1,
2. < φ2 > is true iff φ2,
3. · · ·
...
n. < φn > is true iff φn.
Consider, now, the following set:
Φ = {ψ : ψ is true in N and either ψ or ¬ψ is among {φ1,φ2, · · · ,φn}}
Notice that, then, if we extend N by adding Φ as the interpretation of
the truth predicate for L, all the instances of the T-schema 1, 2, · · · , n above
will be true in the extended model. LetM be such an extended model. This
means that, for any χ ∈ L such that χ → χ < {φ1,φ2, · · · ,φn}, Trpχ → χq
will not be true inM. That is, we just constructed a model,M, that makes
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true all the sentences in P, and hence makes also true that every sentence of
the form α → α is true but that, on the other hand, has an interpretation
of the truth predicate such that, for some sentence χ, χ → χ is not in this
interpretation. Since this is a contradiction, we can conclude that we cannot
have a proof that shows that every sentence of the form α→ α is true.10
That means that the minimalist theory of truth is not enough to explain
all our uses of the truth predicate, because it cannot explain our acceptance
of (ID) only in terms of the instances of the T-schema and some basic logical
principles (not involving the truth predicate). Even more, given Horwich’s
concept of indeterminacy, it is indeterminate whether (ID); thus, it is concep-
tually impossible to know that (ID), for the impossibility of being justified
in believing that (ID) has its roots in the fundamental facts which fix the
meaning of ‘truth’. As another specific consequence of this, notice that we
can only derive each instance of the Principle of Bivalence and not the general
principle itself.
In a postscript to his (1998), Horwich makes a first attempt to solve this
question:
[I]t is plausible to suppose that there is a truth-preserving rule of
inference that will take us from a set of premises attributing to each
proposition some property, F, to the conclusion that all propositions
have F. No doubt this rule is not logically valid, for its reliability
hinges [...] on the nature of propositions. But it is a principle we do
find plausible. (Horwich 1998b, p. 137)
This explanation remains rather mysterious. First, nothing is said about
which feature of propositions is responsible of the plausibility of such a rule.11
And, second, as Raatikainen (2005) claims, there are several problems that
cannot be easily overcome. In the passage above Horwich seems to have in
mind some version of the ω-rule, a rule of inference which allows us to deduce
a general conclusion concerning some domain of objects from an infinite set
of premises ascribing to each object of the domain some given property. One
of the features of this kind of rule is that it has an infinitary nature, so it can
hardly be used by a human being. Thus, it cannot explain our acceptance of
general claims about truth. On the other hand, as Horwich himself admits
in his (1998, fn. 4 in page 20), the minimal theory of truth is not a set,12 for
10For details see, for example, Horsten (2011, p. 69) or Halbach (2011, p. 75).
11Moreover, this might seem to be at odds with Horwich neutral position with respect
to the nature of propositions (see Horwich 1998b, pp. 16–17 ).
12The argument is as follows: suppose the minimal theory is a set. Notice that
for every subset X of it, we can define a proposition (call it the characteristic
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it is too large to be a set, which certainly implies that it is uncountable. But
rules of reasoning like the ω-rule require that every element of the universe
be named, which is impossible if the intended universe is uncountable.13
Horwich (2010c, pp. 43-45, 92-96) follows a new but related strategy to
address this problem; instead of looking for a rule of inference, Horwich
proposes a further explanatory premise that, on the one hand, allows us to
explain our acceptance of general facts concerning truth and, on the other
hand, does not involve the truth predicate, for that would jeopardize the
minimalist character of Horwich’s theory of truth. It should be stressed
that this is not an unfamiliar point, for we need principles concerning other
phenomena to explain all facts about truth; what is important, though, is
that such principles do not use the truth predicate, for if they did, they
would show that we need to go beyond the instances of the T-schema in
order to explain all facts concerning truth. Horwich proposes the following
extra premise:
(P1) Whenever we are disposed to accept, for any proposition of structural
type F (henceforth F-proposition), that it is G (and to do so for uniform
reasons) then we will be disposed to accept that every F-proposition is
G.
Furthermore, this premise is restricted to structural kinds of propositions F
and properties G that satisfy the following condition:
(C) We cannot conceive of there being additional Fs —beyond those Fs we
are disposed to believe are G— which we would not have the same sort
of reason to believe are Gs.
proposition of X) which is true if, and only if, all propositions of X are true. Since,
if two subsets of the theory are different, so are their characteristic propositions,
we can define a 1 to 1 function from the power set of the minimal theory to a
subset of the minimal theory (the one that assigns to each subset of the theory the
instance of the T-schema applied to its characteristic proposition). That means,
intuitively, that the power set of the minimal theory is at most as large as the
minimal theory, which, as Cantor’s Theorem shows, is not possible. Hence, we
conclude, the minimal theory is not a set.
13I am setting aside, here, idealizations where, even when the universe in uncount-
able, we take every object to have itself as a name. In a sense, in these situations
we would have an uncountable language, but, as I said, this is an idealization that
ignores the fact that the language is to be used by human beings. This last remark,
though, is very relevant for the discussion here and, hence, this idealization cannot
be hold in this context.
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Now, to see how this works according to Horwich, interpret F as α → α
and G as truth. First notice that they satisfy the requisite (C), for the
rules that account for our belief that all propositions of the form α → α
are true are uniform and do not depend on the proposition p. Furthermore,
granted that we are disposed to accept that every proposition of the form
α → α is true, (P1) allows us to infer that we are disposed to accept that
all such propositions are true and, hence, to explain why we accept that all
such propositions are true. Finally, since (P1) does not involve the truth
predicate, the explicative fundamentality of the minimal theory is preserved.
Armour-Garb (2010) criticizes and rejects this solution to the Gener-
alization Problem. He claims that the extra explanatory premiss should
mention the awareness of the fact that we are disposed to accept, for every
F-proposition, that it is G:
(P2) Whenever we are disposed to accept, for any F-proposition, that it is G
(and to do so for uniform reasons) and we are aware of this fact (that is,
we are aware that we are disposed to accept, for any F-proposition, that
it is G), then we will be disposed to accept that every F-proposition is
G.
The reason for that is that being disposed to accept a given collection of
facts is consistent with not knowing the existence of such a disposition and,
hence, someone who is disposed to accept, for any F-proposition, that it is
G, will accept that all F-propositions are G only if she knows that she has
the disposition to accept, for any F-proposition, that it is G. Let’s focus now
on the partial instance of (P2) where G is interpreted for ‘true’:
(P3) Whenever we are disposed to accept, for any F-proposition, that it
is true (and to do so for uniform reasons) and we are aware of this
fact (that is, we are aware that we are disposed to accept, for any F-
proposition, that it is true), then we will be disposed to accept that
every F-proposition is true.
Armour-Garb claims that, then, we need to clarify in what consists being
aware of the fact that we are disposed to accept, for any F-proposition, that
it is true. And he proposes the following:
For one to be aware of the fact that, for every F-proposition, she is
disposed to accept that it is true is for that person to be aware of the
fact that she is disposed to accept that every F-proposition is true.
(Armour-Garb 2010, p. 700)
Thus, (P3) becomes:
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(P4) Whenever we are disposed to accept, for any F-proposition, that it is
true (and to do so for uniform reasons) and we are aware of the fact
that we are disposed to accept that every F-proposition is true, then
we will be disposed to accept that every F-proposition is true.
The problem with (P4) is that it is circular; it infers that we have a certain
disposition from the fact that we are aware that we have such a disposition.
I agree with Armour-Garb that we need to be aware of the fact that
we have the relevant disposition in order to be able to derive the desired
generalizations. But, as far as I can see, it is in the spirit of condition (C) to
guarantee this awareness; if we become to be convinced by (C) it is because
we tried to conceive some Fs not being G and it is in this process of trying
that we become aware that, in front of every F we would be disposed to
accept that it is G.
Notice that, then, if we accept Armour-Garb’s analysis of being aware,
then (C) alone already does all the job. For Armour-Garb is claiming that
1. being aware of the fact that we are disposed to accept, for every F-
proposition, that it is true,
is the same as
2. being aware of the fact that we are disposed to accept that every F-
proposition is true.
This is the reason why, according to Armour-Garb, Horwich’s premiss (P)
is eventually circular. But if this analysis is right (that is, 1=2), we do not
need (P) at all, we just need condition (C) which, as I said, implies 1 and,
hence, according to Armour-Garb, implies 2, which is what Horwich needs
to be able to explain our acceptance of generalizations about truth (at least
if we concede that being aware of A implies A).
There is another way out of the Generalization Problem. Field (2001,
2006)14 proposes to understand schemas as something more than the totality
of its instances:
Typically when we advocate a schema [...] we are not merely advocat-
ing the collection of instances that happen to be instantiated in our
language, we are expressing a commitment to continue to accept new
instances as we expand the language. (Field 2006, p. 12)
14The idea we are going to see was first introduced, though used in the context of
number theory and set theory, in Feferman (1991).
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The idea, then, is to introduce schematic letters to the language and use
these schematic letters in our reasoning. Then, we need, first, a rule of
substitution that allows us to substitute particular sentences for schematic
letters in schemas. And, finally, we need an inference rule that allows us to
infer generalizations from schemas (following certain restrictions). Thus, for
example, we can infer ‘a disjunction is true if, and only if, at least one of its
disjuncts are true’ from “p or q’ is true if, and only if, ‘p’ is true or ‘q’ is
true’ (see Field 2006 for more details).
This strategy is not available to Horwich as long as he regards the in-
stances of the T-schema and not the schema itself as epistemologically, ex-
planatorily and conceptually fundamental. It is not clear wether Minimalism
can adopt Field’s proposal without suffering major changes. Horwich, in
his (2010, fn. 15 in p. 95) mentions reasoning with schemas but sticks to
his solution in order to maintain the fundamental role of the instances of
the T-schema. Anyway, the discussion above suggests that Minimalism can
face the generalization problem, at least in the way hitherto presented, with
reasonable expectations of success.
Unfortunately, though, recall that Horwich faces the Liar paradox with
the restriction of the minimalist theory; then, since there will be instances
of the T-schema that will not be in the theory, I will not be able to make,
in principle, any generalizations about truth following the previous strategy.
Besides, I will not be able to use the truth predicate to express agreement
with whatever you said if you said some of the sentences whose instances
of the T-schema are not in the minimalist theory. So, eventually, the truth
predicate is impaired beyond any apparent hope. As far as I can see, the only
strategy available to Horwich is the one he already suggested in his (1998);
Horwich can claim that cases like the Liar sentence are “few and far between;
so the utility of truth as a device of generalization is not substantially im-
paired by their existence” (Horwich (1998b, p. 42)). Moreover, we are in front
of one of the hardest paradoxes in philosophy of logic and no happy solution
should be expected, we know that we will have to give up some things which
we are not willing to give up to. Still, it would be much better if we did
not have to give up something that undermines the very reason, according
to Horwich, of having the truth predicate in our languages and, hence, that
undermines one of the main arguments posed by deflationists points of view.
6.3 Minimalism and the Liar
As I said in section 6.2, Horwich’s strategy in front of the Liar consists
of restricting the instances of the T-schema that constitute the minimalist
theory of truth so that no paradox can be formulated; what I called before the
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paradoxical instances of the T-schema must be ruled out of the truth theory.
Then, though, a natural question arises: which instances of the T-schema
are to count as paradoxical? Horwich (1998b, p. 42) proposes two conditions
that this restriction should meet:
Maximality Instances of the T-schema cannot be excluded unnecessarily;
the minimal theory of truth should be, if possible, a maximal consistent
collection of instances of the T-schema.
Specification There must be a constructive specification of the instances
of the T-schema excluded from the minimal theory of truth. Such
specification should be as simple as possible.
Unfortunately, though, McGee (1992) showed that Maximality is not
enough to determine which instances of the T-schema should be included
in the minimalist theory for, given any consistent set ∆ of sentences, there is
a maximal consistent set Γ of instances of the T-schema which entails each
one of the sentences in ∆.
Let me sketch the proof. First, we use the Diagonalization Lemma to
find, for each sentence δ in ∆, a sentence Bδ such that Bδ ↔ (δ↔ Tr(pBδq)),
which implies, by propositional logic, δ ↔ (Bδ ↔ Tr(pBδq)). The idea is
that we can find an instance of the T-schema materially equivalent to each
one of the members of a given set of sentences.15 Now, take all the consistent
sets of instances of the T-schema that include all the biconditionals of the
form Bδ ↔ Tr(pBδq) for each δ in ∆. They are partially ordered by the
inclusion relation and each chain of this order has a least upper bound (just
take the union of all the sets that form the chain). Thus, applying Zorn’s
Lemma we conclude that this ordered set has a maximal Γ, which is the set
we were looking for.
Hence, given two incompatible consistent sets of sentences ∆1 and ∆2 we
can find two maximal consistent sets of instances of the T-schema Γ1 and
Γ2 such that the former entails every member of ∆1 and the latter entails
every member of ∆2. Hence, if we are just looking for maximal consistent
sets of instances of the T-schema we have no way to choose between Γ1 and
15Notice that the idea McGee uses is similar to the one used in Curry’s paradox.
In this paradox we use γ ↔ (Trpγq → δ), where δ is just any sentence, in order
to conclude δ. The fact that we can find an instance of the T-schema necessarily
equivalent to any sentence leaves us equally uncomfortable for, if we think that
any instance of the T-schema is analytic, that means that we can find, for any
sentence whatsoever of our language, an analytic (and hence, necessary) sentence
necessarily equivalent to it.
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Γ2, although they are incompatible.16 What that means is that “the mere
desire to preserve as many instances of [the T-schema] as possible will give
us too little to go on in constructing” (McGee 1992, p. 237) the minimalist
theory of truth. Hence, we are led to the second condition above: we need
to be able to specify a particular maximal consistent set of instances of the
T-schema.
As Gauker (1999) claims, we can easily see a particular case of McGee’s
result that might be intuitively easier to grasp. Consider these two sentences:
(λ1) λ2 is true.
(λ2) λ1 is not true.
They can easily be showed to be paradoxical as follows:
1. λ1 is true Supposition
2. ‘λ2 is true’ is true Identity
3. λ2 is true λ1-instance of the T-schema
4. ‘λ1 is not true’ is true Identity
5. λ1 is not true λ2-instance of the T-schema
6. λ1 is not true Reductio 1 and 5
7. ‘λ1 is not true’ is true λ2-instance of the T-schema
8. λ2 is true Identity
9. ‘λ2 is true’ is true λ1-instance of the T-schema
10. λ1 is true Identity
11. Contradiction 6 and 9
The instances of the T-schema we used in this argument are the λ1-
instance (steps 3 and 9) and the λ2-instance (steps 5 and 7). Clearly it is
enough to remove one of them from the theory of truth in order to avoid
the paradox generated by λ1 and λ2. But the Maximality principle above
does not tell us which one we are supposed to remove; so, supposing for
a moment that λ1 and λ2 are the only sentences in our language that can
generate a paradox, we would have two equally good maximal consistent sets
of instances of the T-schema and no way of deciding which one is our truth
theory.
Future contingents and Curry’s paradox give us another example of a sit-
uation in which maximality alone fails to determine a unique set of instances
of the T-schema. Take the sentences
(s1) Tomorrow there will be a sea battle
16See McGee (1992) and Weir (1996) for more details on McGee’s proof.
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(s2) Tomorrow there will not be a sea battle
which are incompatible in the sense that they cannot be true at the same
time. Now consider Curry’s paradox for each one of them; with the aid of
Curry’s reasoning we will be able to conclude (s1) and (s2), which would allow
us to conclude a contradiction. But one of (s1) or (s2) will be the case and
hence, it could be argued, it would be safe to conclude it. This means that
we should remove the instance of the T-schema of the (si) that will not be
the case; clearly, then, maximality is not enough to determine which instance
is to be kept.
6.4 Horwich’s Proposal
6.4 The Construction
Horwich has tried to overcome the difficulties posed by the Liar paradox to
his theory of truth by offering, in his (2010a), a construction which, although
not being maximal, would follow a constructive specification, which was the
other condition, apart from maximality, that Minimalism was supposed to
follow when restricting the T-schema in front of the Liar. Let’s quote the
full text:
We might say that our language L is the limit of the expanding sub-
languages L0, L1, L2,... where L0 lacks the truth predicate; L1 (which
contains L0) applies it, via the equivalence schema, to the grounded
propositions of L0; similarly, L2 applies it to the grounded propositions
of L1; L3 applies it to the grounded propositions of L2; and so on.
Thus an instance of the equivalence schema will be acceptable, even
if it governs a proposition concerning truth (e.g. ¡What John said is
true¿), as long as the proposition is grounded.
But which propositions of L0, L1, L2, etc. are the grounded ones?
They are those that are rooted, as follows, in the non-truth-theoretic
facts. Within L0, a proposition is grounded just in case the non-truth-
theoretic facts either entail that proposition or entail its negation; thus
all the propositions of L0 are grounded. Within L1, a proposition is
grounded just in case it, or its negation, is entailed by a combination
of those L0-grounded facts and the (truth-theoretic) facts of L1 that
are ‘immediately’ entailed by them via the just legitimised instances
of the equivalence schema (which are its applications to the grounded
propositions of L0). Similarly, within L2, a proposition is grounded
just in case it, or its negation, is entailed by a combination of those
L1-grounded facts and the facts of L2 that are ’immediately’ entailed
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by them via the just legitimised instances of the equivalence schema
(which are its applications to the grounded propositions of L1). And
so on. (Horwich 2010a, p. 90)
Horwich, thus, describes a construction similar to the one proposed in
Kripke (1975) and takes the grounded sentences to be the ones whose in-
stances of the T-schema constitute the minimalist theory of truth. This
already raises some doubts about whether a deflationist can use the notion
of groundedness in order to specify its theory of truth. For the moment
though, let’s think of this construction as a mere technicality. On the other
hand, notice that the quote leaves the distinction between sentences and
propositions (or even facts) rather confused. For convenience I will speak
about the sentences in the languages, not the propositions.
Let us see, then, if we can have a deeper look at this construction. For
perspicuity, let us suppose we have a classical first-order language L, the base
language, and an expanded language L+ = L∪ {Tr} with a truth predicate
Tr and suppose, furthermore, that for every formula φ ∈ L+ we can express
its canonical name pφq in L via some codification. I will suppose that L is
strong enough to prove the Diagonal Lemma.
Given a model for the base language, N , with domain D, I will use 〈N , A〉
to refer to the model of the expanded language L+ whose interpretation of
Tr is A, which will be a set of (codes of) sentences of L+. I will use |α|M = 1
to mean that the formula α has semantic value 1 in the model M (and the
same for having semantic value 0). Given a set of formulas Γ, I will use
|Γ|M = 1 to mean that, for every γ ∈ Γ, |γ|M = 1. D will be the set of
(codes of) sentences of L+; as I said I am supposing that, via some suitable
codification, D ⊆ D.
Let’s begin with the construction. It will consist of a series Hσ of sets of
sentences of L+ defined for every ordinal σ and relative to a model N for
the base language. We need, first, the following definitions.
Definition Let’s define the following.
For any set A of formulas of L+, A− = {φ ∈ L+ : ¬φ ∈ A}.
For any φ ∈ L+, Tφ is the φ-instance of the T-schema, i.e. Trpφq↔ φ.
For any set A of sentences of L+, TA = {Tφ : φ ∈ A or φ ∈ A−}.
Now, Horwich presents a construction involving a single truth predicate
and a series of sets of sentences of L+ (which he calls languages) which we
could try to characterize in the following way, given a model N for the base
language and for any ordinal σ,
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H0 = {φ ∈ L : |φ|N = 1}
Hσ+1 = {φ ∈ L+ : Hσ ∪ THσ |= φ}
Hλ =
⋃
α<λ
Hα
where λ is a limit ordinal.
Horwich claims, in the quote above, that “our language L is the limit
of the expanding sub-languages”; he means with that that the formulas in
the alleged limit of the sequence are the formulas whose instances of the
T-schema constitute the minimalist theory of truth. It is a good guess to
suppose that what Horwich has in mind is something similar to what Kripke
(1975) presents in his construction; that is, a fixed point of the construction.
Hence, we are looking for an ordinal τ such that Hτ = Hτ+1.
If we want to show the existence of a fixed point, it is sufficient to prove
that the series is monotone.
Lemma 6.4.1 (Monotonicity) If τ ≤ ρ, then Hτ ⊆ Hρ.
Proof The base case with ρ = 0 is trivial. If ρ is a limit ordinal, it follows
from the definition of the series.
Suppose now that ρ is a successor ordinal, σ + 1. Let’s suppose, as
induction hypothesis, that for all ordinals θ ≤ σ, Hθ ⊆ Hσ. We need to show
that for all ordinals θ ≤ σ+ 1, Hθ ⊆ Hσ+1 .
Take, thus, θ ≤ σ + 1. If θ = σ + 1 the result follows trivially. If
θ < σ+ 1 then θ ≤ σ which, by induction hypothesis, implies that Hθ ⊆ Hσ.
Suppose, thus, that φ ∈ Hθ, then, by the last remark, φ ∈ Hσ, which implies
that Hσ ∪ THσ |= φ and, hence, φ ∈ Hσ+1. 
Thus, in each Hσ you keep the sentences present in the previous elements
of the series and, in any case, you add new formulas with the use of a set of
instances of the T-schema.
Theorem 6.4.2 (Fixed point) There is an ordinal τ such that Hτ = Hτ+1.
Proof Suppose there is no such fixed point. Then, given Lemma 6.4.1, for
each ordinal σ there is a formula φσ in L+ such that φσ < Hσ but φσ ∈ Hσ+1.
Notice that the formulas in L+ form a set. Consequently, if we take the
function that assigns to each formula of L+ the subscript of the Hρ where it
appears first, this function has as its domain a set (the set of formulas of L+)
and has as its range the proper class of all ordinals which, for set theoretic
considerations, cannot be. 
6.4. Horwich’s Proposal 123
I will call the fixed point of the construction H. Thus, Horwich’s theory
of truth, the Minimalist theory of truth, is TH.
In the following section, I will show that that construction is consistent
by showing that H is a subset of a consistent set, namely the fixed point of
Kripke’s construction using the supervaluational scheme and restricting the
candidate extensions of the truth predicate to consistent sets.
6.4 Kripke and Supervaluations
I will introduce, now, Kripke’s fixed point construction (as in Kripke 1975)
using the supervaluational scheme. As before N will be a model of the
base language with domain D, 〈N , A〉 refers to the model of the expanded
language L+ whose interpretation of Tr is A, which will be a set of (codes of)
sentences of L+. Again, I will use |α|M = 1 to mean that the formula α has
semantic value 1 in the model M (and the same for having semantic value
0); thus | | is a classical valuation. D will be the set of (codes of) sentences
of L+; as I said I am supposing that, via some suitable codification, D ⊆ D.
Let us first define the supervaluational scheme, which is a third valued
valuation | |s that will take as semantic values 0, 1⁄2 and 1. For any φ ∈ L+,
any model N for the base language L and any set of (codes of) sentences X,
|ψ|s〈N ,X〉 is defined in the following way, :
|ψ|s〈N ,X〉 = 1 iff, for every Y, such that X ⊆ Y ⊆ D−X−, |ψ|〈N ,Y〉 = 1;
|ψ|s〈N ,X〉 = 0 iff, for every Y, such that X ⊆ Y ⊆ D−X−, |ψ|〈N ,Y〉 = 0;
|ψ|s〈N ,X〉 = 1/2 otherwise.
We can define next the following series of sentences of L+, for any ordinal σ,
VF0 = ∅
VFσ+1 = {φ ∈ L+ : |φ|s〈N ,VFσ〉 = 1}
VFλ =
⋃
α<λ
VFα
where λ is a limit ordinal.
As in the case of the previous section, we need to show, first, that the
construction in monotonic.
Lemma 6.4.3 (Monotonicity, Kripke 1975) If θ ≤ ρ, then VFθ ⊆ VFρ.
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Proof The proof proceeds by induction on ρ. The base case with ρ = 0 is
trivial. If ρ is a limit ordinal, it follows from the definition of the series.
Suppose, thus, that ρ is a successor ordinal, σ + 1. Let’s suppose, as
induction hypothesis, that for all ordinals θ ≤ σ, VFθ ⊆ VFσ. We need to
show that for all ordinals θ ≤ σ+ 1, Hθ ⊆ VFσ+1 .
Take, thus, θ ≤ σ+ 1. If θ = σ+ 1 the result follows trivially. If θ < σ+ 1
then θ ≤ σ which, by induction hypothesis, implies that VFθ ⊆ VFσ. Thus,
it remains to show that VFσ ⊆ VFσ+1.
Suppose, thus, that φ < VFσ+1. Then |φ|s〈N ,VFσ〉 , 1 and, hence, there is
a Y such that VFσ ⊆ Y ⊆ D−VF−σ and |φ|〈N ,Y〉 , 1.
Now, σ is either 0, a successor ordinal or a limit ordinal. If σ = 0, φ < VFσ
by definition of VF0.
If σ = γ + 1 then, by induction hypothesis, VFγ ⊆ VFσ and, hence,
VF−γ ⊆ VF−σ so that D −VF−σ ⊆ D −VF−γ . Henceforth, VFγ ⊆ Y ⊆ D −VF−γ .
Since, by supposition of Y, |φ|〈N ,Y〉 , 1, this implies that |φ|s〈N ,VFγ〉 , 1 and
φ < VFσ.
Finally, suppose σ is a limit ordinal, λ. Then, by definition of VFλ, for
all ζ < λ, VFζ ⊆ VFλ and, hence, VF−ζ ⊆ VF−λ, which in turn implies that
D −VF−λ ⊆ D −VF−ζ . This means that for all ζ < λ, VFζ ⊆ Y ⊆ D −VF−ζ .
Since, by supposition, |φ|〈N ,Y〉 , 1, we conclude that |φ|s〈N ,VFζ〉 , 1, which,
in turn, implies that φ < VFζ+1. Finally, since ζ+ 1 < λ, we conclude that
φ < VFλ. 
For the same considerations as in Theorem 6.4.2 there will exist a fixed
point of the construction, that is, an ordinal ρ such that VFρ = VFρ+1. I
will call this fixed point VF.
Following Kripke (1975) and Field (2008) we can now define variations
on the supervaluational scheme by imposing a condition Φ on the candidate
extensions of the truth predicate.17 These restrictions will create other fixed
points that will be supersets of VF. In order to proceed, we define |ψ|Φ,s〈N ,X〉
more generally:
|ψ|Φ,s〈N ,X〉 = 1 iff, for every Y, such that Φ(Y) and X ⊆ Y ⊆ D − X−,|ψ|〈N ,Y〉 = 1;
|ψ|Φ,s〈N ,X〉 = 0 iff, for every Y, such that Φ(Y) and X ⊆ Y ⊆ D − X−,|ψ|〈N ,Y〉 = 0;
17As I said in chapter 3, McGee (1991) also uses these techniques.
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|ψ|Φ,s〈N ,X〉 = 1/2 otherwise
In this definition I am presupposing that there will always be a Y satisfying
the condition Φ and such that X ⊆ Y ⊆ D −X−.18 Given a condition Φ, I
will call VFΦσ the σ stage of the construction using Φ as the property to be
satisfied by the candidate extensions of the Truth predicate. I will call VFΦ
the fixed point of such construction.
We can consider now the following fixed points corresponding to the fol-
lowing conditions:
The vacuous condition: VF
Consistency: VFc
Closure under classical deduction: VFcd
Maximal consistency: VFmc
A trivial generalization of Lemma 6.4.3 together with the considerations
in Theorem 6.4.2 show that all of VF, VFc, VFcd and VFmc exist. We must
see now that all these fixed points are consistent. The following Lemma offers
a sufficient condition on Φ for consistency.
Lemma 6.4.4 (Field 2008, p. 180) Let λ be the Liar sentence. For any
given property Φ, if for every consistent and deductively closed set of sen-
tences Z such that λ < Z and ¬λ < Z there are Y1 and Y2 such that λ < Y1,
λ ∈ Y2, Φ(Yi) and Z ⊆ Yi ⊆ D−Z− (1 ≤ i ≤ 2), then VFΦ is consistent.
Proof Let Φ be any property. Suppose that the antecedent of the Lemma
is true.
In order to seek a contradiction suppose, now, that VFΦ is not consistent.
Then there is a smallest ordinal σ such that either λ ∈ VFΦσ or ¬λ ∈ VFΦσ .
Notice that σ must be a successor ordinal, say, δ + 1. This means that
VFΦδ is consistent, closed under classical deduction, λ < VF
Φ
δ and ¬λ <
VFΦδ . The antecedent of the Lemma, then, implies that there are Y1 and Y2
such that λ < Y1, λ ∈ Y2, Φ(Yi) and VFΦδ ⊆ Yi ⊆ D − VFΦ−δ . Therefore,
18If it were not the case, the construction would have to be adjusted with a fourth
semantic value to represent the situation where there is no appropriate Y. Notice
that, if this fourth semantic value is not defined and there are no Y’s satisfying
the condition Φ and such that X ⊆ Y ⊆ D − X−, then all sentences would have
trivially the values 1 and 0. See Kripke (1975, p. 711) and Field (2008, p. 178) for
more details.
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|Trpλq|s〈N ,VFΦ
δ
〉 = 1/2 and |¬Trpλq|s〈N ,VFΦ
δ
〉 = 1/2. Consequently, Trpλq <
VFΦσ and ¬Trpλq < VFΦσ . But we were supposing that either λ ∈ VFΦσ or
¬λ ∈ VFΦσ which, together with the facts that, by the Diagonal Lemma,
λ↔ ¬Trpλq ∈ VFΦσ , and that VFΦσ is deductively closed, implies that either
Trpλq ∈ VFΦσ or ¬Trpλq ∈ VFΦσ . We have reached, thus, the contradiction
we were seeking. 
Corollary 6.4.5 (Field 2008, p. 180)
(i) VF is consistent.
(ii) VFc is consistent.
(iii) VFcd is consistent.
(iv) VFmc is consistent.
Proof
(i) Take any set of sentences Z consistent, deductively closed and such that
λ < Z and ¬λ < Z. By Lemma 6.4.4 we need two sets of sentences, Y1
and Y2, such that λ < Y1, λ ∈ Y2 and Z ⊆ Yi ⊆ D−Z−. Take Z as Y1
and the deductive closure of Z∪ {λ} as Y2. For (ii) and (iii) we can use
the same Y1 and Y2, for both are consistent and deductively closed.
(iv) Take a maximal consistent extension of Z∪ {¬λ} as Y1 and a maximal
consistent extension of Z∪ {λ} as Y2. 19 
There are several relations that can be established between the fixed
points we have presented.
Proposition 6.4.6
(i) VF ( VFc (Kripke 1975, p. 711)
(ii) VFc ( VFdc
(iii) VFdc ( VFmc (Kripke 1975, p. 711)
19Notice that this Corollary, together with the previous Lemma (6.4.4), shows that,
for the properties considered here (vacuous property, consistency, classical deduc-
tive closure and maximal consistency), there will always be a Y satisfying the
desired properties for the supervaluational scheme as defined above so that no
fourth semantic value is needed.
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Proof
(i) VF ⊆ VFc follows trivially. To see that VF , VFc notice that ¬(Trpλq∧
Trp¬λq) ∈ VFc −VF.
(ii) Let us show that VFc ⊆ VFdc in more detail. We will show that, for each
ordinal σ, VFcσ ⊆ VFdcσ by induction on σ. The 0 and limit cases follow
immediately from the definition of the series. For the successor case,
suppose that σ = ρ+ 1 and, as induction hypothesis, that VFcρ ⊆ VFdcρ .
We need to show that VFcρ+1 ⊆ VFdcρ+1. Take φ ∈ VFcρ+1 in order to
show that φ ∈ VFdcρ+1.
Since φ ∈ VFcρ+1, we have that |φ|c,s〈N ,VFcρ〉 = 1, which means that, for
all Y, such that Y is consistent and VFcρ ⊆ Y ⊆ D−VFc−ρ , |φ|〈N ,Y〉 = 1.
Take now any Y closed under classical deduction such that VFdcρ ⊆ Y ⊆
D−VFdc−ρ . By the induction hypothesis, VFcρ ⊆ Y ⊆ D−VFc−ρ . Notice
now that, by construction of the series, VFc−ρ , ∅, which means, together
with the fact that Y is closed under classical deduction, that Y is con-
sistent. This implies that |φ|〈N ,Y〉 = 1 and, hence, that |φ|dc,s〈N ,VFcρ〉 = 1.
Therefore, φ ∈ VFdcρ+1.
It remains to show that VFc , VFmc. Take the sentence (Trpλq →
Trpλ∨ψq), where ψ is any sentence of the ground language such that
|ψ|N = 0. By Corollary 6.4.5, λ < VFdc and, since ψ is a false sentence
of the base language, λ∨ψ < VFdc. This means, by monotonicity, that
for each ordinal σ, λ∨ψ < VFdcσ . Now, if we consider a given Y closed
under classical deduction such that VFdcσ ⊆ Y ⊆ D − VFdc−σ , for some
stage σ in the construction of VFdc, we have two options. First, if λ < Y,
then |Trpλq|〈N ,Y〉 = 0 and, hence, |Trpλq → Trpλ ∨ ψq|〈N ,Y〉 = 1.
Second, if λ ∈ Y, then, since Y is closed under classical deduction,
λ ∨ ψ ∈ Y and, hence, |Trpλq → Trpλ ∨ ψq|〈N ,Y〉 = 1. This implies
that Trpλq→ Trpλ∨ψq ∈ VFdc.
However, there will be consistent candidate extensions of the truth pred-
icate in the construction of VFc that will contain λ but not ψ∨λ, which
means that (Trpλq→ Trpλ∨ψq) < VFc.
(iii) VFdc ⊆ VFmc follows from the fact that maximal consistency implies
closure under classical deduction. To see that VFdc , VFmc notice that
(Trpλq∨ Trp¬λq) ∈ VFmc −VFdc. 
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Finally, we can now see that H is consistent, as it is just VF.
Lemma 6.4.7 For any ordinal σ, Hσ ⊆ VFσ+1.
Proof The proof proceeds by induction on σ.
• Base case. If σ = 0, then if φ ∈ H0, by definition of H0 we have
that φ ∈ L and |φ|N = 1. This means that for every Y such that
VF0 ⊆ Y ⊆ D −VF−0 , |φ|〈N ,Y〉 = 1 (just because the value of φ, being
from the base language, is independent of the choice of the extension
of the truth predicate) and, hence, φ ∈ VF1.
• Successor case. Suppose now, as induction hypothesis, that Hσ ⊆
VFσ+1. We need to show that Hσ+1 ⊆ VFσ+2.
Take φ ∈ Hσ+1. This means that Hσ ∪ THσ |= φ. What we need to
show is that |φ|s〈N ,VFσ+1〉 = 1, that is, we need to show that for any Y
such that VFσ+1 ⊆ Y ⊆ D−VF−σ+1, |φ|〈N ,Y〉 = 1.
So take any Y satisfying the conditions above. We will show now that
|Hσ|〈N ,Y〉 = 1 and that |THσ |〈N ,Y〉 = 1. This means that, since we are
supposing that Hσ ∪ THσ |= φ, |φ|〈N ,Y〉 = 1, which is what we want to
prove.
– |Hσ|〈N ,Y〉 = 1.
Take φ ∈ Hσ. By induction hypothesis, φ ∈ VFσ+1 and, by mono-
tonicity (Lemma 6.4.3), φ ∈ VFσ+2, which means that |φ|s〈N ,VFσ+1〉 =
1 and, hence, for any Y′ such that VFσ+1 ⊆ Y′ ⊆ D − VF−σ+1,|φ|〈N ,Y′〉 = 1 so, in particular, |φ|〈N ,Y〉 = 1.
– |THσ |〈N ,Y〉 = 1.
Take, first, φ ∈ Hσ. We just showed that |φ|〈N ,Y〉 = 1. But since,
by induction hypothesis and construction of Y, Hσ ⊆ VFσ+1 ⊆ Y,
φ ∈ Y and, hence, |Tr〈φ〉|〈N ,Y〉 = 1. Consequently, |Trpφq ↔
φ|〈N ,Y〉 = 1.
Take, now, φ ∈ H−σ . Then, ¬φ ∈ Hσ, |¬φ|〈N ,Y〉 = 1 and, hence,
|φ|〈N ,Y〉 = 0. On the other hand, by induction hypothesis, ¬φ ∈
VFσ+1 and, therefore, φ ∈ VF−σ+1. But, since by construction, Y ⊆
D−VF−σ+1, φ < Y and, consequently, |Tr〈φ〉|〈N ,Y〉 = 0. Therefore,|Trpφq↔ φ|〈N ,Y〉 = 1. 
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• Limit case. Suppose now by induction hypothesis that for all ordinals
σ, σ < λ, for a given limit ordinal λ, Hσ ⊆ VFσ+1. We need to show
that Hλ ⊆ VFλ+1. Take any φ ∈ Hλ. By definition of Hλ, for some ρ,
ρ < λ, φ ∈ Hρ. By induction hypothesis it follows that φ ∈ VFρ+1 and
hence, by definition of VFλ, φ ∈ VFλ. This, by monotonicity (Lemma
6.4.3) implies that φ ∈ VFλ+1. 
Lemma 6.4.8 For any ordinal σ, VFσ ⊆ Hσ.
Proof The proof proceeds by induction on σ.
• Base case. Clear from the definition of VF0.
• Successor case. Suppose now, as induction hypothesis, that VFσ ⊆ Hσ.
We need to show that VFσ+1 ⊆ Hσ+1.
Take φ ∈ VFσ+1. This means that |φ|s〈N ,VFσ〉 = 1, that is, for any Y
such that VFσ ⊆ Y ⊆ D − VF−σ , |φ|〈N ,Y〉 = 1. We need to show that
Hσ ∪ THσ |= φ.
So take any model 〈N , X〉 such that |Hσ ∪ THσ |〈N ,X〉 = 1. We need to
show that |φ|〈N ,X〉 = 1. In order to do that it will be enough to see
that VFσ ⊆ X ⊆ D−VF−σ .
– VFσ ⊆ X.
Take ψ ∈ VFσ. Then, by induction hypothesis, ψ ∈ Hσ, which
means that, by supposition, |ψ|〈N ,X〉 = 1. Moreover, if ψ ∈ Hσ,
then Trpψq ↔ ψ ∈ THσ and, again by supposition, |Trpψq ↔
ψ|〈N ,X〉 = 1. Therefore |Trpψq|〈N ,X〉 = 1, which implies that
ψ ∈ X.
– X ⊆ D−VF−σ .
Take ψ ∈ X. We want to show that ψ < VF−σ . Suppose, in
order to seek a contradiction, that ψ ∈ VF−σ . In that case, ¬ψ ∈
VFσ and, by induction hypothesis, ¬ψ ∈ Hσ and, hence, ψ ∈
H−σ . Therefore, by definition of THσ , Trpψq ↔ ψ ∈ THσ and,
hence, by supposition, |Trpψq ↔ ψ|〈N ,X〉 = 1. But, if ¬ψ ∈ Hσ
then, again by supposition, |¬ψ|〈N ,X〉 = 1 and, hence, |ψ|〈N ,X〉 =
0. Consequently |Trpψq|〈N ,X〉 = 0, which means that ψ < X .
Contradiction.
• Limit case. Suppose now by induction hypothesis that for all ordinals σ,
σ < λ (λ a limit ordinal), VFσ ⊆ Hσ. We need to show that VFλ ⊆ Hλ.
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Take any φ ∈ VFλ. By definition of VFλ, for some ρ, ρ < λ, φ ∈ VFρ.
By induction hypothesis it follows that φ ∈ Hρ and hence, by definition
of Hλ, φ ∈ Hλ. 
Corollary 6.4.9 H = VF
We can see now that interpreting the truth predicate as any extension of
H such that is disjoint with H− provides us with a model for the fixed point.
Lemma 6.4.10 For all sets of sentences of L+, Y, such that H ⊆ Y ⊆
D−H−, |H|〈N ,Y〉 = 1.
Proof It follows immediately from the fact that H = VF. Suppose VF =
VFτ. Then, VFτ = VFτ+1 and, hence, by definition of VFτ+1, every φ ∈
VFτ+1 is such that |φ|〈N ,Y〉 = 1, where VFτ ⊆ Y ⊆ D −VF−τ , which is what
we needed to prove. 
Corollary 6.4.11 For all sets of sentences of L+, Y, such that H ⊆ Y ⊆
D−H−, |TH |〈N ,Y〉 = 1.
Proof Take, first, φ ∈ H. By Lemma 6.4.10, |φ|〈N ,Y〉 = 1 and, by con-
struction of Y, φ ∈ Y. This implies that |Trpφq|〈N ,Y〉 = 1 and, hence,
|φ↔ Trpφq|〈N ,Y〉 = 1.
Take, now, φ ∈ H−. Then, ¬φ ∈ H and, by Lemma 6.4.10, |φ|〈N ,Y〉 =
0. On the other hand, by construction of Y, φ < Y. This implies that
|Trpφq|〈N ,Y〉 = 0 and, hence, |φ↔ Trpφq|〈N ,Y〉 = 1. 
We can now prove an important feature of Horwich’s fixed point.
Proposition 6.4.12 For all sentences φ of L+, φ ∈ H if, and only if,
Trpφq ∈ H.
Proof Suppose H = Hτ. For the left to right direction, suppose φ ∈ Hτ.
Then φ↔ Trpφq ∈ THτ and, hence, by Modus Ponens, Hτ ∪ THτ |= Trpφq.
That means that Trpφq ∈ Hτ+1 and, since Hτ is a fixed point, Trpφq ∈ Hτ.
For the right to left direction, suppose Trpφq ∈ H. Then, by Lemma
6.4.10, |Trpφq|〈N ,H〉 = 1, which means that φ ∈ H. 
Notice also that, as the following Proposition shows, all the axioms of the
Minimalist theory are founded, that is, they are in H.
Proposition 6.4.13 TH ⊆ H
Proof Take any φ↔ Trpφq ∈ TH. Clearly, H ∪ TH |= φ↔ Trpφq. Hence,
by the fact that H is a fixed point, it follows that φ↔ Trpφq ∈ H. 
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6.4 The Minimal Theory of Truth
We should ask ourselves now whether the theory of truth Horwich is propos-
ing is satisfactory. Recall that we can now characterize in a precise way which
is, according to Horwich (2010a), the minimalist theory of truth: TH. This
means, consequently, that all that can be said about pure truth should follow
from TH. Hence, we could take the set T = {φ : TH ` φ} to be everything
that can be said with respect to pure truth. We will see later which is the
set that represents what can be known about truth at all.
It is well known that VF has many unsatisfactory properties, which, as
we will see in the following lines, are inherited by T . Here there are four
laws we might expect to have in T :
1. For any sentence x; Trp¬¬xq if, and only if, Trpxq.
2. For any sentences x, y; Trpx∨ yq if, and only if, Trpxq or Trpyq.
3. For any sentences x, y; Trpx∧ yq if, and only if, Trpxq and Trpyq.
4. For any sentences x, y; if Trpx→ yq and Trpxq, then Trpyq.
Unfortunately, though, none of these laws are satisfied neither by T nor
by H; specifically, the problem is that we can find some instances that are
not in it.
Thus, with respect to 1, notice that, by the fact that λ < H and Corol-
lary 6.4.11, |TH |〈N ,H∪{λ}〉 = 1. But since |Trpλq → Trp¬¬λq|〈N ,H∪{λ}〉 = 0,
TH 6|= Trpλq → Trp¬¬λq and, hence, Trpλq → Trp¬¬λq < T . Similarly,
we can see that Trpλq → Trp¬¬λq < H. By the fact λ < H, Lemma
6.4.10 and Corollary 6.4.11, |TH ∪H|〈N ,H∪{λ}〉 = 1. Again, since |Trpλq →
Trp¬¬λq|〈N ,H∪{λ}〉 = 0, we conclude that TH ∪H 6|= Trpλq → Trp¬¬λq,
which, since H is a fixed point, yields that Trpλq→ Trp¬¬λq < H.
The following table lists the failure of the laws 1-4, the models that show
such failure and the corresponding examples of sentences that are neither in
H nor in T (as before, λ is the Liar sentence).
Law Model Sentence
1→ 〈N ,H ∪ {λ}〉 Trpλq→ Trp¬¬λq
1← 〈N ,H ∪ {¬¬λ}〉 Trp¬¬λq→ Trpλq
2→ 〈N ,H〉 Trpλ∨¬λq→ (Trpλq∨ Trp¬λq)
2← 〈N ,H ∪ {λ}〉 (Trpλq∨ Trpλq)→ Trpλ∨ λq
3→ 〈N ,H ∪ {λ∧ λ}〉 Trpλ∧ λq→ (Trpλq∧ Trpλq)
3← 〈N ,H ∪ {λ}〉 (Trpλq∧ Trpλq)→ Trpλ∧ λq
4→ 〈N ,H ∪ {λ→ ¬λ,λ}〉 (Trpλ→ ¬λq∧ Trpλq)→ Trp¬λq
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Recall that in section 6.3 we saw the generalization problem: even without
consistency problems (that is, with no restrictions on the T-schema over some
languageL) the minimalist theory of truth would not be able to prove general
statements about truth, but only its instances. We eventually concluded that
this problem might be satisfactorily overcome.
But now we can see the difficulties that the Liar poses to the minimalist
theory of truth with all its virulence. First, all the principles 1-4 will not
be in T , which means, according to Horwich, that they will be principles
about truth that will remain unknown to us; as a matter of fact, they will
be conceptually impossible to know.
Let us see what does exactly mean to say that laws 1-4 are not in H. We
have seen that any modelM for L+ with an extension of the truth predicate,
TrM, is such that H ⊆ TrM ⊆ D−H− satisfies TH —which is the minimalist
theory of truth— and H. We have to ask ourselves, first, who should we
understand H is. The way the construction is devised makes it natural to
consider the set H∪H− as the set of grounded sentences; specifically, H is the
set of determinately true sentences (that is, supposing there are not vague
predicates nor other sources of indeterminacy in Horwich’s epistemic sense,
the sentences which are conceptually possible to know) and H− is the set
of determinately false sentences (that is, the sentences whose negations are
determinately true). Recall that all of these are relative to a given ground
model N . To continue with this picture, notice that, as I said, we can
interpret H0 as the theory of all extra semantic facts given by the ground
model N and define T = {φ : TH ∪H0 ` φ} as everything that can be known
about truth at all. Then, it is natural to expect the following proposition
(for any given sets of sentences Γ and ∆, I will use Γ |= ∆ to mean that, for
every δ ∈ ∆, Γ |= δ).
Proposition 6.4.14 T = H
Proof We will prove, first, that H ⊆ T. In order to do that we will show
that for every ordinal σ, TH ∪H0 |= Hσ. The proof proceeds by induction on
σ. The base case and the limit cases are clear.
For the successor case, suppose that TH ∪H0 |= Hσ in order to show that
TH ∪H0 |= Hσ+1. Take φ ∈ Hσ+1. By definition of Hσ+1, Hσ ∪ THσ |= φ.
Now, from the induction hypothesis and the fact that THσ ⊆ TH, it follows
that TH ∪H0 |= Hσ ∪ THσ . Hence, TH ∪H0 |= φ.
Let us show, now, that T ⊆ H. Suppose φ < H. Then, for no ρ, Hρ ∪
THρ |= φ and, in particular, H ∪ TH 6|= φ. Since H0 ⊆ H, we conclude that
H0 ∪ TH 6|= φ and, hence, φ < T. 
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Thus, H contains everything we can know about truth at all. So the fact
that principles like 1-4 are not in H is a major problem for minimalism.
Can this situation be ameliorated? Yes, it can. It is well known that other
fixed points of the supervaluational scheme, like the ones we have presented
before —created using restrictions on the candidate extensions of the truth
predicate— are much better behaved with respect to principles like 1-4. So
the question is whether Horwich’s construction can be manipulated so that
the fixed point we get at the end be stronger than H; ideally VFmc. This
manipulation, though, should be made following independent reasons beyond
the fact that H does not contain principles 1-4. This can be done, if we have
in mind Horwich’s position in front of the Liar paradox.
Let us begin by asking ourselves which model for the expanded language
is the actual model; which model captures the actual world. First, since
Horwich’s position in front of the Liar defends, as we have seen in Section
6.2, that any sentence (in particular the Liar) is such that it is true or it is
false, the extension of the truth predicate in the actual model will have to
be, at least, complete; there will not be undecided cases of being true.
On the other hand, as we saw in section 6.1, Horwich adopts classical
logic, which means that not only all sentences are either true or false, but
also that it is not the case that they are true and false. Hence, it seems
natural to expect from the extension of the truth predicate to be consistent;
that is, no sentence is both true and false. All this means that the extension
of the truth predicate in the actual model should be maximally consistent.
On the other hand, by factivity of knowledge, it is reasonable to expect
the extension of the truth predicate in the actual model to be a maximally
consistent superset of H.
These considerations naturally suggest to restrict our attention, in gen-
eral, to models whose extension of the truth predicate is maximally consis-
tent. Hence, we can bring this restriction to the consequence relation used
in the construction.
Following this line of thought I will call a modelM for L+ mc-acceptable,
in symbols Mmc if, for every φ ∈ L+, either pφq or p¬φq belong to TrMmc
but not both. We can restrict, then, logical consequence to mc-acceptable
models; that is, given a set of sentences Γ and a sentence α of L+, Γ |=mc α
if, and only if, for every mc-acceptable model Mmc, if |Γ|Mmc = 1 then|α|Mmc = 1.
The definition of the new series will be the same but substituting the
unrestricted consequence relation by |=mc. Lemma 6.4.1 can be proved in
the same way (essentially it uses the fact that, if φ ∈ A, for any sentence
φ and set of sentences A, then A |=mc φ) and, hence, a fixed point of the
construction, let us call it Hmc, will exist. Lemmas 6.4.7 and 6.4.8 can easily
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be proved for Hmc and VFmc to show that Hmc = VFmc.
Now all the instances of laws 1-4 are validated in Hmc and we have found
some independent reasons —that is, Horwich’s stance in front of the Liar—
to motivate the adoption of this stronger fixed point.
Not everything are good news, though. Recall that some of the instances
of the T-schema are not in TH, which means that the utility of the truth
predicate, as presented in section 6.2, is seriously impaired. Moreover, this
can be known from inside the model. For notice that, given λ ↔ ¬Trpλq,
then the Trpλq-instance of the LEM, that is, Trpλq∨¬Trpλq, is equivalent
to ¬(Trpλq ↔ λ). Now, since both λ ↔ ¬Trpλq and Trpλq ∨ ¬Trpλq are
theorems, we have that ¬(Trpλq ↔ λ) is also a theorem and, hence, it is
in H and in T . Hence, it is not only conceptually possible to know that
the Liar-instance of the T-schema is just false, but this is a fact about pure
truth. This, of course, is hardly surprising; any theory of truth that solves
the Liar paradox by keeping classical logic and restricting the T-schema will
suffer from similar problems.20
6.5 Some Objections
It’s time now to take stock. We have seen in section 6.3.2 that Horwich
(1998b) proposes two conditions that the restriction of the T-schema should
satisfy, the Maximality and the Specification constraints. We already saw
that the former alone is not enough to specify a particular maximal consistent
set of instances of the T-schema. We have seen, in the last section, Horwich’s
proposal with respect to the latter. Both conditions, though, are not yet
met, even in the case where we take Hmc as the set of determinately true
sentences. We saw the reason in chapter 5: consider the Truth Teller, the
sentence τ such that τ↔ Trpτq. Notice that τ < Hmc and, hence, although
τ↔ Trpτq ∈ T —for the Diagonal Lemma shows that it is a theorem— and,
hence, we can know that the τ-instance of the T-schema is true, we cannot
know whether τ itself is true or not. Notice now that it would be perfectly
safe to introduce τ already at H0. In this case τ would obviously be at the
fixed point resulting of the construction which would be a superset of Hmc.
As Kripke (1975) showed, there will be many maximal incompatible fixed
points extending VF and we will not have any means to decide which one to
adopt as the root of our truth theory.
In any case, suppose that we succeeded in singling out one unique fixed
point containing sentences like τ. In this case, we would be able to know τ,
20See, for example, the discussion in Field (2008, p. 119).
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because it would be in the fixed point, which, as we saw, contains everything
we can know about truth. But mere desire for maximality seems a poor
reason to achieve knowledge about τ or similar sentences; that is, the max-
imality constrain would give us knowledge about many sentences in a way
that seems too way arbitrary. Having all these considerations into account,
hence, it seems more reasonable to just abandon maximality and retain only
the specification constrain.
We have also seen, in the last sections, the constructive specification Hor-
wich proposes. Its result turned out to be identical to the minimal fixed point
of Kripke’s construction using the supervaluationist schema without restric-
tions on the candidate extensions of the truth predicate. Since the result
of this construction was too weak, we presented a way to strengthen it in
order to obtain the fixed point of Kripke’s construction using the supervalu-
ationist schema, but now with the condition of maximal consistency for the
candidate extensions of the truth predicate. It is worth asking ourselves,
then, why should we need Horwich’s construction at all. Horwich (2010a)
presents his construction as one that “squares with minimalism” (Horwich
2010a, p. 92, ft. 12) in the sense that it does not use compositional prin-
ciples for truth, which are seen as being at odds with minimalism. This
is so because Minimalism understands truth via the T-schema and not via
compositional principles a` la Tarski. Indeed, Horwich rejects Kripke’s con-
struction based on the strong Kleene scheme because it “invokes Tarski-style
compositional principles” (Horwich 2010a, p. 92, ft. 12). The first thing
we have to take into account is whether the supervaluationist version of the
Kripke’s construction is also invoking compositional principles. In this case
it seems reasonable to expect that Horwich would also refuse to accept it,
because even if the supervaluational scheme assigns the semantic value on the
grounds of ways of making the truth predicate precise, in each of this ways,
the semantic value of the sentences is achieved by compositional rules. This
discussion clearly suggests, then, that Horwich takes the construction to be
something more than a mere technical device to determine which instances
of the T-schema are in the minimalist truth theory.
Horwich’s construction, though, heavily relies on the notion of ground-
edness; he himself claims that “a good solution to the liar paradox should
articulate ‘grounding’ constraints [...] on which particular instances of [the
T-schema] are axioms” (Horwich 2010a, p. 91). But then, given that, as we
concluded, the construction is not a mere technical device and has to satisfy
strict deflationist constraints, using the notion of groundedness might seem
to be at odds with Horwich’s deflationist view about truth. After all, depend-
ing on how we understand the notion of groundedness, if it is constitutive of
the notion of truth, it is no longer the case that “our commitment to [the
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T-schema] accounts for everything we do with the truth predicate” (Hor-
wich (1998b, p. 121)) and, hence, it is no longer the case that the T-schema
implicitly defines it.
Horwich may have a way out of this situation; he might understand the
construction of VF as a model of how truth claims are explained by some
things in the world being in a certain way. Let me elaborate on that. Horwich
admits that the correspondence intuition can be accommodated into Mini-
malism. As we saw in chapter 1, we can loosely characterize correspondence
theories of truth as defending that being true consists in corresponding to
facts. Although Horwich does not endorse, obviously, this characterization,
he claims that “we might hope to accommodate much of what the correspon-
dence theorist wishes to say without retreating an inch from our deflationary
position” (Horwich 1998b, p. 104). The idea is that
It is indeed undeniable that whenever a proposition or an utterance
is true, it is true because something in the world is a certain way —
something typically external to the proposition or the utterance. For
example,[...]
<Snow is white> is true because snow is white.
Thus, claims Horwich, the fact that snow is white is explanatorily prior to
the fact that <Snow is white> is true, in the same way that the basic laws
of nature and the initial state of the universe are explanatorily prior to the
fact that snow is white.
I think that it is reasonable to understand the construction of H as an
epistemic model of the relation of explanatory dependence between truth as-
criptions and the extra-semantic facts. In this epistemic reading of grounded-
ness, the grounded sentences, those in H, are the ones that can be explained
—and, hence, the ones that can be known— given how the world is and given
the appropriate instances of the T-schema.
The problem is that, as we have seen, H is too weak. We were able to
strengthen it by taking into account only the models in which the extension
of the truth predicate was a maximally consistent set. Can we understand
the construction of Hmc as an epistemic model of how we are able to explain
truth ascriptions? I do not think so, at least not without begging the ques-
tion. The problem is that we cannot use the claim that the extension of the
truth predicate is a maximally consistent set in the construction unless it is
something that we know, that is, something in Hmc. But we cannot even
construct Hmc without supposing that the extension of the truth predicate is
maximally consistent. Thus, in building maximal consistency into the con-
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struction we are going beyond what is given by the T-schema and, hence, we
are abandoning deflationists views about truth.
6.6 Solving the Paradoxes
In this chapter we have seen how Horwich is able to give an uniform expla-
nation of why the Liar and the Sorites are paradoxical. He uses an epistemic
notion of indeterminacy according to which the use properties of the vague
terms and ‘true’ make it impossible to know the semantic value of some of
their ascriptions. Horwich’s proposal is, hence, a common solution to the
Liar and the Sorites, for it shows how the source of their paradoxicality are
of the same nature.
It remains to see whether Horwich’s epistemic approach is a strong com-
mon solution. I think the answer is no; I would say that, in the case of
vagueness, the prevention is inexistent (or just vacuous), while in the case
of truth a sophisticated construction is needed in order to accommodate the
Liar within the intended theory of truth. Hence, Horwich is proposing a
weak common solution to the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes.
CHAPTER
SEVEN
HARTRY FIELD: TOWARDS A CONDITIONAL
FOR THE LIAR AND THE SORITES
Hartry Field has recently endorsed what can be seen as an effort to put
forward a common solution to the Liar and the Sorites. In this chapter
I will present how I understand to be the paracomplete project. Such a
project consists in obtaining a paracomplete logic, stronger than SK, that
can support a truth predicate and block the Sorites.
I will introduce some more reasons why, according to Field, we should
reject LEM to cope with vagueness and truth and we will see what sense of
rejection is used when stating that some instances of LEM should be rejected.
Finally, I will put forward a suggestion of where I think the investigation
could go by giving a model, based on Field’s work, for a first-order language
with two conditionals, a truth predicate and vague predicates.
7.1 The Liar, the Sorites and Indeterminacy
Hartry Field has defended in a number of places (see Field 2003b, Field
2003c and Field 2008) that the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes are somehow
connected and that, consequently, should be treated in a unified way.
Truth and vagueness are connected, according to Field, in the sense that
both give rise to questions for which there is no fact of the matter about
their answers. Such lack of factivity would be prompted, claims Field, by
the fact that the standard means for explaining ‘true’ (namely, the
[T-schema]) fails to uniquely determine the application of the term to
certain sentences (the “ungrounded” ones); and this seems to be just
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the sort of thing that gives rise to other sorts of vagueness. (Field
2003c, p. 308)
Compare the following claims (and suppose I am a borderline case of
being tall):
1. Sergi Oms is tall.
2. The Liar is true.
3. Tarski’s mother weighed less than 70 kilos when she died.
As Field (2003b, p. 461) points out, we have different attitudes towards
claims like 1 and 2, on the one hand, and 3 on the other. Field proposes
to consider 3 as a “perfectly factual claim” while 1 and 2 as non factual
claims. One first obvious objection to 1 being non factual is the existence of
the Sorites paradox, which seems to conclude, precisely, that there is a fact
of the matter whether Sergi Oms is tall. To see this, consider, again, the
line-drawing Sorites introduced at page 16:
Line-drawing Sorites
Pa1
¬Pan (n > 1)
∀x(Pax ∨¬Pax)
Hence, there is a z (1 ≤ z < n) such that Paz and ¬Paz+1
If we interpret P as ‘tall’ and a1, . . . , ax as the appropriate series, the
resulting argument seems to show that there is a fact of the matter as to
which height exactly divides tall people from non tall people and, hence,
there is a fact of the matter as to whether Sergi Oms is tall or not. Field’s
response to that is to reject LEM and, hence, block the above argument
at the third premise. As a matter of fact, Field proposes to capture the
difference between 1-2 and 3 with the idea that only in the case of 3 would
we accept its LEM-instance.
As far as I can see, Field’s strategy can be understood of as noting, first,
that vague ascriptions to borderline cases are non factual, which amounts to
the rejection of its instances of LEM. Next, since what prompts such non
factuality seems to be the fact that our linguistic practices fail to determine
a unique extension for vague predicates and, moreover, this seems to be the
same that happens with truth in the case of truth paradoxes, it is sensible
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to adopt non factuality for certain truth claims too. Such non factuality will
also involve the rejection of certain instances of LEM. This, together with the
mentioned fact, at the beginning of chapter 5, that restricting LEM blocks
the Liar argument makes the case for adopting a paracomplete logic to cope
with both the Liar and the Sorites.
7.1 Rejecting LEM
If that is so, Field needs to clarify, first, what it is to reject certain instances
of LEM. As he notices (see, for instance, Field 2003c, p. 275), reject cannot
mean deny, in the sense of accepting the negation. If this were so, then
rejecting the LEM-instance of 1 would be the same as accepting:
4. ¬((Sergi Oms is tall) ∨¬ (Sergi Oms is tall))
But if we deny a disjunction it is because we are disposed to deny each one
of the disjuncts, which means that if we accept 4, we are committed to assert
both of the following (the denials of both disjuncts of 4):
5. ¬(Sergi Oms is tall)
6. ¬¬(Sergi Oms is tall)
which is a contradiction.1 Nor will it help to interpret reject as not true, for,
since we are supposing that any claim is equivalent to its truth ascription,
asserting that the LEM-instance of 1 is not true is the same as asserting 4
and, hence, we are driven again to a contradiction.
Rejection cannot be nonacceptance either. To see this consider again
claims 1 and 3 above; I am willing to reject 1 and its negation —due to its
non-factuality— but, although I do not accept neither 3 nor its negation, I
do not reject them, for, given the factuality of 3 and its negation, rejecting
one of them would commit me to accepting the other. This shows that I
do not reject 3, in spite of the fact that I do not accept it. Consequently,
rejection is stronger than mere nonacceptance.
This discussion suggests that explaining rejection in terms of other no-
tions is not a sensible strategy. Field’s way out of this situation consists
in considering rejection as the dual of acceptance and, hence, as a primi-
tive notion. In order to illuminate our understanding of both rejection and
acceptance, Field offers a model of how they relate to each other by ideal-
izing epistemic attitudes and supposing that rational agents have numerical
1In this chapter I am setting aside the possibility of embracing a paraconsistent
view.
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degrees of belief represented by a function P ranging over the real interval
[0, 1]. The function P is typically taken to obey the laws of classical proba-
bility. In relation to that, we need to notice that if
(i) rejecting a claim φ implies that P(φ) < 1,
(ii) we want to reject claims of the form φ∨¬φ, and
(iii) P(φ∨¬φ) = P(φ) + P(¬φ) (as classical probabillty entails),
then we need to weaken the classical probability law,
(CL) P(φ) + P(¬φ) = 1,
to
(CLw) P(φ) + P(¬φ) ≤ 1
That means, unsurprisingly, that classical probability must be revised in
order to accommodate rejection of LEM. How, then, the weakening of (CL)
to (CLw) helps enlighten the relation between acceptance and rejection? In
the present framework, acceptance of φ can be naturally understood of as
having a high enough degree of belief in φ; in other words, as having a
degree of belief in φ over a certain threshold τ > 1/2, that is, P(φ) ≥ τ. We
can then see rejection as the dual of acceptance so that rejecting φ is having
a degree of belief in φ lower that the co-threshold 1− τ. It can be seen, now,
that if (CL) is accepted, then rejecting φ just amounts to accepting ¬φ, but
if it is weakened to (CLw), then we can reject something without accepting
its negation, which means that rejection is weaker than denial. There can be
now a φ such that we reject both φ and ¬φ. Also, as desired, not accepting φ
does not imply rejecting it, so that rejection is stronger than nonacceptance.
This makes rejection a notion in between denial and nonacceptance.
We can now express the difference between factual claims like 3 and non
factual claims like 1 and 2 by using our degree of belief in their LEM-instances
(supposing, for simplicity, that 1 and 2 are clear cases of indeterminate
claims):
P((Sergi Oms is tall)∨¬(Sergi Oms is tall)) = 0
P((The Liar is true)∨¬(The Liar is true)) = 0
P((Tarski’s mother weighed less than 70 kilos when she died)∨
¬(Tarski’s mother weighed less than 70 kilos when she died)) = 1
What characterizes an indeterminate sentence φ, then, is that we reject both
φ and ¬φ, which amounts to rejecting φ∨¬φ.
7.1. The Liar, the Sorites and Indeterminacy 142
7.1 Paracomplete Logics
The discussion in the previous section together with the already noticed fact
at the beginning of the chapter 5 that rejecting LEM allows us to block the
Liar paradox gives us enough reasons to try to solve both the Sorites and the
Liar with the use of a paracomplete logic. One natural candidate for such
a logic would be SK as introduced in chapter 5. We already saw, though,
that SK suffers from two grave problems; first, the logic (specially the logic
governing the conditional) is too weak as it does not even validate principles
like φ→ φ and, second, it suffers from revenge problems, which can be seen
as an inability to express a suitable operator of determinacy.
Part of the paracomplete project endorsed by Field, then, is to obtain a
stronger paracomplete logic that can satisfy the Intersubstitutivity Principle
of Truth (IP), introduced at page 6, which, given that the logic is supposed
to be strong enough to validate φ→ φ, amounts to satisfying the T-schema.
Since the main culprit of the logical weakness of SK seems to be the material
conditional, we can try to add a suitable conditional to that logic, while
preserving the good behavior of the truth predicate. Moreover, having in
mind the discussion of the previous section, such logic should be able to
block the Sorites paradox as well.
There is still another caveat we need to have in mind with respect to the
conditional we are seeking. Recall Curry’s paradox as introduced at chapter
1:
1. γ↔ (Trpγq→ φ) (Diagonal Lemma)
2. Trpγq→ (Trpγq→ φ) (γ-instance of the T-schema and logic on 1)
3. Trpγq→ φ (contraction —ψ→ (ψ→ χ) ` ψ→ χ— on 2)
4. (Trpγq→ φ)→ Trpγq (γ-instance of the T-schema and logic on 1)
5. Trpγq (Modus Ponens on 3 and 4)
6. φ (Modus Ponens on 3 and 5)
Given this paradox, if we want to keep the T-schema, the most obvious
culprit we are left with is the contraction rule on step 3. Consequently,
we are looking for a conditional, strong enough to validate φ → φ (and
other laws we would expect of a conditional), weak enough to fail to validate
contraction and such that can be added to SK in a way that preserves (IP).
One natural candidate is the conditional of Łukasiewicz 3-valued logic →3:
→3 0 1 1/2
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1/2
1/2 1/2 1 1
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If we add →3 to SK we obtain Łukasiewicz 3-valued logic, Ł3. It is easy to
see that contraction is not valid in Ł3. This move, though, will not do for,
with →3, we can define the biconditional φ↔3 ψ as (φ→3 ψ) ∧ (ψ→3 φ)
which is, precisely, one of the biconditionals that, at page 78, we saw cannot
be added to SK together with a truth predicate satisfying (IP).
Still, following Field (2008), we can see that the way how Ł3 copes with
Curry’s paradox might be enlightening. Recall that a Curry sentence is a
sentence γ that is equivalent to Trpγq→ φ. Suppose we are in the worst of
the cases and φ is a contradiction. Notice, first, that in Ł3 we can assign the
same value in a consistent way to γ and Trpγq. For clarity let us use |φ|3 as
a symbol for the semantic value of φ under Ł3. The Ł3 conditional can be
defined now in a more compact way:
|φ→3 ψ|3 =

1 if |φ|3 ≤ |ψ|3
1− (|φ|3 − |ψ|3) if |φ|3 > |ψ|3
Ł3 conditional, thus, has semantic value 1 when the value of the antecedent is
less than or equal to the value of the consequent; that is, when, so to speak,
there is no “loss of truth”. When the value of the antecedent is strictly greater
than the value of the consequent, so that there is “loss of truth”, the value
of the conditional is 1 minus the “lost truth”.
Now we can see how we can consistently assign the same value to γ
and Trpγq. Notice that, since |φ|3 = 0, then |γ|3 = |Trpγq → φ|3 = 1 −
|Trpγq|3. Then, what we need is |γ|3 = |Trpγq|3 = 1 − |Trpγq|3, which
can be accomplished by assigning 1⁄2 to γ. Goal achieved. Unfortunately,
Curry’s problems do not end here. Consider the sentence γ1 equivalent to
Trpγ1q → γ, where γ is the previous Curry’s sentence. Again, we want
to consistently assign the same value to γ1 and Trpγ1q. Suppose it can be
done, so that |γ1|3 = |Trpγ1q|3. Then, |γ1|3 = |Trpγ1q → γ|3 = |γ1 → γ|,
which, given the rules of the conditional implies that |γ1|3 = 3/4. Since
this is an absurdity —we do not have such semantic value in our logic—,
we conclude that our previous supposition was false and that, consequently,
we cannot consistently assign the same value to γ1 and Trpγ1q. Still, we
could try adding the semantic value 3/4 to tour logic (and its dual 1/4) so
that |γ1|3 = |Trpγ1q|3 = 3/4. But a predictable difficulty appears when we
consider the sentence γ2 equivalent to Trpγ2q→ γ1, which forces us to add
the semantic value 7/8 (and its dual 1/8) to the logic. This process can go on
indefinitely, so that the requirement that |γn|3 = |Trpγnq|3 is never met, at
least for a finite semantic value space. Now an idea comes naturally to mind:
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why do not consider an infinite valued semantics? And the most natural
candidate is the Łukasiewicz continuum valued logic Ł∞.
As a matter of fact, Ł∞ is a very promising candidate for the paracomplete
logic we are seeking. First, a truth predicate satisfying (IP) can be added
to Łukasiewicz continuum valued sentential logic.2 Second, Ł∞ is one of the
paradigmatic examples of a many-valued approach to vagueness. I will not
pursue here, though, the compellingness of Ł∞ applied to vagueness, for it
will be enough, for my purposes, to show that, in fact, Ł∞ cannot support a
truth predicate.3
Let us introduce, first, Ł∞, which is a generalization of Ł3 that uses as
semantic values, as I said, the real interval [0, 1] (for our present purposes we
can think of 0 as “false” and 1 as “true”). Given a first-order language L, an
Ł∞ model M will consist of a domain D together with an interpretation for
each predicate (a function from the appropriate cartesian product of D to
the real interval [0, 1]) in the language so that the values of atomic sentences
are settled. I will use |φ|∞M as a symbol for the semantic value of φ in Ł∞
under the model M. Then, given a model M, for any sentences φ and ψ,
the values for complex sentences are determined as follows:
1. |¬φ|∞M = 1− |φ|∞M
2. |φ∨ψ|∞M = max{|φ|∞M, |ψ|∞M}
3. |φ∧ψ|∞M = min{|φ|∞M, |ψ|∞M}
4.
|φ→ ψ|∞M =

1 if |φ|∞M ≤ |ψ|∞M
1− (|φ|∞M − |ψ|∞M) if |φ|∞M > |ψ|∞M
5. |∃xφ|∞M = sup{|φ(d/x)|∞M : d ∈ D}
6. |∀xφ|∞M = inf{|φ(d/x)|∞M : d ∈ D}
In the last two clauses φ(d/x) is the result of replacing all free occurrences
of x in φ with d.4
2See the Appendix of chapter 4 in Field (2008) for a proof.
3For a defense of Ł∞ applied to vagueness see Machina (1976) or Smith (2008) and
for some criticisms see Keefe (2000, chapter 4).
4As I did before, I am supposing that every member d of the domain serves as a
name of itself.
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As Restall (1994) shows, the T-schema cannot hold in Ł∞. In order to
see this, let us first introduce a new logical connective, ◦, called fusion (or,
sometimes, also strong conjunction or T-norm conjunction):
7. φ ◦ψ is defined as ¬(φ→ ¬ψ)
I will use φn to denote the n-fold fusion of φ with itself; thus, φ3 = φ ◦
(φ ◦ φ), φ4 = φ ◦ (φ ◦ (φ ◦ φ)), and so on. Now we can informally sketch
the main argument in Restall (1994). I will use the fact that if a formula
φ is such that |φ|∞M < 1 in a structure M, then for some m, |φm|∞M = 0
(see Restall 1994, p. 2 for the proof). Consider next the following series of
sentences:
A0 = ¬∀x > 0 Ax is true
An+1 = An+10
Now we can reason informally as follows. Suppose A0 is true. Then,
by construction of each An+1 (fusion iterations), all of them are true, which
means that A0 is not true after all. Since we have reached a contradiction,
we conclude that A0 is not true. Then, though, by the previous fact about
fusion iterations, there will be an m such that Am will be false, which means
that A0 is true. Contradiction.5 This shows that, unfortunately, Ł∞ is not a
suitable logic for truth.
We have seen, now, two logics that have failed as the paracomplete logic
we were looking for. SK was too weak, whereas Ł∞ seems to be too strong,
in the sense that, as we have seen, it leads to ω-inconsistency when combined
with a truth predicate.
Hartry Field has tried to devise some logics for truth stronger than SK
and weaker than Ł∞ (see Field 2003a,c, 2007, 2008 and, more recently, Field
2014, 2016). As Restall (1994) points out, the logic called CK (or, sometimes,
5More precisely, Restall (1994) shows that adding the T-schema to Ł∞ yields ω-
inconsistency.
Actually, this can be seen as a revenge problem. Fusion can be used to defined
a definitely operator Dφ = φ ◦φ to express the indeterminacy of the Liar, so that
¬Dλ∧¬D¬λ comes out true. We can then define a new liar sentence, λ1, equiva-
lent to ¬DTrpλ1q and, again, express its indeterminacy with ¬DDλ1 ∧¬DD¬λ1.
This process can go on for sentences λn each one equivalent to ¬DnTrpλnq whose
indeterminacy can be expressed with the use of a Dn operator. What Restall (1994)
shows is that the process collapses at Dω. See Hajek, Paris, and Sheperdson (2000)
for a generalization of this result.
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also RWK) is a good place to start; it is a paracomplete logic, stronger than
SK and slightly weaker than Ł∞. CK can be axiomatized, following Priest
(2008), as follows:
1. φ→ φ
2. φ→ (φ∨ψ)
3. (φ∧ψ)→ φ
4. (φ∧ (ψ∨ χ))→ ((φ∧ψ)∨ (φ∧ χ))
5. ((φ→ ψ)∧ (φ→ χ))→ (φ→ (ψ∧ χ))
6. ((φ→ χ)∧ (ψ→ χ))→ ((φ∨ψ)→ χ)
7. ¬¬φ→ φ
8. (φ→ ¬ψ)→ (ψ→ ¬φ)
9. (φ→ ψ)→ ((ψ→ χ)→ (φ→ χ))
10. (φ→ ψ)→ ((χ→ φ)→ (χ→ ψ))
11. φ→ ((φ→ ψ)→ ψ)
12. φ→ (ψ→ φ)
13. ∀xφ→ φ(x/t)
14. ∀x(φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ∀xψ)
15. ∀x(ψ→ φ)→ (∃xψ→ φ)
16. ∀x(φ∨ψ)→ (φ∨∀xψ)6
R1 A, A→ B |= B
R2 A, B |= A∧ B
R3 If |= A(x), then |= ∀xA
6In 14, 15 and 16 x is not free in A.
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Field has offered a family of logics weaker than RWK to which a truth
predicate satisfying (IP) can be added. He has showed their consistency by
offering models for a language with a truth predicate. Unfortunately, as we
are going to see, the logics Field has presented are still too weak as they
do not satisfy some principles that we would like to be satisfied. In this
chapter I want to explore the possibility of having two conditionals in the
language in order to have a more satisfactory logic. I will use a conditional
intended to capture certain analytic relations that occur between sentences
of a language with a truth predicate and vague predicates. In particular, I
want to see whether this conditional can capture the relation of entailment
and the penumbral connections.
7.2 The Construction
7.2 The First Conditional
I will proceed with the construction that defines the first conditional. Sup-
pose we have a languageL without conditionals, suitable to express canonical
names for its own sentences and we want to extend it to a new language, L+,
with a truth predicate, Tr and two conditionals, → and ⇒. Let us define
models M =< WM, DM, IM > for L as ordered triples with a set of points,
a domain and an interpretation function. WM is a set of three valued points
(the semantic values will be 0, 1⁄2 and 1) and a IM is a function that gives
the denotations of the non-logical terminology at each point. We have a
single non-empty set, DM, as the domain of discourse and IM gives us the
appropriate interpretation for constants and function expressions in the usual
way. I am specially interested here in the case of the predicates, hence I will
skip the details concerning the other non-logical expressions. Furthermore
I will simplify and consider only unary predicates; thus, for each predicate
the function IM yields, at each point, the extension and the anti-extension of
the predicate, two disjoint and not necessarily exhaustive subsets of DM. As
usual, the sentences assigning a given predicate to an object of the extension
will receive the semantic value 1, the sentences assigning a given predicate
to an object of the anti-extension will receive the semantic value 0, and the
sentences assigning a given predicate to an object which belongs neither to
the extension nor to the anti-extension will receive the semantic value 1⁄2.
Let us denote, for a predicate P of L and a point w, the extension of
P at w as P+w and the anti-extension of P at w as P−w. The semantic value
of a sentence A at a point w will be denoted by | A |w together with other
subscripts that I will introduce shortly. I will not mention the model unless
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it is necessary.
Next, we can define an order for the points of W : for all w1 and w2 ∈W,
w1 ≤ w2 iff for each predicate P, P+w1 ⊆ P+w2 and P−w1 ⊆ P−w2 .
Let us define how the logical constants assign truth values to sentences of
L+ and how the truth predicate and the conditionals are to be understood.
The values of the conditionals are given by two functions, j and v. The
function j for⇒ assigns to each w ∈W and each sentence of the form φ⇒ ψ
a value in {0, 1/2, 1}. Similarly, v is a function that assigns to each w ∈W and
each sentence of the form φ→ ψ a value in {0, 1/2, 1}. I will write ju(φ→ ψ)
instead of j(u,φ → ψ), and the same for v. The value of a sentence φ will
depend on the following: a point u ∈ W, functions j and v for the value of
the conditionals and a set of sentences X of L+ for the truth predicate (the
extension of Tr):7
|Tr(pφq)|〈u, j,v,X〉 =

1 iff φ ∈ X
0 iff ¬φ ∈ X
1/2 otherwise
|¬φ|〈u, j,v,X〉 = 1− |φ|〈u, j,v,X〉
|φ∧ψ|〈u, j,v,X〉 = min{|φ|〈u, j,v,X〉, |ψ|〈u, j,v,X〉}
|φ∨ψ|〈u, j,v,X〉 = max{|φ|〈u, j,v,X〉, |ψ|〈u, j,v,X〉}
|∀xφ|〈u, j,v,X〉 = min{|φ(d/x)|〈u, j,v,X〉 : d ∈ D}
|∃xφ|〈u, j,v,X〉 = max{|φ(d/x)|〈u, j,v,X〉 : d ∈ D}
|φ⇒ ψ|〈u, j,v,X〉 = ju(φ⇒ ψ)
|φ→ ψ|〈u, j,v,X〉 = vu(φ→ ψ)
Given the semantic rules above and a model M for L we can construct
a fixed point in the way we have already seen. First, we prove the following
monotonicity principle.
Lemma 7.2.1 (Kripke 1975) For all M, j and v, if X ⊆ X′ then for any
u ∈ W and any sentence φ ∈ L+, if |φ|〈u, j,v,X〉 is an integral value (0 or 1),
then |φ|〈u, j,v,X〉 = |φ|〈u, j,v,X′〉.
7For the quantifiers I will assume that all objects in the domain of discourse have
as name the object itself. I will also use φ(d/x) as the result of replacing all free
occurrences of x in φ with the term d.
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Proof Suppose X ⊆ X′. The proof proceeds by induction on the complexity
of φ. If φ is an atomic sentence of L the result is clear, for φ’s semantic
value is given by the interpretation function I.
Suppose, now, that φ = Trpψq and |Trpψq|〈u, j,v,X〉 = 1. Then, by the
semantic rules for Tr, ψ ∈ X and, since X ⊆ X′ by supposition, ψ ∈ X′ and,
consequently, |Trpψq|〈u, j,v,X′〉 = 1. Suppose, next, |Trpψq|〈u, j,v,X〉 = 0. Then,
¬ψ ∈ X ⊆ X′ and, hence, |Trpψq|〈u, j,v,X′〉 = 0.
When φ = ¬ψ and |¬ψ|〈u, j,v,X〉 = 1, then |ψ|〈u, j,v,X〉 = 0 and, by induction
hypothesis, |ψ|〈u, j,v,X′〉 = 0. Consequently, |¬ψ|〈u, j,v,X′〉 = 1. If |¬ψ|〈u, j,v,X〉 =
0 the result follows similarly. The other connectives are similar. Notice that
the conditionals → and ⇒ are treated as atomic sentences and, thus, the
result follows for them trivially.
As we already have seen, the previous result implies the existence of a
fixed point for the truth predicate.
Proposition 7.2.2 (Kripke 1975) For any M, j and v, there are X such
that for every u ∈W and every sentence φ ∈ L+, |φ|〈u, j,v,X〉 = |Trpφq|〈u, j,v,X〉.
The proof uses a construction like the one in chapter 5 and the considera-
tions of Theorem 6.4.2. In particular, for anyM, j and v there is a minimal
fixed point, K. Notice that the conditionals are still completely opaque to
us, so that we cannot guarantee that the truth predicate will satisfy inter-
substitutivity. But we can easily see a sufficient condition that the functions
that govern the conditionals have to meet in order to guarantee the Inter-
substitutivity for truth. Following Field (2016) let us introduce the following
definition:
A valuation j is transparent if, and only if, for any sentences φ and ψ,
if φ∗ is the result of substituting one or more occurrences of ψ in φ by
Trpψq, then, for any u ∈W, ju(φ) = ju(φ∗) (and the same for v).
Next we can see that, if j and v are transparent, then truth obeys inter-
substitutivity.
Proposition 7.2.3 For any sentences φ, φ∗ and ψ such that φ∗ is the result
of substituting one or more occurrences of ψ in φ by Trpψq, any transparent
j and v, and any u ∈W, |φ|〈u, j,v,K〉 = |φ∗|〈u, j,v,K〉.
Proof The proof proceeds by induction on the depth of the embedding of
the substituted occurrence of ψ in φ. First, if φ = ψ, then φ∗ = Trpψq and
the result follows from the fact that K is a fixed point.
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Suppose that φ = θ1∨θ2. Then |φ|〈u, j,v,K〉 = max{|θ1|〈u, j,v,K〉, |θ2|〈u, j,v,K〉}.
By induction hypothesis, max{|θ1|〈u, j,v,K〉, |θ2|〈u, j,v,K〉} = max{|θ∗1|〈u, j,v,K〉, |θ∗2|
〈u, j,v,K〉} = |θ∗1 ∨θ∗2|〈u, j,v,K〉 = |φ∗|〈u, j,v,K〉. The other logical constants different
from the conditonals are proved similarly.
Finally, suppose that φ = θ1 → θ2. Then the transparency of v guaran-
tees that vu(φ) = vu(φ∗) so that |φ|〈u, j,v,K〉 = |φ∗|〈u, j,v,K〉 (and the same for
⇒). 
I will write |φ|〈u, j,v〉 instead of |φ|〈u, j,v,K〉; it is clear now that, given a base
model and functions j and v, we will find a minimal fixed point relative to
them.8
We need now to construct appropriate transparent j and v to cope with
the conditionals. In order to do that, Field (2003a, 2008, 2016) has used
revision constructions based on the work in Gupta and Belnap (1993). Let
us see how we can achieve the desired valuations for the conditionals.
First, consider a fixed given function j for all⇒-conditionals. We want to
define a function v that will yield the functions vu for all→-conditionals and
u ∈W. Valuations v will depend now on the fixed j, so that this dependency
might be made explicit with a subscript, nevertheless, for readability, I will
drop such a subscript when the dependency is clear from the context. In order
to achieve the desired function v we will construct a revision sequence in the
sense of Gupta and Belnap (1993) and we will use its properties to obtain
a transparent privileged v. The revision sequence will consist of a series
of valuations defined over the class of all ordinals. The process starts with
an initial valuation v0 which assigns the value 1⁄2 to all the →-conditionals.
Then, we need to specify how to obtain new members of the process form
the previous ones. I will denote revision sequences with (vκ) and the stages
of the sequences with vκ, for some ordinal κ.Given a valuation vκ for →-
Conditionals, I will write |φ|〈u, j,κ〉 instead of |φ|〈u, j,vκ〉.
Now, we need to know how to construct a new valuation vκ given the
previous valuations. We will characterize each vu, j,κ, for every u ∈ W. This
will be done in the following way, where u ∈W and α is an ordinal:
vu, j,α(φ→ ψ) =

1 iff (∃β < α)(∀γ ∈ [β,α)), |φ|〈u, j,γ〉 ≤ |ψ|〈u, j,γ〉
0 iff (∃β < α)(∀γ ∈ [β,α)), |φ|〈u, j,γ〉 = 1 and |ψ|〈u, j,γ〉 = 0
1⁄2 otherwise.
8So, properly speaking, K should have some kind of indexes pointing to this depen-
dency, but, for readability, I will omit them.
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It is easy to see that the sequence (vκ) just defined preserves transparency
and, hence, given that v0 is transparent, all the members of (vκ) are.
As I said, the sequence (vκ) is a revision sequence as used in Gupta and
Belnap (1993, pp. 167–168). According to Gupta and Belnap (1993), a rule
of revision is an operation on a space of functions. In our case, each vκ is
a function from →-conditionals and points in W to {0, 1/2, 1} and the rule
above tells us how to obtain each vκ from the previous ones. In more detail,
when κ is a successor ordinal σ+ 1, vκ depends on vσ and, when κ is a limit
ordinal, the value that vκ assigns to a given →-conditional will depend on
whether the appropriate conditions stabilize in the series up to κ.
Revision sequences have very interesting properties. One of them is that
there are valuations vκ that appear arbitrarily late, that is, there are valua-
tions vκ such that for any ordinal σ, there is an ordinal θ, θ ≥ σ, such that
vκ = vθ. Let us call cofinal the ordinals κ such that vκ has this property and
COFIN(vκ) the class of cofinal ordinals for valuations in the sequence (vκ).
As Gupta and Belnap (1993, p. 170) show, there is a least cofinal ordinal α,
called the initial ordinal for (vκ), such that for all ordinals σ, σ ≥ α, σ is
cofinal.
Not all cofinal ordinals assign the same valuation to →-conditionals; if
they did, we would have a fixed point. So we need a privileged vκ that we
can use to define validity. In order to obtain the appropriate ordinal κ, we
use the following theorem, adapted from the Reflection Theorem in Gupta
and Belnap (1993).
Theorem 7.2.4 (Reflection theorem, Gupta and Belnap 1993) There
are limit ordinals ∆(vκ) (called reflection ordinals for the sequence (vκ)) such
that,
(i) ∆(vκ) ∈ COFIN(vκ),
(ii) For any sentences φ and ψ in L+, any world u ∈ W and any d ∈
{0, 1/2, 1},
[∀σ ∈ COFIN(vκ), vu,σ(φ→ ψ) = d] if, and only if, [(∃β < ∆(vκ))(∀γ ∈
[β,∆(vκ))), vu,γ(φ→ ψ) = d].
What this means is that there are ordinals, the reflection ordinals, that
capture all the stabilities in the sequence (vκ). Following Field (2016) we can
now extend, for the integral values, the previous theorem to all the sentences
in L+. Before that, though, let us prove the following lemma.
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Lemma 7.2.5 (Continuity lemma) The value of the →-conditionals at a
point u is continuous at limit ordinals. That is, for any u ∈ W, any φ and
ψ in L+ and any limit ordinal λ,
vu,λ(φ→ ψ) =

1 iff (∃β < λ)(∀γ ∈ [β,λ)), vu,γ(φ→ ψ) = 1
0 iff (∃β < λ)(∀γ ∈ [β,λ)), vu,γ(φ→ ψ) = 0
1⁄2 otherwise.
Proof From right to left. Suppose that there is a β, β < λ, such that for
every γ, γ ∈ [β,λ), vu,γ(φ→ ψ) = 1. In particular, then, there is a β, β < λ,
such that for every γ, γ ∈ [β,λ), vu,γ+1(φ → ψ) = 1, which means that
|φ|〈u, j,γ〉 ≤ |ψ|〈u, j,γ〉. Consequently, vu,λ(φ→ ψ) = 1. Similarly for 0.
From left to right. The proof is by induction on the limit ordinal λ.
Suppose that for each limit ordinal µ, µ < λ, the result holds. Suppose,
next, that vu,λ(φ → ψ) = 1. Hence, there is a β, β < λ, such that for
every γ, γ ∈ [β,λ), |φ|〈u, j,γ〉 ≤ |ψ|〈u, j,γ〉. Consequently, for every γ, γ ∈ [β,λ),
vu,γ+1(φ → ψ) = 1. Finally, by induction hypothesis, for every γ, γ ∈
[β+ 1,λ), vu,γ(φ→ ψ) = 1. Similarly for 0. 
This lemma has important consequences for the semantics presented so
far, as the following corollary, adapted from Field (2016), shows.
Corollary 7.2.6 For any reflection ordinal ∆(vκ) for the sequence (vκ), any
u ∈W, any transparent valuation j and any sentence φ ∈ L+,
(i) |φ|〈u, j,∆(vκ)〉 = 1 if, and only if, ∀θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |φ|〈u, j,θ〉 = 1
(ii) |φ|〈u, j,∆(vκ)〉 = 0 if, and only if, ∀θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |φ|〈u, j,θ〉 = 0
Proof The right to left direction of both (i) and (ii) is trivial, for ∆vκ ∈
COFIN(vκ). So it remains to show their left to right direction.
Before proceeding with the proof, notice that, at first glance, it would be
natural to adopt as strategy an induction on the complexity of φ. Unfor-
tunately, this strategy will not work because we do not have any guarantee
that, given a sentence of the form Trpψq, ψ will be a formula of a complexity
less than Trpψq itself. Our strategy will be to prove the contrapositives of
(i) and (ii). But, since the problem is the predicate Tr and, consequently, we
need to make explicit the stages σ of Kripke’s fixed point construction9,we
will prove something stronger:
9See chapter 5.
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(i*) If ∃θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |φ|〈u, j,θ〉 , 1, then ∀σ, |φ|〈u, j,∆(vκ),σ〉 , 1
(ii*) If ∃θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |φ|〈u, j,θ〉 , 0, then ∀σ, |φ|〈u, j,∆(vκ),σ〉 , 0
Notice that, properly, the consequents of (i*) and (ii*) are stronger than
what we need to prove, for we need to conclude, from the supposition that
∃θ ∈ COFIN(vκ) such that |φ|〈u, j,θ〉 , 1, that |φ|〈u, j,∆(vκ)〉 , 1. But given the
fixed-point construction, if, for any σ, |φ|〈u, j,∆(vκ),σ〉 , 1 then φ will not have
semantic value 1 at the corresponding fixed point K, that is, |φ|〈u, j,∆(vκ)〉 , 1
(and the same for 0). So let us prove (i*) and (ii*) by induction on the stages
σ of the fixed-point construction.
1. Base case. Suppose σ = 0. We need to show, then, the following:
(i**) If ∃θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |φ|〈u, j,θ〉 , 1, then |φ|〈u, j,∆(vκ),0〉 , 1
(ii**) If ∃θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |φ|〈u, j,θ〉 , 0, then |φ|〈u, j,∆(vκ),0〉 , 0
This will be proven by induction on the complexity of φ.
(a) First, when φ is an atomic formula of L or a ⇒-conditional the
result is clear, for their value do not change throughout the con-
struction.
(b) Next, suppose that φ = ¬ψ and that ∃θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |¬ψ|〈u, j,θ〉 ,
1, then |ψ|〈u, j,θ〉 , 0 and, by induction hypothesis, |ψ|〈u, j,∆(vκ),0〉 ,
0, which means that |¬φ|〈u, j,∆(vκ),0〉 , 1. The result for the 0-clause
for negation and the rest of the logical constants, except for →,
follow in a similar way.
(c) Suppose, now, that φ = ψ→ χ. Since the value of→-conditionals
does not change throughout the fixed point construction and it
depends only on the valuation v, what we need to prove is the
following:
(i’) If ∃θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), vu,θ(ψ → χ) , 1, then vu,∆(vκ)(ψ →
χ) , 1
(ii’) If ∃θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), vu,θ(ψ → χ) , 0, then vu,∆(vκ)(ψ →
χ) , 0
Given lemma 7.2.5 and the fact that ∆(vκ) is a limit ordinal, this
amounts to the following:
(i”) If ∃θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), vu,θ(ψ→ χ) , 1, then (∀β < ∆(vκ))(∃γ ∈
[β,∆(vκ))), vu,γ(ψ→ χ) , 1
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(ii”) If ∃θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), vu,θ(ψ→ χ) , 0, then (∀β < ∆(vκ))(∃γ ∈
[β,∆(vκ))), vu,γ(ψ→ χ) , 0
Now, (i”) and (ii”) follow immediately by contraposition from the
Reflection theorem 7.2.4.
(d) Finally, we must show that (i**) and (ii**) hold for φ = Trpψq.
But this is clear, for at the first stage of the fixed-point construc-
tion all Tr-ascriptions are assigned 1⁄2, so that the consequents of
both (i**) and (ii**) are true.
2. Successor case. Suppose that the result holds for σ in order to show
that it also holds for σ+ 1. So we need to prove the following:
(i***) If ∃θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |φ|〈u, j,θ〉 , 1, then |φ|〈u, j,∆(vκ),σ+1〉 , 1
(ii***) If ∃θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |φ|〈u, j,θ〉 , 0, then |φ|〈u, j,∆(vκ),σ+1〉 , 0
Again, the proof proceeds by induction on the complexity of φ. The
cases for atomic formulas of L, ⇒-conditionals, →-conditionals and
the rest of logical connectives are analogous as in the base case of
the induction on σ. It remains to be proven that the result holds for
sentences φ = Trpψq.
Take the induction hypothesis on σ applied to ψ. Given that all vκ are
transparent and j is transparent we can apply proposition 7.2.3 and
replace ψ by Trpψq in the antecedents of (i***) and (ii***):
(i****) If ∃θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |Trpψq|〈u, j,θ〉 , 1, then |ψ|〈u, j,∆(vκ),σ〉 , 1
(ii****) If ∃θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |Trpψq|〈u, j,θ〉 , 0, then |ψ|〈u, j,∆(vκ),σ〉 , 0
Finally, notice that, given the fixed point construction, |ψ|〈u, j,∆(vκ),σ〉 =|Trpψq|〈u, j,∆(vκ),σ+1〉, which gives the desired result.
3. Limit case. Suppose λ is a limit ordinal and suppose that the result
holds for all ordinals σ, σ < λ. As before, this is proven by induction
on the complexity of φ and all the cases are analogous to the base case
for σ except for sentences φ = Trpψq. Hence, we need to show the
following:
(i?) If ∃θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |Trpψq|〈u, j,θ〉 , 1, then |Trpψq|〈u, j,∆(vκ),λ〉 ,
1
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(ii?) If ∃θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |Trpψq|〈u, j,θ〉 , 0, then |Trpψq|〈u, j,∆(vκ),λ〉 ,
0
To see that (i?) is the case, suppose that there is a θ ∈ COFIN(vκ)
such that |Trpψq|〈u, j,θ〉 , 1 and that |Trpψq|〈u, j,∆(vκ),λ〉 = 1. Then,
by the induction hypothesis, for all σ, σ < λ, |Trpψq|〈u, j,∆(vκ),σ〉 , 1.
On the other hand, if |Trpψq|〈u, j,∆(vκ),λ〉 = 1, then, given the fixed-
point construction, there has to be a σ, σ < λ, |Trpψq|〈u, j,∆(vκ),σ〉 = 1.
Contradiction. Similarly for 0.
We need now to take stock. For the moment, ignore the valuation j and
think of the above result as applied to a language L′+ like L+ but without
⇒. Then, this construction tell us how to define a privileged valuation, v∆(vκ) ,
for any reflection ordinal ∆(vκ), that governs the values of the→-conditionals.
Now we can define validity in terms of it. Thus, for any sentence δ of L′+
and any set of sentences Γ of L′+ we say that Γ |= δ if, and only if, for
all models (we are ignoring now W so that there is no need to mention the
points), if |Γ|〈∆(vκ)〉 = 1 then |δ|〈∆(vκ)〉 = 1.10
With these definitions at hand we obtain one of the logics defended in
Field (2003a, 2008).11 The main problem of this conditional is that it still
seems too weak. Some principles we would like to have are not satisfied in
the logic. For example, these axioms of RWK as presented above are not
among the principles of →:
5. ((φ→ ψ)∧ (φ→ χ))→ (φ→ (ψ∧ χ))
12. φ→ (ψ→ φ)
Field (2014, 2016) also considers→ to be too weak (see, for example Field
2016, p. 1), for it cannot adequately express restricted quantification; that
is, we cannot express principles like, for example, the following ones:
(∀x(φx→ ψx)∧∀x(φx→ χx))→ ∀x(φx→ (ψx∧ χx))
10Recall that |δ|〈∆(vκ)〉 is an abbreviation of |δ|〈∆(vκ),K〉, where K is the minimal fixed
point of Kripke’s construction with v∆(vκ) as the valuation for →-conditionals.
11The main logic defended in Field (2003a, 2008) has a conditional that is slightly
different in the 0-clause; its 0-clause is satisfied when the condition that stabilizes
in the sequence is that the value of the antecedent is strictly greater than the value
of the consequent. The conditional → is called by Field (2008) the first variant.
Filed himself adopts the first variant in Field (2014, 2016).
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∀xφx→ ∀x(ψx→ φx)
which cannot be obtained unless 5 and 12 above hold. Field (2014, 2016) has
tried to overcome this difficulty by adding a new conditional based on the
sort of so called variably strict conditionals discussed in Stalnaker (1968) or
Lewis (1974), among many others. Field (2014, 2016) uses two conditionals,
I and B. The former is the conditional he used in Field (2008), → in this
chapter, which is, in Field’s words, material-like . The latter is a variably
strict conditional defined intensionally over a set of points intended to capture
indicative conditionals. Field can obtain, then, among others, mixed versions
of the principles above:
5. ((φ I ψ)∧ (φ I χ)) B (φ I (ψ∧ χ))
12. φ B (ψ I φ)
Hence, Field uses a material-like conditional to express the conditional used
to restrict universal quantification and another conditional used to capture
ordinary uses of the indicative conditional.
I am not concerned about restricted quantification here, but about how
we can strengthen the logic in a language with a truth predicate and vague
predicates, while preserving the semantics of the latter ones. Accordingly, I
propose to apply the techniques in Field (2016) to add to the construction of
→ a new conditional, ⇒, intended to capture certain analytic relations that
occur between sentences of L+. In particular, I want to see whether ⇒ can
capture the relation of entailment and the penumbral connections. In the
next sections we will see how this conditional works and which principles can
we have once we define validity, so that the new conditional satisfies laws
we would like to have in the logic. Next, we will see whether penumbral
connections can be captured. All of this, of course, with a truth predicate,
Tr, satisfying the Intersubstitutivity Principle introduced at page 6.
7.2 The Second Conditional
Recall that we left a valuation j for⇒-conditionals fixed and, over it, we built
a privileged valuation for →-conditionals, let us call it v, that depended on
the model for L and j. We also saw that v was transparent and, hence,
given proposition 7.2.3, if we obtain a transparent j we will retain intersub-
stitutivity for Tr. The strategy I will follow will be to add the conditional
⇒ to the construction by using the techniques in Field (2016), which con-
sist in devising another revision sequence for j, ( jκ), that is defined over
the class of all ordinals and that eventually yields the intended valuation
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for ⇒-conditionals. I will write |φ|〈u,κ〉 instead of |φ|〈u, jκ,∆(vκ),K〉, so that the
former is the semantic value of the sentence φ under the fixed point K that
we obtain when we evaluate →-conditionals under v∆(vκ) (where ∆(vκ) is any
reflection ordinal for (vκ)) using jκ as the valuation for ⇒-conditionals.
As before, let us begin with a function j0 that assigns 1⁄2 to all the sen-
tences of the form φ⇒ ψ. The rule is the following one, for each u ∈W:
ju,α(φ⇒ ψ) =

1 iff (∃β < α)(∀γ ∈ [β,α))(∀w ∈W, u ≤ w),
if |φ|〈w,γ〉 = 1, then |ψ|〈w,γ〉 = 1
0 iff (∃β < α)(∀γ ∈ [β,α))(∀w ∈W, u ≤ w)(∃v ∈W, w ≤ v),
|φ|〈v,γ〉 = 1 and |ψ|〈v,γ〉 = 0
1⁄2 otherwise.
As before, the reflection theorem 7.2.4 and the Continuity lemma 7.2.5
hold for ( jκ). Unfortunately, though, corollary 7.2.6 does not hold unre-
strictedly. What this corollary would claim, applied to ( jκ), is that for any
reflection ordinal Ω( jκ), any u ∈ W and any sentence φ ∈ L+, the valuation
jΩ( jκ) captures the behavior of φ in the series. But this is not the case for→-
conditionals. To see this, consider the following example from Field (2016).
Let us have a sentence, λ⇒, that is equivalent to Trpλ⇒q ⇒ ¬Trpλ⇒q,
which, given intersubstitutivity of truth, is equivalent to λ⇒ ⇒ ¬λ⇒. No-
tice that at each stage κ of the ( jκ) series and any u ∈W,
(a) if κ is a limit ordinal, then |λ⇒|〈u,κ〉 = 1/2,
(b) if κ is an odd successor, then |λ⇒|〈u,κ〉 = 1,
(c) if κ is an even successor, then |λ⇒|〈u,κ〉 = 0.
Next, consider the sentence λ→ equivalent to Trpλ⇒q→ ¬Trpλ⇒q and,
hence, equivalent to λ⇒ → ¬λ⇒. Since λ⇒ is equivalent to a⇒-conditional,
its value, given by a valuation jκ, does not change through the revision
sequence for each vµ over ( jκ). That means that, for any u ∈ W and any
ordinals κ and µ > 0,
(d) if |λ⇒|〈u,κ〉 , 1, then |λ→|〈u,κ,µ〉 = 1,
(e) if |λ⇒|〈u,κ〉 = 1, then |λ→|〈u,κ,µ〉 = 0.
Combining (a)-(e) we get, for any ordinals κ and µ > 0,
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(f) if κ is an even successor or a limit, then |λ→|〈u,κ,µ〉 = 1,
(g) if κ is an odd successor, then |λ→|〈u,κ,µ〉 = 0.
But, since all reflection ordinals Ω( jκ) are limit ordinals, then, for any u ∈W,|λ→|〈u,Ω( jκ)〉 = 1, in spite of the fact that the value of λ→ is not 1 at every
cofinal ordinal. Thus, the result of corollary 7.2.6 does not hold any more
for →-conditionals. Still, it does hold for ⇒-conditionals so that we have a
restricted version of it.
Corollary 7.2.7 (Field 2016) For any reflection ordinal Ω( jκ) for the se-
quence ( jκ), any u ∈W and any sentence in L+ of the form φ⇒ ψ,
(i) |φ⇒ ψ|〈u,Ω( jκ)〉 = 1 if, and only if, ∀θ ∈ COFIN( jκ), |φ⇒ ψ|〈u,θ〉 = 1
(ii) |φ⇒ ψ|〈u,Ω( jκ)〉 = 0 if, and only if, ∀θ ∈ COFIN( jκ), |φ⇒ ψ|〈u,θ〉 = 0
The proof is analogous to the part of the corollary 7.2.6 that deals with
→.
Although the limitation in corollary 7.2.7 represents a difficulty, we can
still try to use the reflection ordinals for the sequence ( jκ) to define validity
and see how the conditional ⇒ behaves. Moreover, since, again, j0 was
clearly transparent and the rule for ( jκ) preserves transparency, proposition
7.2.3 guarantees intersubstitutivity for Tr in the whole construction, so that
for any u ∈W, any ordinal κ and any sentence φ ∈ L, |φ|〈u,κ〉 = |Trpφq|〈u,κ〉.
Let us see what has been done so far. The semantic value of a sentence
depends on four parameters. First, on a point u ∈ W in the model for L
that only affects the conditional ⇒. Second, an ordinal that represents the
stage in the sequence of valuations for ⇒-conditionals ( jκ). We arrived at
the intended valuation in this series which was jΩ( jκ) . Third, an ordinal that
represents the stage in the sequence for→-conditionals (vκ) that depended on
our choice of valuation j. Again, we arrived at the intended valuation in this
series which was v∆(vκ) . Fourth, an ordinal that represents the stage in the
Kripke’s fixed-point construction and that depends on our choice of valuation
j and v. In symbols, this would be |φ|〈u,Ω( jκ),∆(vκ),K〉, which I abbreviate when
it is possible.
7.2 Validity
We can now define validity in terms of the reflection ordinals for ( jκ). We say
that a sentence γ is a logical consequence of a set of sentences Γ, in symbols
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Γ |= γ, when for every model M, every u ∈ WM, any reflection ordinal for
the sequence ( jκ), Ω( jκ), and any reflection ordinal for the sequence (vκ)
over Ω( jκ), ∆(vκ), if |Γ|〈u,Ω( jκ),∆(vκ)〉 = 1, then |γ|〈u,Ω( jκ),∆(vκ)〉 = 1. As usual,
validity is defined as logical consequence from the empty set. As before, I
will sometimes simplify, for readability, |γ|〈u,Ω( jκ),∆(vκ)〉 with |γ|〈u,Ω( jκ)〉.
Notice that, given transparency of j and v, proposition 7.2.3 and the
definition of logical consequence, Tr satisfies the Intersubstitutivity Principle.
It will be useful to have the following lemma.
Lemma 7.2.8 (Field 2016) For any valuation j for ⇒-conditionals, any
reflection ordinal ∆(vκ) for (vκ) over j, any u ∈ W and any →-conditional
φ→ ψ, |φ→ ψ|〈u, j,∆(vκ)〉 = 1 if, and only if, for all θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |φ|〈u, j,θ〉 ≤|ψ|〈u, j,θ〉.
Proof Take any valuation j for ⇒-conditionals, any reflection ordinal ∆(vκ)
for vκ over j, any u ∈W and any→-conditional φ→ ψ. For the left to right
direction suppose that |φ → ψ|〈u, j,∆(vκ)〉 = 1. Then, by corollary 7.2.6, for
each θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |φ→ ψ|〈u, j,θ〉 = 1. Hence, for each θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |φ→
ψ|〈u, j,θ+1〉 = 1, which, given the definition of →, implies the desired result.
For the right to left part suppose that for all θ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |φ|〈u, j,θ〉 ≤|ψ|〈u, j,θ〉 = 1. Then, |φ→ ψ|〈u, j,θ+1〉 = 1 which, given the Continuity lemma
7.2.5, implies that there is an ordinal α such that, for all ordinals β, α ≤ β,
|φ→ ψ|〈u, j,β〉 = 1. Finally, since ∆(vκ) is a cofinal ordinal, |φ→ ψ|〈u, j,∆(vκ)〉 =
1. 
This lemma also holds for ⇒-conditionals and reflection ordinals Ω( jκ) :
Lemma 7.2.9 For any u ∈W , any reflection ordinal Ω( jκ) for ( jκ), any re-
flection ordinal for the sequence (vκ) over Ω( jκ), ∆(vκ), and any⇒-conditional
φ⇒ ψ, |φ⇒ ψ|〈u,Ω( jκ),∆(vκ)〉 = 1 if, and only if, for any w ∈ W, u ≤ w, any
ordinal θ ∈ COFIN( jκ) and any reflection ordinal for the sequence (vκ) over
θ, ∆θ
(vκ)
, if |φ|〈w,θ,∆θ
(vκ)
〉 = 1 then |ψ|〈w,θ,∆θ
(vκ)
〉 = 1.
Proof The proof is essentially the same as in lemma 7.2.8.
The following schemas all have valid instances in the construction above:
1. φ⇒ φ
2. φ⇒ (φ∨ψ)
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3. (φ∧ψ)⇒ φ
4. (φ∧ (ψ∨ χ))⇒ ((φ∧ψ)∨ (φ∧ χ))
5. ((φ→ ψ)∧ (φ→ χ))⇒ (φ→ (ψ∧ χ))
6. ((φ→ χ)∧ (ψ→ χ))⇒ ((φ∨ψ)→ χ)
7. ¬¬φ⇒ φ
8. (φ→ ¬ψ)⇒ (ψ→ ¬φ)
9. (φ→ ψ)⇒ ((ψ→ χ)→ (φ→ χ))
10. (φ→ ψ)⇒ ((χ→ φ)→ (χ→ ψ))
11. (φ∧ (φ→ ψ))⇒ ψ
12. φ⇒ (ψ→ φ)
13. ∀xφ⇒ φ(d/x)
14. ∀x(φ→ ψ)⇒ (φ→ ∀xψ)
15. ∀x(ψ→ φ)⇒ (∃xψ→ φ)
16. ∀x(φ∨ψ)⇒ (φ∨∀xψ)12
Proof Principles 1 and 7 are clear, for the antecedent and the consequent
will have the same truth value at every u ∈ W and every reflection ordinal
Ω( jκ).
Principle 2. Suppose that there is a modelM, a u ∈WM and a reflection
ordinal Ω( jκ) such that |φ ⇒ (ψ ∨ φ)|〈u,Ω( jκ)〉 , 1. By lemma 7.2.9, we
conclude that there is a θ ∈COFIN( jκ) and a w ∈ W, u ≤ w, such that|φ|〈w,θ〉 = 1 and |φ ∨ ψ|〈w,θ〉 , 1, which, given the valuation for ∨, yields a
contradiction. Principles 3 and 4 are similar; all follow from the fact that
the value of the antecedent will always be less than or equal to the value of
the consequent. Principle 13, which involves the universal quantifier, is also
similar.
Principle 5. Suppose that there is a modelM, a u ∈WM and a reflection
ordinal Ω( jκ) such that |((φ→ ψ)∧ (φ→ χ))⇒ (φ→ (ψ∧χ))|〈u,Ω( jκ)〉 , 1.
Then, by lemma 7.2.9, there is a θ ∈COFIN( jκ) and a w ∈WM, u ≤ w, such
12In 14, 15 and 16 x is not free in φ.
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that, for some reflection ordinal ∆(vκ) for (vκ) over jθ, (i) |(φ→ ψ) ∧ (φ→
χ)|〈w,θ,∆(vκ)〉 = 1 and (ii) |φ→ (ψ∧ χ)|〈w,θ,∆(vκ)〉 , 1.
By (i) we get that |φ→ ψ|w,θ,∆(vκ) = 1 and |φ→ χ|〈w,θ,∆(vκ)〉 = 1, which,
by lemma 7.2.8, imply that for all ρ ∈ COFIN(vκ) , |φ|〈w,θ,ρ〉 ≤ |ψ|〈w,θ,ρ〉 and
|φ|〈w,θ,ρ〉 ≤ |χ|〈w,θ,ρ〉.
By (ii) and lemma 7.2.8, we conclude that there is a τ ∈COFIN(vκ) such
that |φ|〈w,θ,τ〉 > |ψ∧ χ|〈w,θ,τ〉. Contradiction. Principle 6 is similar.
Principle 8. Suppose that there is a modelM, a u ∈WM and a reflection
ordinal Ω( jκ) such that |(φ → ¬ψ) ⇒ (ψ → ¬φ)|〈u,Ω( jκ)〉 , 1. By lemma
7.2.9, we conclude that there is a θ ∈COFIN( jκ) and a w ∈ W, u ≤ w, such
that (i) |φ→ ¬ψ|〈w,θ,∆(vκ)〉 = 1 and (ii) |ψ→ ¬φ|〈w,θ,∆(vκ)〉 , 1.
By (i) we get that there is a β, β < ∆(vκ), such that for all γ, γ ∈ [β,∆(vκ)),|φ|〈w,θ,γ〉 ≤ |¬ψ|〈w,θ,γ〉. And by (ii), we obtain that for all β, β < ∆(vκ), there
is a γ, γ ∈ [β,∆(vκ)) such that |ψ|〈w,θ,γ〉 > |¬φ|〈w,θ,γ〉. This means that there
is a τ, τ < ∆(vκ) such that |φ|〈w,θ,τ〉 ≤ |¬ψ|〈w,θ,τ〉 and |ψ|〈w,θ,τ〉 > |¬φ|〈w,θ,τ〉,
which, given the definition of ¬, is impossible.
Principle 10. Suppose that there is a modelM, a u ∈WM and a reflec-
tion ordinal Ω( jκ) such that |(φ→ ψ)⇒ ((χ→ φ)→ (χ→ ψ))|〈u,Ω( jκ)〉 , 1.
Then, by lemma 7.2.9, there is a θ ∈COFIN( jκ) and a w ∈WM, u ≤ w, such
that (i) |φ→ ψ|〈w,θ,∆(vκ)〉 = 1 and (ii) |(χ→ φ)→ (χ→ ψ)|〈w,θ,∆(vκ)〉 , 1.
By (i) and lemma 7.2.8, we get that for all ρ ∈ COFIN(vκ) , |φ|〈w,θ,ρ〉 ≤
|ψ|〈w,θ,ρ〉.
By (ii) and lemma 7.2.8, we get that there is a τ ∈COFIN(vκ) such that|χ→ φ|〈w,θ,τ〉 > |χ→ ψ|〈w,θ,τ〉. Since τ is cofinal, there will be another cofinal
ordinal τ′ > τ, such that vτ = vτ′ and, hence, such that |χ → φ|〈w,θ,τ′〉 >
|χ → ψ|〈w,θ,τ′〉. Now, we have two disjunctive options both of which are
contradictory,
• First, |χ → φ|〈w,θ,τ′〉 = 1 and |χ → ψ|〈w,θ,τ′〉 , 1. The first conjunct
implies, by the definition of→, that there is a µ < τ′, such that, for all
γ ∈ [µ, τ′), |χ|〈w,θ,γ〉 ≤ |φ|〈w,θ,γ〉 and the second conjunct implies that
for all α < τ′, there is a β ∈ [α, τ′), |χ|〈w,θ,β〉 > |ψ|〈w,θ,β〉. Consider now
ζ = sup{µ, τ}. Since τ is cofinal, so is ζ and, moreover, since ζ < τ′,
there is a pi ∈ [ζ, τ′) such that |χ|〈w,θ,pi〉 ≤ |φ|〈w,θ,pi〉 and |χ|〈w,θ,pi〉 >
|ψ|〈w,θ,pi〉. Since pi is also cofinal, by (i) we get |φ|〈w,θ,pi〉 ≤ |ψ|〈w,θ,pi〉,
which is impossible.
• Second, |χ→ ψ|〈w,θ,τ′〉 = 0 and |χ→ φ|〈w,θ,τ′〉 , 0. In this case, there is
a µ < τ′, such that, for all γ, γ ∈ [µ, τ′), |χ|〈w,θ,γ〉 = 1 and |ψ|〈w,θ,γ〉 = 0,
and for all α < τ′, there is a β ∈ [α, τ′), such that either |χ|〈w,θ,β〉 , 1
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or |φ|〈w,θ,β〉 , 0. As in the previous case, this implies that there is a
cofinal pi such that |χ|〈w,θ,pi〉 = 1 and |ψ|〈w,θ,pi〉 = 0 and |φ|〈w,θ,pi〉 , 0.
Moreover, since pi is cofinal, by (i) we get |φ|〈w,θ,pi〉 ≤ |ψ|〈w,θ,pi〉, which
is impossible.
Principle 9 is similar.
Principle 11. Suppose that there is a model M, a u ∈ WM and a
reflection ordinal Ω( jκ) such that |(φ ∧ (φ → ψ)) ⇒ ψ)|〈u,Ω( jκ)〉 , 1. Then
there is a θ ∈COFIN( jκ) and a w ∈ W, u ≤ w, such that (i) |φ ∧ (φ →
ψ)|〈w,θ,∆(vκ)〉 = 1 and (ii) |ψ|〈w,θ,∆(vκ)〉 , 1.
By (i) we get that |φ|w,θ,∆(vκ) = 1 and |φ → ψ|〈w,θ,∆(vκ)〉 = 1, which, by
lemma 7.2.8 and corollary 7.2.7, imply that for all ρ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |φ|〈w,θ,ρ〉 =
1 and |φ|〈w,θ,ρ〉 ≤ |ψ|〈w,θ,ρ〉. But this means that for all ρ ∈ COFIN(vκ),|ψ|〈w,θ,ρ〉 = 1, contradicting (ii).
Principle 12. Suppose that there is a model M, a u ∈ WM and a
reflection ordinal Ω( jκ) such that |φ⇒ (ψ→ φ)|〈u,Ω( jκ)〉 , 1. Then, there is
a θ ∈COFIN( jκ) and a w ∈ WM, u ≤ w, such that (i) |φ|〈w,θ,∆(vκ)〉 = 1 and
(ii) |ψ→ φ|〈w,θ,∆(vκ)〉 , 1.
By (i) and corollary 7.2.6, we get that for all ρ ∈ COFIN(vκ), |φ|〈w,θ,ρ〉 = 1.
Moreover, (ii) together with lemma 7.2.8, imply that there is a τ ∈COFIN(vκ)
such that |ψ|〈w,θ,τ〉 > |φ|〈w,θ,τ〉. But, since by the previous considerations,
|φ|〈w,θ,τ〉 = 1, we reach a contradiction.
Principle 14. Suppose that there is a model M, a u ∈ WM and a
reflection ordinal Ω( jκ) such that |∀x(φ → ψ) ⇒ (φ → ∀xψ)|〈u,Ω( jκ)〉 , 1.
Then there is a θ ∈COFIN( jκ) and a w ∈ W, u ≤ w, such that (i) |∀x(φ →
ψ)|〈w,θ,∆(vκ)〉 = 1 and (ii) |(φ→ ∀xψ)|〈w,θ,∆(vκ)〉 , 1.
By (i), min{|(φ → ψ)(d/x)|〈w,θ,∆(vκ)〉 : d ∈ D} = 1. Consequently, for
each d ∈ D, |(φ → ψ)(d/x)|〈w,θ,∆(vκ)〉 = 1 and, since x is not free in φ,|φ→ ψ(d/x)|〈w,θ,∆(vκ)〉 = 1. Hence, for each d, there is a βd, βd < ∆(vκ) such
that, for all γ, γ ∈ [βd,∆(vκ)), |φ|〈w,θ,γ〉 ≤ |ψ(d/x)|〈w,θ,γ〉.
By (ii) and the definition of →, we get that for all β < ∆(vκ) there is
a γ ∈ [β,∆(vκ)), |φ|〈w,θ,γ〉 > |∀xψ|〈w,θ,γ〉 = min{|(ψ)(d/x)|〈w,θ,γ〉 : d ∈ D}.
Therefore, we can choose a d0 such that |φ|〈w,θ,γ〉 > |ψ(d0/x)|〈w,θ,γ〉. Con-
sider, next, βd0 . Since βd0 < ∆(vκ), then there is a γ0 ∈ [βd0 ,∆(vκ)), such
that |φ|〈w,θ,γ0〉 > |ψ(d0/x)|〈w,θ,γ0〉. Moreover, by (i) and the fact that γ0 ∈
[βd0 ,∆(vκ)), we obtain that |φ|〈w,θ,γ0〉 ≤ |ψ(d0/x)|〈w,θ,γ0〉, which is impossible.
Principles 15 and 16 are similar. 
The behavior of → and ⇒ alone are very similar. One difference, that
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stems directly from the way they are defined, is that → is contrapositive
while ⇒ is not. Moreover, → does not satisfy principles 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12,
14, 15 and 16 (although all of them, except 12, are obtained in rule forms).13
As can be seen, in the mixed version, most of the principles of CK (all
of them except 11) are satisfied in mixed form. If we take CK as capturing
the logical laws we might want to have in a paracomplete logic with a vague
predicate, we can then take⇒ as capturing the relation of entailment between
sentences of L+.
Although the construction has one form of the Modus Ponens reasoning,
principle 11, it lacks the following:
11’. φ⇒ ((φ→ ψ)→ ψ)
To see why, consider again sentence λ⇒. Since the value of λ⇒ keeps oscil-
lating from 1 to 0 along the successor ordinals of the ( jκ) series, the same
happens eventually to the sentence > ⇒ ((> → λ⇒) → λ⇒), which means
that it gets value 1⁄2 at all limit ordinals in the jκ sequence, hence, in partic-
ular, it has semantic value 1⁄2 at all reflection ordinals Ω( jκ).
7.3 Vagueness
I want to sketch, next, one way of adapting the previous semantics to vague-
ness due to Field (2003c) and to propose another one that seems slightly
more natural to me. As far as I can see, a kind of irresolvable tension arises
at this point within what I have been calling the paracomplete project. The
tension has to do with the role that the model is taken to be playing.
Field (2003c) presents a generalization of the semantics for→ intended to
be “the unified logic for vagueness and the [truth] paradoxes” (Field 2003c,
p. 294). Moreover, he claims, the proposed semantics should be something
more than a mere tool to give an extensionally adequate notion of logical
consequence; it should represent the semantics of vague terms “as faithfully
as possible” (Field 2003c, p. 289).
But, if we consider the constructions we used in this chapter to strengthen
the conditional of SK, they can hardly be considered as faithfully representing
the semantics of ‘true’; indeed, this seems clear if we compare them with
Kripke’s construction, which, as we saw in chapter 5, can be seen as capturing
some of the core intuitions behind the use of ‘true’. As a matter of fact,
the main purpose of the more sophisticated constructions considered in this
13The details about why these principles fail can be found in Field (2008, pp. 266–
270).
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chapter is to show how a truth predicate can be consistently added to any
base model with a suitable logic.14 What that means is that the intuitive
appeal of Kripke’s construction is abandoned.
Still, we can try to capture the semantics of vague predicates as faith-
fully as possible. This implies, at the very least, respecting the penumbral
intuitions we discussed in chapter 5. So if a and b are borderline cases of
the predicate ‘tall’ (T), then, if b is taller than a, we would like to assert
the sentence Ta ⇒ Tb. Moreover, as some authors have claimed (like, for
instance, Field 2003c or Shapiro 2006), given a borderline case of ‘tall’ and
of ‘short’ (S), we should be able to say that a is in the short-to-tall region.
But, given the semantics of ∨, we cannot express that with Sa∨ Ta. We can
use the conditional, though, and try to express that a is in the short-to-tall
region with ¬Sa ⇒ Ta. The same happens with the idea that ‘short’ and
‘tall’ are contraries, which, although it cannot be expressed with the use of
∨, it can be expressed with ∀x(Sx ⇒ ¬Tx). So, taking stock, we need the
following sentences to be true, for any a and b borderline case of ‘tall’ and
‘short’:
(i) Ta⇒ Tb, when b is taller than a.
(ii) ¬Sa⇒ Ta.
(iii) ∀x(Sx⇒ ¬Tx)
Let me sketch, next, the proposal in Field (2003c). The semantics uses
an infinite set W of worlds at which sentences are assigned one member of
{0, 1/2, 1} and a privileged world @. We must think of the elements of W
as “alternative methods for assigning semantic values to actual and possible
sentences, given the way the world actually is in precise respects” and @
as “the actual assignment” (Field 2003c, p. 290). Each w ∈ W is assigned
to a (possibly empty) directed family Fw of nonempty subsets of W, called
w-neighborhoods. A given Fw is directed if, and only if,
(∀X,Y ∈ Fw)(∃Z ∈ Fw),Z ⊆ X∩Y
Each w-neighborhood is meant to represent the worlds that meet a certain
standard of similarity to w. Field proceeds by adding some conditions to @:
14As Field stresses in many places, these constructions show something more, a kind
of conservativeness result; they show that a truth predicate can be added to a given
base model without changing the true-free part of the language that depended on
that base model (see, for instance, Field 2008, p. 66 or Field 2003a, p. 171).
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1. @ is normal, that is, (∀X ∈ F@), @ ∈ X
2. {@} < F@
That is, the actual assignment @ is similar to itself according to all standards
of similarity and it shares any standard of similarity with at least another
world. Field imposes other conditions to the worlds in W and their neigh-
borhoods, but since they are not important for the purposes of this section,
I will skip over them. As expected, a model will consist of a given domain
for each w ∈W and an assignment of an extension and an anti-extension (as
usual, two disjoint but not necessarily exhaustive subsets of the domain) to
each predicate, so that vague predicates can be captured in the model. The
valuation rules for the conditional-free fragment of the language are governed
by SK with no reference to other worlds. The conditional → is defined as
follows:
|φ→ ψ|u =

1 iff (∃X ∈ Fu)(∀w ∈ X), |φ|w ≤ |ψ|w
0 iff (∃X ∈ Fu)(∀w ∈ X), |φ|w = 1 and |ψ|w = 0
1⁄2 otherwise.
Validity is defined in terms of preservation of semantic value 1 at @ in any
model.
The above semantics is a generalization of the revision semantics for→ of
the previous section in the language L′+ without ⇒. To see why consider a
model in which W is the closed initial segment [0,∆(vκ)], for some reflection
ordinal ∆(vκ) (for example, the smallest one) for the sequence (vκ) governing→. Moreover, @ is, precisely, ∆(vκ) and, for each ordinal σ ∈ W, Fw has as
members the intervals of the form [τ, σ), for all τ < σ. An obvious problem
of the model just defined is that no element of W is normal, not even @. This
can be solved, though, thanks to corollary 7.2.6, for we can make @ (that is,
∆vκ) normal while leaving the rest non-normal.
We need to see, next, whether the model preserves the penumbral in-
tuitions. As I said, each w-neighborhood is meant to represent the worlds
that meet a certain standard of similarity to w. Now, suppose a and b are
borderline cases (are assigned 1⁄2) of T and S at @, if we need (i) to be true at
a given point w, one of the w-neighborhoods must be such that the value of
Ta is always less than or equal to the value of Tb, which makes perfect sense
if we understand that neighborhoods are determined by the meanings of the
predicates in the language, so that at least one of the conditions of being a w-
neighborhood is to be a collection of admissible and not necessarily complete
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ways of making the predicates of the language precise, where admissibility is
given by the meaning of the predicates and the already settled cases in w. A
similar explanation can be given for claims (ii) and (iii) above so that they
turn out to be true at each world in W. So the semantics can preserve the
penumbral connections.
As I said, Field sees a virtue in the fact that his neighborhood semantics is
a generalization of the construction for→. Notice, though, that it is not clear
at all that the same claim can be made with respect to the construction with
→ and ⇒; recall that the value of →-conditionals depends on the sequence
(vκ) we built over one of the reflection ordinals Ω( jκ) of the sequence ( jκ)
while the value of⇒-conditionals depends on the sequence ( jκ). The problem
is, then, that we do not know which of the series of ordinals should be assigned
to the worlds in W. I do not see any natural way to remedy that.
I want to propose now another semantics for a language with a truth
predicate and vague predicates that uses the models presented in section
7.2.1 and the construction used in the sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 for → and
⇒. I propose to follow Field and interpret W as the possible ways to assign
semantic values to the sentences in L+. Recall that the points in W were
ordered by inclusion of the extension and the anti-extension of the predicates
other than Tr, so that going up through the order can be interpreted as
making some of the predicates in the language more precise; that is to say,
roughly speaking, if u ≤ w, then they both agree on the clear cases of the
predicates other than Tr in u, although w may have made clear some of the
cases left indetermined in u. In this framework, the conditional ⇒, which is
intended to capture the penumbral connections, works as suggested in Kamp
(1981) or Shapiro (2006); a conditional is true when, no matter how you
make the predicates in the conditional more precise, the consequent cannot
be true without the antecedent being true. Moreover, no matter how you
make the predicates in the conditional more precise, you can still precisify
them in a way that the antecedent is true and the consequent is false.
Of course, this is not enough to capture claims like (i)-(iii) above, we need
to restrict the points in W, that is, the possible ways of assigning semantic
values to the sentences of the language. In particular, not all assignments
of extensions and anti-extensions to the predicates other than Tr will be
admissible, and only the admissible ones will be in W. The model, thus,
is supervaluational in spirit, in the sense that uses the notion of admissible
(although not necessarily complete) precisification.
Hence, when a and b are borderline cases of being ‘tall’ and b is taller than
a, there will not be points in W where a is assigned to T+ and b is not, so
that (i) is true. Moreover, when we say that ‘short’ and ‘tall’ are contraries
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what we mean is that S− = T+ and S+ = T−, that is, that the clear cases
of not being short are all clear cases of being tall and that the clear cases of
being short are clear cases of being not tall. If we keep these restrictions on
W, (ii) and (iii) become true at any point. So that the penumbral intuition
is preserved.
7.4 Solving the Paradoxes
We have seen that part of the paracomplete project consists in offering an
appropriate paracomplete logic for truth. Hartry Field has been trying to do
that in the last years with highly sophisticated constructions that, although
succeed in strengthening SK, do not, unfortunately, give any real insight in
the semantics of truth. Instead, the models are used to show that a truth
predicate can be consistently (and conservatively) added to a given base
model for a ‘true’-free language and obtain a sufficiently strong logic. Still,
we tried to see whether a model faithful to the semantics of vague terms
could be given for a language with vague predicates and ‘true’. We saw
two proposals to do that that can be considered as constituting the same
prevention both to the Liar and the Sorites.
On the other hand, we saw that Field defends that the linguistic practices
behind ‘true’ and vague predicates fail to determine a unique extension and
that that failure makes some of their ascriptions non-factual, which means
that LEM should not be applied to them. It is when we apply LEM that we
incur into a paradox.
All these considerations imply that Field is exploring a strong common
solution for the Liar and the Sorites.15
15I need to add that I am not being completely faithful to Field’s work, for he has
said in many places that he does not have a “firm conviction” that a non-classical
logic should be used for vagueness (see, for instance, Field 2010a, p. 458). But,
still, he acknowledges that such a possibility is worth exploring, which is what I
have been doing in this chapter.
CHAPTER
EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS
The main goal of this dissertation was to examine some of the major proposals
for a unified account of the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes. In order to do
that we needed to characterize, first, the notion of a common solution to a
given collection of paradoxes. In turn, this needed the clarification of the
notion of a solution to a single paradox, which, again, needed a definition of
what a paradox is.
So, after characterizing the Liar and the Sorites, we looked at the tradi-
tional definition of paradox, which was found to be too narrow. We needed,
hence, a more appropriate definition of what a paradox is. After discussing
and discarding some alternatives, a paradox was found to be an argument
that seemed valid —in the sense that rejecting its validity would imply giving
up some core intuitions about the notion of logical consequence— but such
that the commitment to the conclusion that stems from the acceptance of the
premises and the validity of the argument should not be there. Something
even stronger was stated to be the case: apparently, there is no commitment
at all.
With an appropriate definition of the notion of paradox at hand we looked
into what should be expected from a solution to a single paradox. We con-
cluded that any solution should necessarily contain what Chihara called the
diagnostic of the paradox, an explanation of the reason behind the decep-
tion in the paradox and, ideally, an explanation of why the culprit seemed so
compelling in the first place. Apart from the diagnostic, a solution to a para-
dox might have to offer the prevention of the paradox, which we took to be
the logico-semantic framework we need to adopt in order to block the para-
dox. Once we have seen all the examples of common solution present in this
dissertation, it is easier now to see what a prevention of a paradox is. Note
that, typically, when the need of a (non vacuous) prevention is implied by the
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diagnostic, both the diagnostic and the prevention are intertwined with each
other. For example, if we adopt a supervaluational approach to the Sorites,
the prevention, which is the supervaluational semantics, is used in the diag-
nostic when the supervaluationist needs to explain why some premises in the
Sorites are not true and why they are, despite that, so compelling.
Next, we were in a position to establish what should be expected from a
common solution to a given collection of paradoxes. We concluded that, given
a collection of paradoxes, a common solution to all of them should offer, at
least, a common reason why they are paradoxical. When only such a common
reason was given, we called such a solution a weak common solution. If,
besides a common explanation of the source of paradoxicality, also a common
prevention was given, then a strong common solution was offered. A first
application of this characterization of the notion of a common solution was
to see that McGee’s approach to vagueness and truth in his book Truth,
Vagueness and Paradox is not, as it stands, a common solution to the Liar
and the Sorites. It remains to be seen whether it can be turned into a
common solution, by endorsing the claim that ‘true’ is a vague predicate
and not only that it can be treated as a vague predicate.
It was important, next, to see whether we have good reasons to expect
a common solution to the Liar and the Sorites. We found that, apart from
methodological aspects like simplicity and uniformity, one of the main reasons
to pursue a common solution to some collection of paradoxes is their being
of the same kind, where two paradoxes are of the same kind when they have
a common reason about why they are deceptive. Although, at first sight,
the Liar and the Sorites seem completely different paradoxes, we saw there
were enough reasons to at least begin the search for a common solution.
We discussed Graham Priest’s criterion for being the same kind of paradox:
the inclosure schema. We concluded that Priest’s claim to have captured
the internal structure of the Sorites paradox with the inclosure schema was
unwarranted.
We examined, next, three proposals to cope with the Liar and the Sorites:
Jamie Tappenden’s, Paul Horwich’s and Hartry Field’s.
We saw that Tappenden defended the logic SK for languages with truth
and vague predicates. In the case of truth, he accepted Kripke’s fixed point
construction. The problem, as we stated, was that SK was too weak, as it did
not even validate elementary laws such as φ→ φ. The weakness of SK had
unwelcome consequences both for truth and vague predicates; in the former
case, it meant that we did not get the T-schema and, in the latter case, it
meant we were not able to capture the penumbral intuitions. We looked into
how Tappenden tried to handle the weakness of SK with supervaluationist
techniques and a new speech act, which he called articulation. Unfortunately,
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Tappenden’s approach was judged to be unsuccessful, specially in the case of
the Liar, where the strategy used with vague predicates turned out difficult to
apply to truth. Still, I think using pragmatic considerations to deal with the
inconveniences caused by embracing a non-classical logic is a clever insight
worth exploring further.
Next, we looked into Horwich’s stance in front of the Liar and the Sorites.
With respect to the latter, Horwich defends an epistemicist account that
accepts that vague predicates have sharp boundaries, although we cannot
know them. Most of the chapter was focused on whether the epistemicist
position Horwich defends for the Sorites can be extended to the Liar. We saw
that the diagnostic offered for the Liar was in need of a prevention that used
a fixed-point construction a` la Kripke. Such a construction was made precise
and was found unsatisfactory, for it did not contain some natural principles
we expect any truth theory to contain. This could be solved by building
into the fixed-point construction the maximal consistency of the extension
of ‘true’. Unfortunately, that strategy either begged the question or forced
giving up deflationist views about truth. Still, it remains to explore whether
a semantic version of Horwich’s theory that accepted truth value gaps —and
probably more supervaluationist in spirit— would be viable.
The last chapter was devoted to what I called the paracomplete project,
which has been carried out mainly by Hartry Field. We saw a construction
that used fixed-point and revision techniques in order to add two condition-
als and a transparent truth predicate to a language with vague predicates.
This construction, which was a variation on Field’s most recent one, was a
suggestion of the direction that I think the paracomplete project could follow
in order to accommodate truth and vagueness. Clearly, there still is much
work to be done; specially, obtaining a strong enough unified conditional.
Another point I have ignored in the last chapter, and that has been deeply
researched by Hartry Field, is higher order phenomena like revenge problems
in the case of the Liar and higher order vagueness in the case of the Sorites.
Field has proposed to deal with both with a operator of determinacy defined
in terms of the conditional. It remains, hence, to explore this possibility in
the model I proposed.
There are other projects to uniformly treat the Liar and the Sorites that
were not treated in this dissertation. To my mind, one of the most promis-
ing ones is the treatment of both paradoxes with some substructural logic,
specifically, with the restriction of the contraction rule. One such a logic is
defended in Zardini (2011) to deal with the truth paradoxes and a similar
strategy is proposed in Slaney (2010) in order to treat the Sorites. Other
authors have proposed to deal with vagueness and truth with substructural
logics that restrict transitivity. I think there is future work to be done in
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these directions.
∗ ∗ ∗
It is said that Philitas of Cos, a poet and philosopher of the early Hel-
lenistic period, died of insomnia trying to solve the Liar paradox. As far as
we know, nobody has ever died because of the Sorites. This might be due,
though, to the fact that, given that there is no sharp boundary between life
and death, no living being can die —if there can be living beings at all. Be
that as it may, the Liar and the Sorites are two of the toughest paradoxes in
philosophy of language, and many philosophers have struggled to solve them
for centuries.
I tend to think that the we should be skeptics towards the claim that
there is something like the solution to the Liar, or the solution to the Sorites.
A fortiori, I think we should be skeptics towards the existence of anything
like the common solution to both paradoxes. This would explain the failure
to achieve a minimal agreement among philosophers about how they should
be solved.
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